THE STATE ex rel. J. L. FRY et al., Directors of Consolidated School District, v. CHARLES A. LEE, State Superintendent of Public Schools
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
May 24, 1926
314 Mo. 486
Division One
Either party could terminate the lease by giving written notice of intention so to do six months prior to the 31st day of December in any year. This notice was given by the plaintiff, and the lease properly terminated. It would violate every principle of law and logic to hold that defendant, for the corporation, can evade the express covenant that we have set out, supra. Defendant is the lessee and cannot deny the title of his lessor, and the lessor having the undisputed legal title, and the right to the possession after the termination of the lease, is entitled to the possession of that which belongs to him.
The judgment is affirmed. All concur.
Division One, May 24, 1926.
1. MANDAMUS: Issues: Petition and Demurrеr. Where the record upon which a mandamus suit is submitted consists of the relator‘s petition and the respondent‘s demurrer thereto, all facts well pleaded in the petition are taken as true and as admitted to be true.
2. SCHOOLS: Consolidated District: Judicial Discretion. The power conferred upon the county superintendent of schools by the statute (Laws 1921, p. 654) to determine and locate the boundary lines of a proposed consolidated school district calls for the exercise of a judicial, or a quasi-judicial, discretion and function, rather than the exercise of a merely ministerial duty.
3. ——: ——: ——: Conflict: Comity. In the exercise of a judicial function or duty by two county superintendents of coordinate jurisdiction, the one which first acquires jurisdiction of the subject-matter retains jurisdiction until the matter in controversy is settled, and the other will not be permitted to interfere or thwart action.
5. ——: ——: Territory in Two Counties: Usurpation and Interference. A petition for the formation of a consolidated school district was presented to the County Superintendent of Camden County, in which a majority of the petitioners resided. He visited the community, investigated its needs, and marked out a district whose boundaries included, besides one in Camden County, three common school districts in Laclede County, and prepared notices and plats and presented them to the County Superintendent of Laclede County, who refused to sign them. Thereupon the Superintendent of Camden County appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Schools, who heard the appeal, and duly signed the plats and notices, and they were on the same day posted. Previously on the same day, a petition was presented to the County Superintendent of Laclede County for the formation of a consolidated school district, and he visited the community, investigated its needs and marked out a district within whose boundaries were included two of the three common school districts in Laclede County which had been included in the proposed boundaries of the consolidated district outlined by the Superintendent of Camden County, and on the same day he prepared plats and notices for an election to be held one day before the election called by the other notices was to be held, and posted them a few hours before the notices and plats signed by the Superintendent of Camden County or the State Super-
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: Appeal and Error, 4 C. J., Section 2681, p. 747, n. 32. Courts, 15 C. J., Section 583, p. 1134, n. 58, 59; p. 1136, n. 60. Schools and School Districts, 35 Cyc., p. 834, n. 92.
Mandamus.
PEREMPTORY WRIT AWARDED.
Wm. C. Irwin and Barney Reed for relators.
(1) Jurisdiction to visit the community of Stoutland and investigate the needs of the community and to determine the exact boundaries оf a proposed consolidated school district was acquired by the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, on receipt of a petition of more than twenty-five qualified voters of that community, a majority of whom resided in Camden County.
North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and J. Henry Caruthers, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.
The jurisdictional act in the formation of a consolidated school district is the posting of notices and plats. State ex rel. Moore v. Eden, 54 Mo. App. 35; School Dist. No. 1 v. School Dist. No. 4, 94 Mo. 618; State ex rel. v. Young, 84 Mo. 94; State ex inf. v. Smith, 271 Mo. 175.
