*1 THE STATE Acting OF MONTANA, By Through its DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff and Re- spondent, v. MIDLAND CO., MATERIALS Defendant and Respondent, Wood, Defendant Appellant. No. 82-375.
Submitted
Briefs
Feb.
1983.
May 12,
Decided
This interpleader case stems from an action brought the Montana Highway Department to determine whether respondent, Co., Midland appellant, Materials Tim Wood, was the Walters, “successor-in-interest” to Edith I. the former of property Pit,” owner known as the “State 60-4-204, under section MCA. The District Court of the District, Thirteenth Judicial County, Yellowstone denied defendant for summary Wood’s motion judgment granted summary motion submitted Mid- land Materials Co. From judgment, Tim Wood appeals. parties stipulated the facts to be as follows:
“1. On December Edith I. Walters conveyed *3 deed ... to the State Highway of Commission Montana a (hereinafter tract of land County, Yellowstone Montana Pit’). ‘State
“2. In 1974 I. conveyed by warranty Edith Walters . deed . . to M. G. Long property adjacent to and north and south- of Pit’, west excepting ‘State Pit’. In M. ‘State 1975 G. Long conveyed the property ‘Midland’ to defendant Midland . . warranty Materials Co. deed . February 4,
“3. On 1981 the Montana of Highways sent a letter to . . Edith Walters .
“4. On February 6, 1981 the Montana of Highways a sent letter to . . . Midland Materials Co. prior 25,
“5. Sometime to June 1981 the Depart- of Highways published ment a Notice of Sale the ‘State Pit’ property . . . 25,
“6. On June the Montana of High- ways, acting pursuant authority granted by to the § §60-4- 60-4-204, MCA, 202 and public conducted Bill- a auction at ings, Montana of the property. ‘State Pit’ at bidding by Mr. Joel of defendant opened Long
said auction was Timothy $18,000.00. Defendant Midland Materials Co. for $18,100.00. for After an unsuccessful call E. Wood then bid higher bids the auctioneer concluded the sale at $18,100.00 high alleged then to those Long bid. Mr. Joel Co.) (Midland they Materials were successors present like to Edith I. Walters and would to exercise Long Mr. informed right high to meet the bid. was their to representative to send his claim a prescribed form. by registered the State mail 27, Timothy E. ob- “7. On June 1981 defendant Wood from I. .. . of the ‘State Pit’ Edith quitclaim tained deed he had first met and contacted after Walters whom attorney, after he had talked with his public auction and Essman, Co.’s claim be about Midland Materials Jeff in interest. successor Co. and defendant
“8. Both defendant Midland Materials in interest of successor Timothy E. Wood claim to be the MCA, §60-4-204, purpose I. for Edith Walters high price to the State prepared pay are both bid . . Highway Commission . Montana, suit, of this prior filing
“9. The State of to the July Wood letter dated rejected the claim 2, 1981.” en- after was
Subsequent stipulation to the for check to the State tered, Midland Materials submitted on was mailed to them price a deed purchase the full deed, prior August 25, although signed 1982. The August 24, Tim August On not until that date. was mailed but it was not stay of execution Wood had obtained issuing of the prior to the appellants the State served subsequently recorded. deed was deed. The *4 Court erred is the District presented issue whether “successor-in- to be the Midland Materials Co. determining 60-4-204, MCA? term section interest” as that is used summary judgment, appeal is an from As this case v. Milbank in Darrah as set out must follow the rules we
69 (1983), Mutual Insurance 323, Company 202 Mont. 658 374, St.Rep. 40 There stated: P.2d 117. we “In involving summary pretrial cases records judgment any genu- must be looked at determine whether there are v. 56(c) Flemmer fact, M.R.Civ.P., ine issues of material Ming (1980), Mont., 1038, 1916, St.Rep. 621 P.2d 37 be- summary only 56(c), cause is judgment proper under Rule M.R.Civ.P., where the record discloses such exist no issues party and the is as moving judgment entitled to a matter of law. Reaves v. Reinbold (1980), Mont., 898, 896, P.2d 615 37 (and therein). 1500, St.Rep. cases purpose cited As the is to proceeding any determine whether there are mate- involved, rial issues of fact it should be remembered that presented by formal issues pleadings are not con- trolling. Byrd v. Bennett (1981), Mont., 695, 631 P.2d 38 St.Rep. 1083. moving party
“The in summary action has the of showing burden complete absence of material issues Byrd v. Bennett (1981), Mont., 696; fact. 631 P.2d at Cereck v. Albertson’s Inc. (1981), Mont., 509, 511, 637 P.2d (and 1986, 38 St.Rep. therein); Rumph v. Dale cases cited Edwards, Inc. (1979), 359, 163, Mont. 600 P.2d St.Rep. 1022.” 658 P.2d at case,
In this
the absence of such issues has been
shown, despite
prior
there
being
“successor-in-interest,”
