State ex. rel. Curtis v. City of TopekaState ex. rel. Curtis v. City of Topeka
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Valentine
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Valentine, J.:This is an action brought originally- in this court in the name of the state of Kansas, to oust the city of Topeka from the alleged exercise of various powers. Before submitting the case to the court, the pai’ties entered into the following stipulation:
“ It is hereby agreed that all questions submitted by the petition in this case may be dismissed without prejudice, except the first and second allegations of said petition, being the alleged illegal exercise of power in requiring dogs to be registered and to destroy dogs found running at large in said city, and the collection of a road or poll tax from certain of the citizens of said city.”
The petition, to the extent stipulated, was dismissed in accordance with the agreement of the parties. The defendant answered, denying that it has .exorcised any powers not conferred upon it by law, and setting forth its ordinances with respect to dogs, and to road or poll taxes; and the case was submitted to the court upon the petition and the answer.
The plaintiff’s first claim is, that the statute and the ordinance regulating the running at large of dogs are unconstitutional and void; and its counsel founds this claim principally upon the proposition that dogs are property, and he cites *82many authorities to sustain this proposition; but the proposition has seldom if ever been questioned, and so far as this case is concerned it will be admitted. But it does not follow that, because dogs are property, no statute or ordinance can be passed regulating, restricting or prohibiting the running at large of dogs, or for their destruction in case they are permitted to run at large in violation of law. Bulls and stallions are also property, and property of a much higher grade than dogs, and yet their running at large may be regulated or prohibited. Even venomous reptiles, skunks, and hyenas, may be made property; and yet when they are made property it does not follow that their running at large in populous cities cannot be regulated or prohibited. The plaintiff also cites many authorities to the effect that horses, hogs, cattle and other like valuable property cannot be destroyed or confiscated without a judicial investigation and determination upon proper and legal notice to the owner; but it does not follow from these authorities that the running at large of dogs may not be regulated, restricted or prohibited, or that dogs may not be killed if found running at largo in violation of law. Nor does it follow from these authorities that the killing of dogs found running at large in violation of law is not “due process of law” under both the state and the federal constitutions. As we have already stated, property in dogs is not of that high character that property in many other things is. (City of Independence v. Trouvalle, 15 Kas. 73; Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121, 127; Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 140; Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 489; Leach v. Elwood, 3 Bradw. 457; 4 Bl. Com. 236.) Mr. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, speaks of property in dogs as a “base property;” and dogs were not the subject of larceny at common law; and they are seldom assessed for taxation, and seldom have a market value.
It is also claimed that the registration fee required to be paid , upon the registration of each dog is a tax, and that it is not levied at a “uniform and equal rate,” as required by § 1, article XI, of the constitution. We suppose it will be ad*83mitted that said registration fee is a tax; but clearly it is not that kind of tax contemplated in the aforesaid provision of the constitution. It is a tax levied for the purpose of regulation and restriction, and is not a tax levied merely for the purpose of raising revenue, as that provision contemplates. That it is not unconstitutional because it is a tax, we think follows from the following decisions : City of Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kas. 151, and the numerous cases there cited; Tulloss v. City of Sedan, 31 id. 165, and cases there cited; City of Cherokee v. Fox, 34 id. 16; Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 489; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62; Tenney v. Lenz, 16 Wis. 589; Van Horn v. The People, 46 Mich. 183; Hendrie v. Kalthoff, 48 id. 306; Commonwealth v. Markham, 7 Bush, 486; Mowery v. Salisbury, 82 N. C. 175; Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio St. 340; Cole v. Hall, 103 Ill. 30.
It is also claimed that all dogs are not taxed alike, and therefore that the tax is invalid. The tax is “ a registration fee of $2 for each male dog and $5 for each female dog,” where the dogs are more than six weeks old, and no fee where the dogs are less than six weeks old. Now as before stated, this tax is imposed for regulation and restriction, and not merely for revenue; and therefore under the authorities above cited we think it is valid.
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There are a few cases to be found in the reports which hold that constitutional provisions similar to those contained in § 10 of the bill of rights of the Kansas constitution apply to-such offenses against the laws of the state as existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and not to subsequently-created offenses. Whether these cases are correct expositions of the law or not, it is not necessary for us now to determine. But for the purposes of the case we shall assume that the provisions of said § 10 apply to all prosecutions for offenses against’ the laws of the state, without reference to whether such offenses or similar ones were in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution, or were subsequently created. Also, for the purposes of this case, we shall assume *89that if the state should permit cities to pass ordinances attempting to regulate matters not coming within the legitimate scope or purpose of municipal regulation, but coming more properly within the scope and object of state regulation, a person accused of violating such ordinances would have the right to demand a jury trial; for in such a case the prosecutions would to all intents and purposes be state prosecutions, and not merely city prosecutions.; and the state could not by indirection do what it could not do directly. In other words, offenses against the public in general must be prosecuted for the public in general, and with a jury, if the defendant demand it; while offenses against the ordinances of a city regulating only city affairs, may be prosecuted for the city and without a jury. Now this case belongs to the latter class of cases. Streets within a city or other strictly municipal corporation are peculiarly within the management and control of such corporation; they are graded, paved, curbed, guttered and kept in repair by the corporation, and not by the general public ; and if they are permitted to become unsafe or dangerous, and injury to individuals results thereby, the corporation itself is liable; and this kind of liability is peculiar to municipal corporations. Neither the state, nor any county, township or road district is ever liable for injuries resulting from defective highways. Only municipal corporations proper are subject to such a liability; and therefore such corporations should have the fullest and most ample power for keeping their streets in good order and in a safe condition; and for this purpose they should have ample power to tax the people residing or holding property within the corporate limits, and to enforce the collection of such taxes. We think they have such power.
We do not think that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief in this case, and therefore its petition will be denied.
All the Justices concurring.