SEDDON, C.—This is an original proceeding in mandamus instituted in this court by relators, the directors of Consolidated School District No. 2 of Camden County, to compel the respondent, the State Superintendent of Public Schools, to apportion and set over to Camden County, to the use and benefit of said Consolidated School
The record upon which the proceeding is submitted to this court consists of relators’ petition and respondent‘s demurrer thereto. Inasmuch as all facts well pleaded in the petition are to be taken as true and admitted by respondent‘s demurrer, we will include herein the salient allegations of those pleadings. The petition, omitting all formal and introductory аllegations, is as follows:
“3. Relators say that on the 23rd of May, 1925, the citizens in the common school district of Stoutland, Camden County, Missouri, desiring to form a consolidated school district, in accordance with the provisions of the laws of the State of Missouri, did file with the County Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, Missouri, a petition containing the names of more than twenty-five resident citizens of said community, praying for the establishment of a consolidated school district in said community of Stoutland, Camden County, Missouri, and praying that said Commissioner of Public Schools of Camden County, Missouri, visit said community and investigate the needs of the community and locate and mark out a proposed consolidated school district in said community; that a majority of said petitioners signing said petition were residents and citizens of Camden County, Missouri; that the said town of Stoutland, Camden County, Missouri, contains a population of about four hundred people and is situated on the linе between Camden County and Laclede County, a portion of said town being in Laclede County and a portion thereof being in Camden County; that said commissioner did on the 23rd day of May, 1925, receive and file said petition, and forthwith thereafter the County Superintendent of said Camden County did visit said community, investigate the needs of said community for a consolidated school district and did mark out and establish the boundaries thereof, having due regard for the welfare of adjoining districts; that because of the proximity of the town of Stoutland to the county line
“4. Relators further say that after the citizens of the community of Stoutland, Missouri, had petitioned for the establishment of a consolidated school district in that community, and after the County Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, Missouri, had determined that a majority of said petitioners resided in Camden County, and after he assumed jurisdiction over said consolidated school district and community, and after he had visited said community in person, marked out and located said consolidated school district, including the territory comprised of Districts Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of Laclede County, Missouri, and after the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, Missоuri, presented to the Superintendent of Public Schools of Laclede County, Missouri, the notices and plats required by law and requested his signature thereto, and after
“Your petitioners say that the pretended organization of a consolidated school district, herein referred to as the Ware Consolidated School District No. —— of Laclede County, Missouri, and including therein a portion of the territory, to-wit, School Districts Nos. 13 and 14 of Laclеde County, Missouri, and lying adjacent to and in close proximity to the town of Stoutland, Missouri, was not done in good faith, but for the sole purpose of hindering and defeating the establishment of a consolidated school district at Stoutland, Missouri, including the adjacent territory comprising said districts situated in Laclede County, Missouri; that said proceedings done and carried out by the County Superintendent of Laclede County, Missouri, was begun and continued after the County Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, Missouri, had acquired jurisdiction over said territory, and had marked out and platted said districts as a part of the district known as Consolidated School District No. 2, and all of said proceedings relating to the establishment of the pretended consolidated school district at Ware, Laclede County, Missouri, were null and void and of no effect, and the County Superintendent of Public Schools of Laclede County, Missouri, had and acquired no jurisdiction whatever оver the territory comprising Districts Nos. 13 and 14, which had already been marked out, platted and designated as proposed Consolidated School District No. 2 of Camden County, Missouri, but that the jurisdiction over said territory had been acquired and maintained by the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, Missouri, until such time as the voters of said district should vote for or against the organization of said district, within the boundaries so established and laid out by the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, Missouri.
“5. Relators say that heretofore and within the time required by law they have made out an enumeration of the children of school age within Consolidated
“6. Your relators further say that it is the duty of the State Superintendent of Public Schools of the State of Missouri to apportion said public funds of the State of Missouri to Camden County, Missouri, upon the basis of the lawful establishment of Consolidated School District No. 2, including the territory comprised within the boundaries of Districts Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of Laclede County, Missouri, and to refuse to apportion any part of said public funds of the State of Missouri to Laclede County, Missouri, on account of the pretended organization of the Ware Consolidated School District in said county; that said superintendent threatens to and is now about to apportion said funds to Ware Consolidated
Respondent‘s demurrer is as follows:
“Now comes the above-named respondent, Charles A. Lee, State Superintendent of Public Schools, and demurs to the petition herein and says that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this respondent in said cause, for the following reasons, to-wit:
“That it appears by said petition that relators acquired no jurisdiction in its pretended attempt to organize Consolidated School District No. 2 of Camden County, Missouri, since there was filed with the Superintendent of Public Schools of Laclede County, Missouri, a petition asking for the formation of a consolidated school district at Ware, Laclede County, Missouri, and that thereafter said superintendent marked out said proposed Consolidated School District No. —— of Laclede County, Missouri, including therein Common School Districts Nos. 13 and 14, situated in said Laclede County, which districts had been included in the pretended Consolidated School District No. 2 of Camden County, Missouri; that thereafter, to-wit, on the forenoon of the third day of June, 1925, said Superintendent of Public Schools of Laclede County caused to be duly posted notices and plats calling for a special meeting of the qualified voters of said proposed consolidated school district on the 18th day of June, 1925, not less than fifteen days subsequent to said notice; that pursuant to said notice a meeting of the
“Wherefore, for the foregoing reason, respondent prays the court for an order quashing the alternative writ heretofore issued in this cause.”
