117 Fla. 556 | Fla. | 1933
Lead Opinion
The term at which the final judgment of the court was rendered having expired on June 12, 1933, the court only retained jurisdiction to entertain and act upon a petition for rehearing which had to be filed within fifteen days from the date of the final judgment which was rendered on June 2, 1933. If this petition for rehearing which was filed on June 16, 1933, had been granted, this action of the court would have resulted, in effect, in a reinstatement of the cause on the docket during the June Term, being the present term of the court, for such disposition of the cause as the court might deem fit; but the petition for rehearing was denied, and the question arises whether, upon such denial, the cause was terminated and the court's jurisdiction of the cause ended, so that it could not take any further action in the cause which had for its object any modification of or change in the judgment which it had rendered during the preceding January Term.
And if the court did lose jurisdiction when it denied the petition, the further question arises, can the court now reacquire jurisdiction of the cause, which is an original proceeding in quo warranto instituted in this Court, by now setting aside or vacating its order made during the present June Term, denying the petition for rehearing.
In the absence of statute, the general rule is that the power of an appellate court over its orders and judgments, like that of courts generally, continues to the end of the term at which the judgment is rendered, and then absolutely terminates. This general rule is modified, in this *558 State, as to cases in the circuit court, by the statute permitting the court to entertain and act upon a motion for new trial presented within the time required by the statute, and as to cases in the Supreme Court, by the rule permitting the filing of petitions for rehearing within fifteen days.
In Washington v. The State,
In the case of Chapman v. St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church,
In the case of State, ex rel. Davis, Attorney General v. City of Clearwater,
But it may be fairly contended that there is a difference in its effect upon the jurisdiction of this Court between a case where mandate has been withheld, in appellate proceedings, and a case — of either appellate or original jurisdiction — where a petition for rehearing has been filed within fifteen days from the time the judgment of this Court was rendered. In the above cited case of State, ex rel. Davis v. Clearwater, in the opinion written for the Court by Circuit Judge ADAMS, it was said: "After a study of this situation, I have concluded that until the mandate is transmitted, even though it may be delayed, the lower court is without jurisdiction of the cause and can in no wise act therein, and that under such circumstances the cause remains within the jurisdiction of the appellate court. There can be no twilight zone in jurisdiction nor vacuum in its application. It is effective in full force or not at all."
The power and jurisdiction of this Court to consider causes wherein petitions for rehearing have been filed within the time prescribed by the rules may in some respects be likened to the jurisdiction of the circuit court in cases where motions for new trial have been presented within the time prescribed by the statute and held by the court for disposition thereof during vacation, as permitted by Section 4159 C. G. L. We have held that where a motion for a new trial was seasonably made and continued by a special order entered upon the minutes to a day beyond the term when the *561
verdict was rendered, it can be heard and disposed of by the judge in vacation and upon such disposition a final judgment can be entered by the clerk under the order of the judge; that on the hearing of such a motion, the judge is holding a term of court as to that case, and the entries of the clerk made in obedience to the orders of the court are the entries of the judge himself. McGee v. Ancrum,
It would seem therefore that the case at bar was not finally disposed of until the petition for rehearing, which was filed within fifteen days, was acted upon by this Court. The petition was filed after the term at which our judgment was rendered, but before the expiration of fifteen days, and therefore the filing of the petition under the rule gave this Court jurisdiction to either grant or deny the petition, although such petition and the order made thereon was filed and made during the succeeding term, which is the present term of this Court. This Court denied the petition for rehearing, and several months have elapsed since such order of denial was made, but the term at which such order was made still continues. The question presented is whether *562
the jurisdiction of this Court absolutely and finally terminated when it made the order denying the petition for rehearing. It was an order made during this pending term, and it would seem that the rule that all orders and judgments of a court made during the term can be modified or vacated before the expiration of the term, would apply. If this rule does apply, we can vacate the order denying the petition for rehearing, thus reinstating the cause, and either reconsider the said original petition for rehearing or entertain and act upon the second petition for rehearing, which has been filed within the past few days, or both. On the other hand, it might be argued that, as the preceding term had ended, at which our judgment in this case was rendered, the effect of the filing of a petition for rehearing under the rule within fifteen days, which petition was filed in the succeeding or present term of the Court, was that the only jurisdiction which was left in this Court was to either grant or deny the petition and that if the petition was denied, that terminated the cause and the jurisdiction of this Court to take any further action therein. This view is supported, to some extent at least, by analogy, by the case of Lanier v. Shayne,
Addendum
The foregoing opinion prepared by Mr. Justice BROWN prior to his absence on account of illness is agreed to by a majority of this Court as a correct statement of the law applicable to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and grant herein the extraordinary petition of relator and corelators for reinstatement of this cause on the docket for the purpose of a further rehearing herein.
But a majority of the Court are of the opinion that conceding the jurisdiction of this Court to be well founded to grant the prayer of the extraordinary petition, that the circumstances of this case and the status of the legislative Acts pertaining to the boundaries of the City of Avon Park, as prescribed by the existing statutes, do not warrant the Court in vacating or otherwise interfering with the opinion and judgment of this Court heretofore filed on June 2, 1933, to which action of this Court the present extraordinary petition is directed.
That extraordinary petition for reinstatement of this cause and for further rehearing is denied, without prejudice to the rights of relator and the corelators to proceed in accordance with the judgment of this Court entered June 2, 1933, dismissing this proceeding without prejudice to the rights of the parties to institute appropriate proceedings in the Circuit Court for the purpose of having finally adjudicated the questions involved in this controversy, both as to law and fact, including those attempted to be set up and presented as grounds for further rehearing on the instant petition which has been denied without prejudice as aforesaid.
Extraordinary petition for rehearing denied without prejudice. *565
WHITFIELD, TERRELL and BUFORD, J. J., and HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge, concur.
DAVIS, C. J., disqualified.