State Ex Rel. Douglas v. SporhaseState Ex Rel. Douglas v. Sporhase
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- White
The Supreme Court of the United States in
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
_ U.S. _, 102 S.
Ct.
3456, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1982), reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the matter to this court, holding that since the reciprocity requirement of
In
State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase,
208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981), this court held that underground water was not an article of commerce in this state, was the subject of public ownership, and thus regulations governing the use of such water, as well as prohibiting its export to nonreciprocating states, did not violate the commerce clause of
While declaring that this court erred in holding that underground water was not an article of commerce, the U.S. Supreme Court did not declare illegal the statutory scheme for conservation and preservation of ground water. Rather, on a variety of theories, the Court approved the general scheme, e.g., “unexercised federal regulatory power” and “measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource in time of severe shortage.” Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. at 3463-64.
We are then called on to decide purely as a matter of state law whether the emphasized portion of
This court has variously expressed the test to be applied in determining whether an unconstitutional clause in a statute may be severed from the remainder. (1) Whether, when absent the invalid portions, a workable plan remains.
Nelsen v. Tilley,
137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939). (2) Whether the valid portions of an act can be
All the parties urge the court that the provision is severable in applying the tests described. We agree.
An examination of Chapter 46, article 6, reveals a comprehensive and complete approach to the conservation and beneficial use of ground water. The striking of the provision prohibiting transfer of water to nonreciprocating states does not weaken or otherwise impair the operation of the act. The valid portions present a complete, workable plan independent of the invalid portions.
The parties concede that no legislative history exists which proves or tends to prove that the invalid portions were an inducement to the passage of the act. Indeed, they point to a severability clause in 1969 Neb. Laws, Ch. 9, § 72, p. 145, containing amendments to
The briefs of the parties cite at great length the comments in floor debate and committee reports of members of the Legislature. The purpose of
We hold that severance of the portion of
Judgment of severance.