THE STATE EX REL. FLEMING ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. ROCKY RIVER BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 96-2024
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 16, 1997
79 Ohio St.3d 200 | 1997-Ohio-4
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 66757. Submitted May 6, 1997.
{¶ 1} Prior to August 1989, appellee Rocky River Board of Education employed individuals designated as “tutors” to provide instructional services to certain students. The board compensated these individuals, including appellants, Dorothy P. Fleming, Paula Binder, and Carol Weissinger, at an hourly rate below the
{¶ 2} The board hired some “tutors” to provide federal and state-mandated special education services to handicapped students. These “tutors” require valid teaching certificates, and the board receives partial reimbursement from the State Department of Education for wages and retirement contributions paid to these certificated tutors.
{¶ 3} The board also hired some “tutors” to provide instructional services that were not required by state or federal law to students who did not meet the criteria for special education services. These tutors are not required by law to have
{¶ 4} In August 1989, the board restructured its tutoring program in response to our decision in State ex rel. Brown v. Milton-Union Exempted Village Bd. of Edn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 21, 531 N.E.2d 1297. The board divided the individuals who had been previously referred to as “tutors” into special education tutors and learning assistants.1
{¶ 5} Learning assistants, tutors, and classroom teachers all have significantly distinct permit or certification requirements and duties. Unlike tutors and classroom teachers, learning assistants are not required to have teaching certificates in their specific areas of assignment. Instead, learning assistants are only required to have educational aide permits. In fact, the board has previously allowed nonteachers, including honors students, to serve as learning assistants or perform instructional tasks that are normally done by learning assistants.
{¶ 6} The board patterned the position of learning assistant after “educational aides,” as defined in former
{¶ 7} Since August 1989, the board has employed appellants as both special education tutors and learning assistants at compensation levels less than it pays classroom teachers. Beginning in August 1989, the board adopted the
{¶ 8} In January 1994, appellants filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the board, the school district superintendent, and the school district treasurer, to compensate them at the salary and retirement benefit levels adopted for classroom teachers for the work appellants performed as tutors and learning assistants for the board. Following a hearing before a court-appointed commissioner to resolve disputed factual issues, the court of appeals granted a limited writ of mandamus to compel appellees to pay appellants the difference between what they were paid as tutors
{¶ 9} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Hohmann, Boukis & Brunn Co., L.P.A., and Thomas L. Brunn, Sr.; Law Offices of Daniel W. Dreyfuss and Michael T. Williams, for appellants.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., and Susan C. Hastings, for appellees.
Per Curiam.
Tutors; R.C. 3317.14 Filing Requirement
{¶ 10} Appellants assert in their first proposition of law that the board must compensate them under the negotiated classroom teachers’ salary schedules for their work as special education tutors from August 1989 until the 1993-1994 school year. Appellants claim that the board did not substantially comply with
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} In State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 32-33, 641 N.E.2d 188, 194-195, we held that tutors were entitled to be paid in accordance with teachers’ salary schedules contained in collective bargaining agreements because they were filed and adopted in substantial compliance with
{¶ 13} Appellants contend that under Chavis, they are entitled to be compensated in accordance with the negotiated salary schedules for classroom teachers because the tutors’ salary schedules adopted by the board were not filed with either the Superintendent of Public Instruction or the Department of Education. Appellants’ contention lacks merit for the following reasons.
{¶ 14} First, we recently rejected a similar contention in State ex rel. Kabert v. Shaker Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 37, 676 N.E.2d 101. We noted that the adopted salary schedules contained provisions for increments based upon training and years of service and substantially complied with both
{¶ 15} Second, the evident purpose of the filing requirement has been satisfied in this case.
{¶ 16} Third, as noted by the court of appeals, “since August, 1989, the Board indisputably adopted the additional salary schedule, entered into contracts and paid its teacher-tutors accordingly, contributed to the State Teachers Retirement System, and received its partial reimbursement from the state based upon the adopted, but not physically filed, teachers’ salary schedule.” Therefore, the state had notice of the amounts being paid appellants and reimbursed the board accordingly.
{¶ 17} Finally, as the court of appeals further held, nothing in
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly held that appellants were not entitled to be compensated pursuant to the negotiated classroom teachers’ salary schedules rather than the duly adopted tutors’ salary schedules for the period between August 1989 and the 1993-1994 school year. Appellants’ first proposition of law is meritless.
Learning Assistants
{¶ 19} Appellants assert in their second proposition of law that they are entitled to be paid as classroom teachers for their services as learning assistants.
{¶ 20} Second, the court of appeals determined that appellants’ activities established that they were educational aides rather than teachers when they worked
{¶ 21} Appellants do not dispute that persons with teaching certificates are not entitled to teachers’ compensation for work performed as educational aides under
{¶ 22} Instead, appellants contend that the court of appeals erred in determining that they acted as educational aides rather than teachers when they were employed as learning assistants. Appellants cite portions of testimony from appellees’ witnesses to support appellants’ claim that they acted as teachers in their learning assistant positions.
{¶ 23} In essence, appellants request that we render a de novo determination of this evidentiary issue. Generally, an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of a trial court where competent, credible evidence exists to support the judgment. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR 408, 411, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276. The court of appeals appointed a commissioner who held an evidentiary hearing concerning appellants’ employment as learning assistants. Since the court of appeals, through its commissioner, was able to “view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony,” this court should defer to the court of appeals’ determination if it is supported by competent, credible evidence. 10 Ohio St.3d at 80, 10 OBR at 410, 461 N.E.2d at 1276. There is no reason to exercise our discretionary, plenary authority in extraordinary writ actions to consider the evidence de novo in this appeal. Cf. State ex rel. Natalina Food Co. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 562 N.E.2d 1383, 1384.
{¶ 24} Here, as the court of appeals determined, its conclusion that learning assistants employed by the board were educational aides rather than teachers is supported by “overwhelming evidence.” The evidence established that the board patterned the learning-assistant position after the
{¶ 25} Therefore, appellants are not entitled to be paid as classroom teachers for work they performed as learning assistants. Appellants’ second proposition of law is overruled.
{¶ 26} The court of appeals thus properly held that appellants are not entitled to additional compensation as special education tutors or learning assistants after August 1989. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals granting appellants only a limited writ of mandamus is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.