As will be observed from the foregoing pleadings, the proceeding involves a cоnflict of jurisdiction. The sole question of law herein presented is whether the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County first acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or whether jurisdiction was first acquired by the Superintendent of Public Schools of Laclede County. The solution of that question lies in our construction of the statute of this State which prescribes the procedure for the formation of a consolidated school district. That statute (Sec. 11259, R. S. 1919, as amended by the Legislature in 1921,
“When the resident citizens of any community desire to form a consolidated district, a petition signed by at least twenty-five qualified voters of said community shall be filed with the county superintendent of public schools. On receipt of said petition, it shall be the duty of the county superintendent to visit said community and investigate the needs of the community and determine
It seems to be conceded by respondent, and the allegations of the petition admitted by the demurrer so show, that all of the procedural steps prescribed by the foregoing statute were taken in the formation of Consolidated School District No. 2 of Camden County. Relators and respondent apparently, differ only upon the single question: What is the first jurisdictional act or step under the statute in the formation of a consolidated school district?
Relators contend that the first jurisdictional act under the statute is the filing with the county superintendent of public schools of a petition signed by at least twenty-five qualified voters of the community. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the first jurisdictional act under the statute is the posting, by the county superintendent, of the plats and notices required by the statute.
Diligent counsel for the respective parties have cited no decision of any appellate court of this State bearing upon the precise question which now confronts us, and our own research fails to discover any such ruling or decision. Apparently, the matter is one of first impression in this State. Respondent, however, relies upon State ex rel. Moore v. Eden, 54 Mo. App. 31; School District No. 1 v. School District No. 4, 94 Mo. 612; State ex inf. v. Smith, 271 Mo. 168, and State ex rel. v. Young, 84 Mo. 90, as being highly persuasive in the solution and determination of the precisе question now before us.
State ex rel. Moore v. Eden, supra, was a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto to determine the validity of certain proceedings for the division of a school district into two new districts, and to inquire into the right and
“It is competent to divide school districts by the observance of certain statutory conditions. . . . We have no doubt that the statutory notice thus prescribed is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that a division of school districts made at an annual meeting not within the scope of an antecedent notice given for the time, and at the plaсes, and in the manner fixed by law, is void.” (Citing authorities.)
School District No. 1 v. School District No. 4, supra, was a proceeding in mandamus which involved the validity of proceedings relating to the re-organization of certain school districts in Cass County. Likewise, the primary question ruled by this court in that case was the sufficiency of the posted notice and it was ruled that the posting of the notice is a jurisdictional act under the statute, and, therefore, the statutory requirements as to the posting of the notice and the information to be contained therein must be fully complied with.
State ex inf. v. Smith, supra, was a proceeding by quo warranto to oust defendants from the offices of directors of a school district in Platte County. The proceeding involved the validity of the organization of a consolidated school district, and again the primary question before this court was the sufficiency of the posted notice of the meeting and election. It was again ruled by this court, in effect, that the posting of notice of the meeting and election is a jurisdictional act under the statute and that “therefore, unless the notice is given, as required by statute, which will cause the voters to investigate the matter, the election would be void.”
While, in each of the foregoing cases to which we have adverted, it was ruled that the giving and posting
State ex rel. v. Young, supra, chiefly relied upon by respondent in support of his contention, was a mandamus proceeding, instituted by the directors of a school district in Cole County against the county commissioner of schools, to vacate an order or decision made by him relative to the formation of a new school district and a change of boundary lines of an existing district. The statute then in force, relating to the formation of new schоol districts, made it the duty of the directors of the districts affected, upon the filing of a petition signed by ten qualified voters residing in either of the districts affected, requesting a change in boundary lines or the formation of a new district, to post a notice thereof in each district interested twenty days prior to the time of the annual meeting. If a part of the districts affected voted in favor of, and a part against, such change, the matter was referable to the county school commissioner for decision, which decision was final and conclusive when transmitted to, and entered upon the records of, the various districts. It was alleged that the county school commissioner had no jurisdiction to make a decision in the matter for the reason that the petition, upon which the directors of the respective districts acted in posting notices of the proposed change to the voters, was not signed by ten qualified voters, as the statutе required; that, therefore, the elections held in pursuance of such notices were void. In ruling the question then before this court, the learned writer of that opinion, speaking for the court, said: “I am inclined to think that the relators are wrong in respect to the supposed jurisdictional fact. The section makes it the duty of the directors to act, when ten qualified voters request them to do so, but it does not assume to prohibit them from acting of their own motion when the interests of the district, in their judgment, call for action. Their action terminates by posting a proposition
As we read the last-mentioned case, while this court therein ruled that the statute involved did not assume to prohibit the school directors from acting of their own motion, without the filing, by ten qualified voters of the district, of a petition requesting such action, nevertheless, the court in substance recognized the fact that the statute made it the duty of the school directors to act in the premises upon the filing of a proper petition calling for such action upon their part; in other words, this court inferentially, at least, considered and viewed the filing of a proper petition as a jurisdictional act calling for the judgment and decision of the directors upon the sufficiency of the petition so filed. Consequently, in our opinion, the cases cited by respondent in no sense negative the contention of relators herein.
