103 Wis. 591 | Wis. | 1899
The following opinion was filed September 5, 1899:
The constitution of this state (sec. 3, art.. YII) provides: “The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be co-extensive with the state; but in no case removed to the supreme court shall a trial by jury be allowed. The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over cill inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same.”
Yery early in the history of this court and of the state the question of the construction and meaning of this section was presented to this court, and learnedly discussed by Justice Smith in the opinion in the case of Attorney General' v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317. That case was an information filed in this court by the attorney general in the nature of a quo-warranto against Blossom and others, and motion was made to dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the granting of the writs in the third clause of the constitutional provision above quoted gave no additional jurisdiction, but that those writs were- simply named as instru-mentalities by which the appellate power and the superin
The section came before this court again in the great case of Attorney General v. Railroad Oos. 35 Wis. 425, and the exhaustive discussion by Chief Justice Ryaw in that case of the original jurisdiction of this court under the third clause of the section will ever stand as a monument to- the legal learning and ability of that distinguished justice. In that
These propositions, so clearly laid down, have never been questioned, nor does it seem that they are open to question even in the absence of decisions upon the subject, and look
It is very apparent that when the makers of the constitution used the words “ superintending control over all inferior courts ” they definitely referred to that well-known superintending jurisdiction of the court of king’s bench. In England it was a branch of the king’s power lodged with the king’s court; in this country it is a branch of the sovereign power of the people, committed by them as a sacred charge to this court, not to be esercised upon light occasion, or when other and ordinary remedies are sufficient, but to be wisely used for the benefit of any citizen when an inferior court either refuses to act within its jurisdiction, or acts beyond its jurisdiction to the serious prejudice of the citizen. 2 Spelling, Extr. Relief, § 1388. The two great writs by which this superintending jurisdiction was principally exercised by the court of king’s bench were the writs of mandamus and prohibition ; the one directing action by the inferior court, and the other forbidding action. Of these writs and their peculiar office, when directed to an inferior court, Blackstone says (3 Oomm. ch. Y, p. 110): “Eor it is the peculiar business of the court of king’s bench to superintend all other inferior tribunals, and therein to enforce the due exercise of those judicial or ministerial powers, with which the crown or leg
It was suggested at the bar upon the argument of this case that this “superintending control” was a branch of the jurisdiction of this court which had practically remained dormant. during the existence of this court, but a very slight examination of the decisions will demonstrate that this is an erroneous idea. The examples may not be numerous, and it is to the credit of the trial courts that such is the fact, but they are entirely sufficient. It is true, the subject has never been fully discussed, and the jurisdiction has been exercised without being classified or named, but the fact remains that it has certainly been exercised by the use of the writs of mandamus and prohibition. Thus, in State ex rel.
There seems to have been no extended discussion of the general character and limits of the superintending jurisdiction of supreme courts in the decisions of other states, although the constitutions of Missouri, Michigan, and Colorado contain provisions very similar to our provision granting to the supreme court superintending control over all inferior courts; while in Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, North and South Carolina the superintending control is given in somewhat different phraseology. However, we have found no decisions nor intimations contradictory to the views hereinbefore expressed, while we find the writs of mimdamus and prohibition to have been frequently used in the exercise of this-jurisdiction. Thus, in State ex rel. Bayha v. Philips, 97 Mo. 331; S. C. State ex rel. Bayha v. Kansas City Court of Appeals, 3 L. R. A. 476, note, mandamus. was used under the-superintending power to compel an inferior court to reinstate a
Having thus demonstrated that the constitutional grant •of superintending control over all inferior courts vested in this court an independent and separate jurisdiction enabling •■and requiring it, upon sufficient occasion, by the usé of all proper and necessary writs to promptly restrain the excesses •and quickén the neglects of inferior courts in the absence of other adequate remedy, the question arises whether the case presented is one within that jurisdiction, and, if so, whether maiidamus is an appropriate and efficient remedy. The pres■ent controversy arises out of the administration of the affairs of an insolvent bank with nominal assets of o vei^ a million and -a half, and debts nearly as large. By the deed of assignment these assets became substantially the property of the creditors to the amount of their just claims held in trust for their benefit by the assignee, to be converted into money, under the direction of the court, and applied in liquidation of their claims. The creditors were the real owners, the assignee their trustee, and, in a sense, their mere agent. While they were not entitled to officiously intermeddle with the business, nor dictate to the assignee, they were entitled at all reasonable times and in all reasonable ways to be informed of the progress of affairs and the state of the business. These propositions seem self-evident from the very nature of the relations of the parties to the subject matter, and from the
¥e are compelled to say in the present case that the fundamental rights of the creditors seem to have been entirely ignored or denied by the assignee and by the court, and the position seems to have been taken that the business was the business of the assignee, in which the creditors were only remotely interested, if interested at all. Eive years and more passed without the rendering of any account by the assignee, and these years were full of many business transactions, some of them of considerable magnitude, including the compromise of large claims, the purchase and closing out of á large stock of furniture upon execution, and the payment of senior execution creditors from the proceeds. When at last, in compliance with an order of court, the as-signee rendered a supposed account of his long stewardship, he failed utterly to comply with the requirement of the statute. By sec. 1701, Stats. 1898, his account and report must consist of (1) an itemized and verified statement of the property by him received, (2) the manner of his dealing therewith, (3) the amount of money realized by him, (4) the condition of the property and funds in his possession, (5) the names and residences of the assignor’s creditors, (6) the dividends paid them, (7) his receipts and disbursements, and (8) his claim for compensation. The account filed by the assignee consisted principally of a transcript of his cash account, which is nowhere footed, and which utterly fails to state the property received by him, the manner of his dealing therewith,
It seems to us manifest that there has been in this case a denial of several absolute and valuable rights which the law guarantees to the creditors of an insolvent estate. They had a statutory right to have an account rendered by the assignee in substantial conformity with the terms of the statute; they had a statutory right to file objections to such an account after examination thereof (sec. 1701); they had a statutory right to inspect the books of the assignee, and examine the officers of the assignor and other witnesses prior to the final adjustment and approval of such account (sec. 16935; Berles v. Comstock, 104 Mich. 129); they had a common-law right, arising from their relations to the property and to the assignee, to examine the books of the assignee, and the assignee himself, prior to the final approval of such account. All these rights were valuable and absolute rights, to be exercised within reasonable limits, but which, in the present case, were wholly denied to the creditors; and, unless there be adequate remedy for such denial in the regular exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this court, it is difficult to see why the superintending jurisdiction should not be exercised to quicken the neglect or refusal of the circuit court, and compel it to act within its jurisdiction. Merrill, Mandamus, § 204.
