79 Neb. 822 | Neb. | 1907
This is a quo warranto proceeding brought by the attorney general upon the relation of Joseph Einstein, an inhabitant of the village of Arapahoe, against Homer H. Northup, Frank A. Brewster, George M. Schwerdtfeger and Fred F. Tomblin, claiming to act as councilmen of the city of Arapahoe, questioning the respondents’ right to exercise the duties of the office of councilman; the relator’s contention being that no legal incorporation of the city of Arapahoe as a city of the second class has ever taken place, that the office of councilman of said city has no legal existence, and that the officers of the village of Arapahoe are entitled to administer the government of the municipality.
The village of Arapahoe has been under village government for more than 30 years. During this period there has been a slow but steady growth in the population. In the year 1906 the board of trustees of the village caused a census to be taken by the village clerk, Dick Emmett, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of inhabitants, with a view of incorporating as a city of the second class if it should prove that there were the requisite number of people within the corporate limits to alkov of such an incorporation. The result of the enumeration taken and reported to the village board showed a population of 1,010 inhabitants. The census was taken in the months of May and June, 1906, and was reported to the board of trustees soon afterwards. No action was taken upon the report until the 11th day of January, 1907, when a resolution was passed declaring that the population of the city was more than 1,000 and that Arapahoe had become a. city of the second class. At the same time an ordinance was passed dividing the city into two wards, and requiring the election of two councilmen from each ward, a mayor, and other city officers at the regular municipal election in 1907. The respondents, Northup and Brewster, were candidates for the office of councilmen- from the second ward
The persons whose eligibility to be considered as inhabitants is in question fall into several classes. For instance, in one class are persons under legal age Avhose parents reside in the village, but avIio are temporarily absent attending school or engaged in some employment. Persons of this class are entitled to be considered as inhabitants of
Taking the enumeration of May, 1907, as shown by exhibit “D,” as a basis, examining page by page, and determining according to established principles, as nearly as we can from the competent evidence, the question of whether the persons named were inhabitants of the village of Arapahoe on January 11, 1907, it appears that there
In Osborn v. Village of Oakland, 19 Neb. 310, it is said by Norval, J., writing the opinion of this court, after quoting the statutory provision, section 1, art. I, ch. 11, Comp. St. 1895: “By the foregoing proAdsion each village in this state containing the population required by statute is a city of the second class without any action on the part of the municipality, and it is the duty of the board of trustees to divide the territory embraced therein into not less than two Avards, and call an election at the proper time for the election of city officers.” State v. Holden, 19 Neb. 219; State v. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709. If the village became a city of the second class Avithout any action on the part of the municipality as soon as it contained 1,000 inhabitants, then Arapahoe became a city at some time between the 11th day of January, 1907, and the 'day of election. It Avas a city of the second class upon election day. Whether or not it Avas such a city at the time the village board called the election is not of great materiality. The village board merely proAdded administrative detail for the change of form by their act in providing for the election of city officers, and, even if they erred in their judgment as to the conditions, the machinery they provided Avas no less effective in evidencing the popular will. As soon as the population reached more than 1,000 the village board became officers of the city. State v. Babcock, supra. They left the Avard boundaries as they had previously fixed them. The inhabitants had the right to select a mayor and councilmen and other officers at the time that the election was held. They elected the respondents Northup and Bmvster as councilmen at that
As to the other respondents, it is clear that the two councilmen from the second 'ward, acting alone had no power to appoint them to the office of councilman. There is no special provision in the statute governing cities of the second class providing for the filling of vacancies in the office of councilman; but by the general election law, section 103, ch. 26, Comp. St. 1905, it is provided that vacancies in city offices shall be filled by the mayor and council. This does not mean by the mayor alone, nor by the council alone. Hence, the action of the two councilmen without the concurrence of the mayor in the .appointment was invalid. No action by the mayor and council is alleged to have been taken, fin’d the relator is entitled to a Avrit against the respondents, Schwerdtfeger- and Tomblin, ousting them from the office of councilman of the first ward of the city of Arapahoe.
It is seldom that a case is presented to this court in Avhich the evidence is so unsatisfactory as in this case. Nearly three months elapsed after the resolution and ordinance were passed before the date of the city election, and up until that time no proceedings Avere begun by any person seeking to question the authority of the board. It Avas not until after the election that there seemed to be any question in the mind of the relator as to the legality of the proceedings, and the delay resulted in making the evidence difficult to procure and unsatisfactory in its nature. We have cpnsidered throughout that, under the rule in this state, the burden of proof has been upon the respondents. State v. Davis, 64 Neb. 499. The relator, however, has furnished the largest quantum, and this, with the respondents’ testimony showing the persons omitted, has supplied the necessary proof, though in such a confused and ill-ordered manner as to impose an unnecessary burden on the court.
For ■ the reasons stated, we find for the respondents Northup and Brewster, and against the respondents
Judgment accordingly.