term
60-4-204,
contained in section
MCA, by this Court or
legislature,
any
as
indication
legislative
to the
intent from the statute as a whole. Guid
ance in construing
provided
this
interpreta
term
tion
Department,
of the Montana Highway
the agency
Power
with
statute. charged
administering the
Company
v. Cremer
(1979),
182 Mont.
Section legislative policy and intent Code, section of placed deal great of trust authority in the of highway perti- hands officials. The part nent of that section states:
“Consistent with the determination and declara- foregoing *5 70
tions, legislature the intends:
“(1) of of in the hands those place high degree to trust is, limits available duty officials whose it within the of funds, maintain, plan, operate, protect to and the develop, as for present facilities of this for as well fu- highway state use; ture
U
“(4) to provide authority enable the sufficiently broad government all of to function ade- officials at levels highway respective re- quately efficiently all areas of their sponsibilities, of the constitution subject to the limitations legislative imposed.” Section and the mandate hereinafter 60-1-102, MCA. past in the authority Highway Department
Under the this “successor-in-interest” to mean interpreted has the terms can be traced whose chain of title the landowner adjacent The District Court original owner of the entire tract. citing After section found in its of law No. 7. so conclusion 60-1-102, MCA, policy intent section of legislative v. State ex rel. Mon- case of Castles Code, Highways (1980), Mont., tana 609 P.2d of 234, by 1223, entered into all St.Rep. stipulation and the 37 parties, it stated: interpreta- agency “All of these factors indicated of 60-4-204, MCA, Montana tion of Materials the conclusion that Midland Highways supports ” Co. is the ‘successor-in-interest.’ that, with law, when faced Under the case it clear construction, the court must show problems statutory of given the stat interpretations respect deference and with administra agencies charged ute the officers and Protection v. Environmental Power Co. tion. Montana 344, (9th Cir.1979), 334, Agency 608 F.2d of Light (1978), Puget Power and 179 v. Sound Revenue Cheyenne Tribe v. 1282, Northern P.2d Mont. 587 1793, 48 (1976), 649, 96 S.Ct. 425 U.S. Hallowbreast L.Ed.2d
71 interpreta persuasiveness anof administrative “The thoroughness upon depends tion statute evident of a reasoning validity consideration, its tency its its consis pronouncements earlier and later of the same with agency, [citation omitted]” Tribe Indians v. Blackfeet (D.Mont.1981), (see F.Supp. 446, State Montana Company also, Power v. Environmental Protec Agency, supra). bar, tion In the case at there is no substan tial evidence to show that the of “successor- in-interest” made has not consistently years. applied *6 been the over
It should also be District noted that the Court found interpretation by appellant the advanced the would adopted. lead to an absurd result if In conclusion of law No. 10 it stated: only reasonably
“In this case ‘successor-in-interest’ can re- present adjacent property fer to the owner the of from original which Highways acquired of tract the land portion strip. Any interpre-
its other parties tation would be as it unreasonable would lead to adjacent being without an in the land allowed the advantage being high public able to match the bid at by obtaining quitclaim original auction deeds from owners longer any ownership who had interest.” previously construing This Court has held that when stat- utes, the be should reasonable to avoid such (and supra Cremer, absurd results. Montana Power Co. v. therein). cases cited foregoing
For reasons, we believe District Court granting summary judgment. was in correct Affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HASWELL and JUSTICES HAR- RISON and WEBER concur. dissenting:
MR. SHEEHY, JUSTICE opinion. foregoing I from dissent (1) I would hold the term “successor-in-interest” does not title; (2) appeal in here is not moot include a successor delivery quitclaim High- of a deed virtue of (3) Co.; way Timothy E. to Midland Materials Wood, he quitclaim of the deed which received virtue Walters, merely from the Edith a trans- original grantor, interest”; in feree, title, a successor in and not a “successor (4) quitclaim deed to Midland Materials should be void, aside, null and the held set if it in- proper statutory procedures ordered to follow in question. tends to sell the land misinterprets in majority errs this case because it here term in interest” both on the facts “successor applicable law. is. It
