{¶ 1} In 1998, аppellee-claimant, Christopher D. Posey, held two jobs concurrently: one was with appellant, Ford Motor Company, and the other was his own lawn care business — Nature’s Creations Landscaping. From 1994 through 1996, claimant was the sole employee of his business. In 1997, he hired another employee.
{¶ 2} In 1998, claimant injured his neck while working for Ford. Claimant’s injury forced him to stop his physical participation in his lawn care business, so he hired three more employees. The injury аlso temporarily forced claimant from his job at Ford, and he received temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”) from June 24,1998, through September 8,1998.
{¶ 3} Fоrd later sought to recoup that TTC, alleging that claimant’s participation in his business constituted work and therefore prohibited TTC. Evidence presented rеgarding claimant’s participation in his business, however, established only that claimant signed his four workers’ paychecks and fueled and drove riding lawnmowers onto a truck. Surveillance of claimant by Ford supported claimant’s contention that he did no landscaping work in connection with this business while receiving TTC.
{¶ 4} Apрellee Industrial Commission of Ohio refused Ford’s request to declare TTC to have been overpaid:
{¶ 5} “The claimant admits to owning a landscaping business during the рeriod in question but denied working at the business while collecting temporary total compensation. The claimant contends that he hired help to do thе work after he became disabled and that he withdrew from nearly all business activities.
{¶ 6} “The claimant states that he engaged in the following business activities: aрproximately once a week he put gas in lawn mowers, signed checks and issued cash for the employees!’] wages; on one occassion [sic] he pushed his self propelled mower into the garage and he continued to store the landscaping equipment at his residence just as he had done before he became disabled.
{¶ 7} “Prior to becoming temporarily and totally disabled, the claimant performed nearly all of the general labоr for his business. He cut grass and
{¶ 8} “With the excеption of signing payroll checks, all of the clerical duties were performed by his girlfriend.
{¶ 9} “* * *
{¶ 10} “According to the [hearing] transcript[,] the employer had the сlaimant surveilled for approximately thirty-six hours by Choice Point Services. At the District Hearing Officer’s hearing, Ms. Miller, the claims Director of Choice Point Servicеs, admitted that neither she nor anyone from her company observed the claimant performing any landscaping work for his business. (See page 90 of the trаnscript.)
{¶11} “* * *
{¶ 12} “Both [State ex rel.] Nye [v. Indus. Comm. (1986),
{¶ 13} “Surely the claimant would have been seen working if he had carried on his business pursuits, after his injury as he had donе before, because the nature of his business required that the work be done outside.
{¶ 14} “Instead the evidence supports the claimant’s contention that he withdrew from nearly all business activities except those necessary to preserve the business until he was physically able to return to it. The Staff Hearing Officеr does not believe the Nye and Durant [decisions] prevent the meager activities engaged in by the claimant nor do they require a self-employed individual to relinquish еven that control which is absolutely necessary to preserve the existence of his pre-existing enterprise.
{¶ 15} “Based upon the foregoing facts, thе Staff Hearing Officer finds that the claimant was not working [and] therefore fraud is not an issue in this case. The Staff Hearing Officer also finds that the claimant did not engagе in activities inconsistent with the receipt of temporary total compensation during the period in question. While the concept of activities inconsistent with the receipt of disability benefits has no precise definite [sic] case of temporary total disability in general, it encompasses situatiоns where one engages in physical activities which exceeds [sic] the medical restrictions.
{¶ 17} The court of appeals declined Ford’s request to order the commission to vacate its order. Ford now appeals here as a matter of right.
{¶ 18} TTC is prohibited to one who has returned to work. R.C. 4123.56(A); State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982),
{¶ 19} Work is not defined for workers’ compensation purрoses. We have held, however, that any remunerative activity outside the former position of employment precludes TTC. State ex rel. Nye v. Indus. Comm. (1986),
{¶ 20} Ford asserts that Blabac is controlling and bars TTC here. In Blabac, the claimant, John Blabac, was getting TTC when it was discovered that he was earning wages as a scuba diving instructor. While his partner did the physical instruction, Blabac sat at poolside with a clipboard, grading the students. Id. аt 113,
{¶ 21} The commission terminated TTC and declared an overpayment. Blabac argued that only “substantially gainful” work could bar TTC, and that his work was neither substantial nor gainful. We disagreed with Blabac, holding that low paying and spоradic employment was still work. Because Blabac was paid for his efforts, we determined that they constituted work, and barred TTC. We suggested that wage-loss сompensation would have been more appropriate for Blabac’s circumstances.
{¶ 22} Ford argues that under Blabac, any work precludes TTC and asserts that Blabac forbids TTC here. Ford, however, overlooks the distinctiоn between this case and Blabac. Blabac never disputed that his actions constituted work. He argued instead that he had not worked enough to prevent TTC. Claimant
{¶ 23} Claimant’s assertion has merit. Unlike the claimants in Blabac, Nye, State ex rel. Johnson v. Rawac Plating Co. (1991),
{¶ 24} Obviously, apрlication of this rationale must be applied on a case-by-case basis and only when a claimant’s activities are minimal. A claimant should not be able to erect a facade of third-party labor to hide the fact that he or she is working. In this case, however, claimant’s activities were truly minimal and only indirectly related to generating income. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.