The statute (
Analyzing the statute as amended, we find that it makes it the duty of a County Superintendent of Public Schools, upon the filing with him of a petition signed by at least twenty-five qualified voters of any community, to visit said community, investigate the needs thereof, and determine and locate the exact boundaries of the proposed consolidated district, having due regard to the welfare of adjoining districts. If the proposed consolidated district includes territory lying in two or more counties, the petition must be filed with the county superintendent of that county in which the majority of the petitioners reside, whereupon that county superintendent must call a special meeting of all the qualified voters of the proposed consolidated district for consideration of the question of consolidation, making the call by posting within the proposed district ten notices in public places,
In our opinion, the power conferred by the foregoing statute upon the County Superintendent of Public Schools to determine and locate the boundary lines of a proposed district calls for the exercise of a judiciаl, or a quasi-judicial, discretion and function, rather than the exercise of a merely ministerial duty. [State ex rel. v. Wright, 270 Mo. 376.] This is evident from the language of the statute, which provides that, “in determining these boundaries, he shall so locate the boundary lines as will in his judgment form the best possible consolidated district, having due regard also to the welfare of adjoining districts.” In matters calling for the exercise of a judicial function or duty by two or more tribunals of co-ordinate jurisdiction, it is a well-settled principle of law that the tribunal which first acquires jurisdiction of the subject-matter retains jurisdiction until the determination of the matter in controversy, and no tribunal of co-ordinate power will be permitted to interfere with, or thwart, its action. [15 C. J. 1134.] This rule or principle rests upon comity and is a reasonable and necessary one, because any other rule would lead to confusion and perpetual collision, and would be productive of calamitous results and ofttimes a gross miscarriage of justice. The rule has been recognized and applied by this court,
Under the admitted facts, as disclosed by the pleadings herein, the requisite petition for the formation of a consolidated school district was filed with the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County on May 23, 1925, a majority of the petitioners residing in Camden County. Under the statute, it thereupon became the duty of the Superintendent of Public Schools of that county to visit the community, investigate its needs, and to determine and so locate the boundary lines of the proposed district as would in his judgment form the best possible consolidated district, having due regard to the welfare of adjoining districts. Immediately upon the filing of the petition, jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the proceeding was acquired by, and vested in, the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County, and such jurisdiction remained in him until the question of the formation of the proposed consolidated district was determined by the qualified voters of the proposed district at the special meeting called by him for the consideration of that question. The jurisdiction of the subject-matter, first acquired by the Superintendent of Public Schools of Camden County on May 23, 1925, could not be thwarted by the subsequent refusal, on June 2, 1925, of the Superintendent of Public Schools of Laclede County to sign and approve the notices and plats calling for the special meeting of qualified voters to consider the question under consideration, in view of the admitted fact that the matter was immediately appealed to the State Superintendent (respondent herein) by the County Superintendent of Camden County and the decision of the State Superintendent was in favor of the appellant, as evidenced by the State Superintendent‘s action in signing and approving the plats and notices for and on behalf of the County Superintendent of Laclede County. It matters not that the Cоunty Superintendent of Laclede County in the forenoon of June 3, 1925 (a few hours before, but on the same day, the notices
It follows that the peremptory writ of mandamus against respondent prayed for by relators in their petition filed in this court should be awarded, and it is so ordered. Lindsay, C., concurs.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by SEDDON, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur, except Otto, J., not sitting.