First let us determine a “successor-in-interest” what in are not certainly is not a successor title. The two terms synonymous. ‘successor-in-interest,’ party must con-
“In a order to be with- original rights same as the owner tinue retain the change ownership. out change There must be a form It does not include only and not substance. transfer . . one to another . party from terms ‘successor-in-in- apply “The City endeavors terest,’ meaning, as the same having and ‘successor-in-title’ City New .” . . support but cites no law to this claim *7 (S.Ct. Development Corporation Turnpike York v. Kings 1962), Co. 36 Misc.2d 233 N.Y.S.2d may property A an owner of real be successor-in-interest law, by operation of one who is for the owner substituted in heir, a trustee personal representative, such as a an foreclosure, any change other purchaser a at or bankruptcy, in- in It cannot is in form and not substance. only which from the owner by assignment or clude a transferee deed title, is a successor-in- assignee because such transferee and not a successor-in-interest. case, be no “suc-
Moreover, there can facts of this owner, Wal- Edith cessor-in-interest,” original because in existence proceedings ters, is time of these at the very recognized in that she exis- much so. The State was by upon request serving right tence her a for a waiver of her says: original applies as the owner. The statute which originally acquired “The owner the interest is from whom option or his shall have the successor-in-interest purchase by offering an therefore amount money equal highest to the bid received for the interest at the sale . . .”
It can be discerned from terms of an the statute that owner, successor-in-interest, and the owner’s cannot coexist exists, at the If same time. the owner the successor does only not. The if successor-in-interest exists he is substi- place original tuted stead of owner. Long In this case the from Edith deed Walters to Malcolm specifically excepted property known the State Pit. as Long acquired right, Malcolm no title or interest by State Pit virtue of his deed from Edith Walters and Long’s transferee, neither did Malcolm Midland Materials Co. majority interpretation relies on the of the term “suc- Highway Department.
cessor-in- interest” Where interpretation, manifestly wrong, law, a matter of we should not follow such when the effect is muddle what otherwise should be clear law. logic applies argument Timothy
The same to the Wood. quit- He claims to a be successor-in-interest virtue of pur- claim deed from Edith obtained Walters after the ported property place. sale of the had not taken He did thereby successor-in-interest, become a rather he became transferee, successor-in-title. As a he is not a successor-in- right highest interest. He claim can to meet the bid anymore under 60-4-204,MCA, section as a mere transferee than can Midland Materials Co. a mere as transferee.
Midland Materials Co. also this case that the contends appeal quitclaim isWood moot because a deed has been delivered judg- case, however,
Midland. Under the of this facts *8 24, 1982, Court, is the District August ment not moot. On acting parte, may M.R.App.Civ.P., ex as it under Rule stay respect to judgment. judg- issued a order with its Midland, upon payment of the ment was to the effect that money Department would obtain a proper Highway the not Pit. the deed was delivered deed to the State However the date until after on which Highway In order. that cir- supersedeas the District Court entered its is cumstance, stayed is and the issue not judgment A appeal. for the deed takes effect purposes moot Wood’s Deeds delivery. Here the only upon legal 23 Am.Jur.2d §78. 25, 1982, Department, August delivery by Highway supersedeas of the order of was too late to avoid the effect the District Court. should be clear: Midland
The situation before us therefore Wal- to Edith Materials Co. not successor-in-interest to Edith Timothy is not a ters. Wood successor-in-interest longer an owner because she Walters. Edith Walters is in Pit any the State quitclaimed has she had De- object Highway should of the Wood. It be not need to obtain partment land which it does selling money highest sum bidder would greatest High- of the agree pay public at a auction. The actions that benefi- side-stepped in this case have way order that the deed is- purpose. cial We should therefore in this case to Midland sued aside, void, set be null and Materials Co. declared If wishes reversed. then have re- which would to sell the lands the future statutory procedures, and be it, verted to it must follow conducting public auction. guided by opinion our