21 Nev. 235 | Nev. | 1892
By the Court,
The relator, as clerk of Humboldt county, was, prior to 1892, entitled to a salary of two thousand four hundred dollars per annum, to be allowed by the board of commissioners of that county. This was, however, by the act of March 9, 1891 (Stát. 1891, p. 30), reduced to one thousand two hundred dollars per annum, to be paid by a warrant drawn by the auditor upon the salary fund. He claims that this act is unconstitutional, and this is the question iuvolved in this action.
1. The first ground upon which this claim is made is that both the act audits title embrace more than one subject, to-wit:
Section .17, art. 4 of the constitution directs that “each law-enacted bv the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.” As frequently stated by the courts, the object of this provision was twofold: Fird, to prevent the uniting in one act of several independent and disconnected matters, good, bad and indifferent, many of which could not be carried upon their own merits, but by uniting them together in the same bill, thereby obtaining the support of all interested in each measure, enough strength could be mustered to push it through; ¡secondly, to prevent fraud and surprise upon both the members of the legislature and the people, as under the old system it was often found that some of the most vicious acts had been smuggled through the legislature under innocent titles that gave no hint of their real nature, and of which all except those directly interested were ignorant. (State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135.)
The evil can be well understood from what is said in Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 425, where Sharswood, J., speaking for the court, used this language: “Tlie people did not mean by. the amendment of 1864 to require that the title should be a full index to all the contents of the law, but by declaring that each bill shall be confined to one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title, to prohibit the vicious practice of rolling together what were termed ‘ Omnibus Bills,’ including sometimes more than a hundred sections on entirely different subjects, with the title of the enactment of the first section, ‘ and for other purposes.’”
This, then, being the mischief against which this clause of the constitution is directed, it should be so construed as to correct the evil, but at tlie same time not to needlessly thwart
All presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and it will be held valid until the mind of the court is clearly convinced to the contrary. [Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322; Railroad Co. v. Morris, 65 Ala. 193. In cases of doubt, every possible presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act in question. The courts will only interfere in cases of clear and unquestioned violation of the fundamental law. [State v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 120; People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 635.) The objections should be grave, and the conflict between the constitution and statute palpable, before the judiciary should disregard a legislative enactment upon the sole ground that it embraces more than one object. [Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 155, Suth. Stat. Const. See. 82.) It is only the subject of the act which must be stated in the title; matters properly connected with that subject need not be mentioned. [Humboldt Co. v. Churchill Co., 6 Nev. 30.) If they are mentioned it simply makes the title unnecessary prolix, but does not constitute the connected matter a separate subject nor otherwise invalidate the law. [Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361; Hronek v. People, 134 Ill. 139.)
From an examination of the act in question and comparing it
2. It is also claimed that the act is in conflict with section 25 of article 4 of the constitution, because it -destroys the uniform system of county government therein required to be established, but we deem it unnecessary to consider this point. The question involved in this case is the validity of that part of the act of 1891 which fixes the salary of the clerk of Humboldt county. The part which it is claimed is unconstitutional, upon this ground, is that which consolidates the offices of superintendent
We find the principles that should govern this question stated in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations as follows: “Where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other. The constitutional and unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand, though the last fall.” (Page 177. State v. Estabrook, 3 Nev. 173; Turner v. Fish, 19 Nev. 295. )
It does not follow because the legislature does not have the power to legislate concerning a particular matter, which otherwise wóuld be properly connected with the subject matter of an act, that the act embraces two subjects, or that the whole act is void. The same rules apply that apply in any other case where a part of an act is invalid.
Our conclusion is that the act in question embraces but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and admitting, without at all deciding, that the connected matter is in conflict with another part of the constitution, this does not affect the validity of the part fixing the relator’s salary.
Mandamus denied.