If it appears that an appeal will not be an adequate remedy, mcmdamusTCi&j still issue, in the discretion of the court. Merrill, Mandamus, § 201; Merced M. Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 130; Hawes, Jur. § 141. In the present case it is quite apparent that appeals from the orders complained of would in all reasonable probability constitute no remedy to the creditors. The assignment was made June 1, 1893. A large portion of the assets of the bank consisted of commercial paper executed prior to that date, and necessarily maturing in the summer and early fall of 1893. Such of the paper as is still uncollected and has not been sued on will become barred by the statute of limitations within a few months. Eurthermore, the long lapse of time which has occurred since the assignment renders it almost certain that rights of action are daily lapsing. Appeals from such orders could not, in the ordinary course of appellate proceedings, be heard and decided before late in the coming autumn or in the winter of 1899. It is very plain that, if the creditors are to exercise their rights with any prospect of benefit, they must exercise them promptly. The delay attending upon the presentation and consideration of an appeal would probably be fatal to any effective relief.
Again, it is said that the orders in question are discretionary in their nature, and reliance is placed upon the well-known principle that mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of discretion. It has already been shown that the
This brings us to the consideration of another objection made by the respondent, namely, that the various orders made by the court below confirming the assignee’s account and refusing the applications for examination cannot be reversed upon momdanms, and hence that, being unreversed and unappealed from, they constitute complete bars to any relief by mandamus. This difficulty, also, is more apparent than real. While it is true that the legitimate function of the writ of mandamus is to compel action by the inferior court, rather than to reverse action already taken, it would be gross absurdity to hold that, after refusal to perform a plain duty within its jurisdiction, the inferior court could nullify the constitutional grant of superintending power by the entry of any order or orders. This court holds its power under no such uncertain terms. Those powers are not dependent upon the speed with which the trial court enters orders, If it becomes necessary, in the due discharge of its' power of superintending control, that orders of the inferior court be vacated, this court will not hesitate to compel the vacation of such order by the inferior court by so framing its writs of ma/ndamus. With the superintending control and the attendant writs this court took all the power necessary to make that control and those writs effective, and its arm is not nerveless because no writ may be found in the form books so framed as to meet the emergency. The .writ will be framed to meet the exigencies of the case, and the court will discharge the duties of the trust reposed with it by the people, though it becomes necessary to modify and enlarge the terms of the ancient writ.
And so we have reached the conclusions briefly stated in
The remaining question referred to arose upon the hearing of the return to the alternative writ. It was claimed by the respondent that issues of fact were raised by the return. to the writ and the answer to said return, and that the said issues must be tried either in the circuit court for Milwaukee county or some other circuit court, as provided by sec. 3152, Stats. 1898. That section provides that issues of' fact in a mandamus proceeding in this court shall be tried in the circuit court of the county within which the material facts are alleged to have arisen, or in some other circuit court to which this court shall, in its discretion, for cause shown, order such trial. This contention was summarily overruled for two entirely sufficient causes: First. There are no true issues of fact raised by the return and answers thereto. The issues raised, upon analysis, will all be found to be issues of law. There are no material contentions raised as to the rulings of the court, nor as to the papers upon which those! rulings were based, but the sole material contentions are as to the legal effect of those rulings, and the legal rights of the parties as shown by the record. Second. Even admitting that issues of fact”were raised by the answer, we cannot admit that the legislature has any power to deprive this ’court of any part of its constitutional jurisdiction to fully hear and try such questions. Ey the constitution this court was given power to exercise fully and completely the jurisdiction of superintending control over all inferior courts. This power carries with it not only the writs necessary to-its exercise, but the right to hear and determine the cause when the writ has brought it before the court. No part of' that power can be taken away by a statute. This court will always pay all due deference to the legislative will, and.
No costs will be awarded against the respondent, but the fees of the clerk of this court will be taxed and paid out of the assigned estate.
By the Court.— Judgment is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue in accordance with this opinion, and that the record transmitted to this court in response to the writ of certiorari be at once remitted to the trial court.