This is an original application in this court, for a writ of certiorari to command the state board of equalization to certify and return to the supreme court all the proceedings concerning a certain order of the board, whereby the assessment of the property in Salt Lake county for the year 1897 was to be increased. The writ was issued, and the board filed its answer, and demurred to the petition. A demurrer to the answer was also filed. Thereupon the case was argued and presented on its merits, and will likewise be considered.
The provisions of the constitution, so far as material to the decision of this case, are as follows: In section 2 of article 13 it is provided that “ all property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.” Under this provision all taxable property must be assessed and taxed “in proportion to its value.” It will be noticed that “ value ” is here referred to in a comparative manner, and is to be “ ascertained as provided by law.” The word “ proportion ” doubtless has reference to sameness or likeness in value of property; that is, all property must be taxed at the same relative value. If this provision were to be considered by itself, it might be contended with some force that the legislature had power to provide that all property should be assessed at a basis less than its
The provision relating to county boards was before us in the case of Salt Lake City v. Armstrong, 15 Utah 473; and we there held that the county board of equalization might raise or lower the valuation of any class of property in the county, or of real estate in any particular locality, for the purpose of adjustment and equalization of values. Mr. Chief Justice Zane, delivering the opinion of the court, in reference to section 11, "said: “ The last-section makes it the duty of the county board to adjust and equalize the valuation of the real and personal property within their respective counties, without prescribing-tlie mode to be adopted. This leaves the board the discretion to adopt any reasonable and just method, and if, upon an examination and investigation of the assessment, the board should be of the opinion that the real estate in a particular locality is too high, and that in other localities
- What has been said respecting county boards applies with equal force to the state board, except that it may not encroach upon the domain of the county board in an attempt to adjust and equalize the valuation of property within the county. With this exception, it will be observed that the constitutional duties and powers of the state and county boards contained in this section are precisely the same. Where the same duty is imposed, and the same power exists, there the same result may be expected, as intended, from the performance of such duty, and the exercise of such power. Howr, then, can it be maintained that the state board cannot increase the total valuation of the state when necessary for the purpose of equalization, while the county board may, for such purpose, increase the total valuation of the county, even though it
Having considered the above constitutional provisions, it becomes important now to examine the statutory enactments, so far as applicable to this case, to ascertain whether the state board,-in making the order complained of, acted within the jurisdiction and power conferred by the constitution and statutes. Section 1 of the revenue act (chapter 129, p. 423, Sess. Laws 1896)'reads: “AH' property in this slate, not exempt under the laws of the Un'ited States, or under the constitution of this state1, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, as hereinafter provided.” Section 5: “All taxable. property must be assessed at its full cash value. Land and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed.” As will be observed, there is nothing in either of these sections of the statute which conflicts with the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the constitution. Under section 5, all taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value; but, as we have seen, this is so under the constitution, and, as to assessing land and improvements separately, there is nothing in the constitution to prevent it. Section 71, relating to county boards, which reads as follows: “The board has power, after giving notice in such manner as it may, by rule, prescribe, to increase or lower any assessment contained in the assessment book, so as to equalize the assessment of the property contained therein, and make the assessment conform to the true value of such property in money,” — has been referred to by counsel for
In Salt Lake City v. Armstrong, supra, this court held that the county board had such power as is conferred by section 71. If this decision is right, as we think it is, it is difficult, upon examination of the two provisions, to discern how a similar power can be denied the state board. Wise or unwise, the manifest object of the several constitutional and statutory enactments was an equitable apportionment of the burdens of the government among the several counties of the state. Evidently in pursuance of this object, the state and county boards were provided for in the constitution, so as to supervise the actions of the county assessors whose offices are created by the statute, and whose duty it is to list and value the property in the first instance. While it is the sworn duty of these officers to value and assess all taxable property equally and uniformly, at ’its full cash value, yet
Counsel for the relators have cited and rely on the cases of People v. Lothrop, 3 Colo. 428, and State v. Equalization Board, 18 Mont. 473. We must decline to follow those decisions, because, as may be seen by examination and comparison, the provisions of the constitutions and laws of the states of Colorado and .Montana respecting the subject of “ revenue and taxation ” are essentially and materially different from the provisions, on the same subject, contained in the constitution and laws of Utah.
The next material question is whether the state board, in making the order In controversy, regularly pursued its authority. Section 83 of the revenue act, in reference to the state board, provides: “ When, after a general investigation by the board, the property is found to be assessed above or below its full cash value, the board may, without notice, so determine, and must add to or deduct from the valuation! of: (1) the real estate; (2) 'improvements on such real'estate; (3) the personal property, except money, such per centum respectively as is sufficient to raise or reduce it to its full cash value.” It is contended by.one of counsel for the defendant board that this section is in excess of constitutional authority, and therefore void; and reference is made to the provision of section 2 of the constitution, hereinbefore considered, as the one with which it is in conflict. We are unable to see in what respect section 83 is 'in conflict with that provision of the constitution which we have construed in connection with section 3 of that instrument, as providing for the assessment of all taxable property at its full cash value. Section 83 provides likewise. .The constiiu
It is insisted for the relators that the order in question not only does not conform to section 83, above quoted, but also that, in its operation, it would increase the valuation on money listed on the assessment roll, and that it is therefore invalid. The order is general in its terms, and does not specifically refer to each ofr the classes of property mentioned and designated in the statute. The state board has only such powers as are conferred upon it by the constitution and statutes, and its duties must be performed 'in accordance with their requirements. We think the provisions of section 83 respecting the classification of taxable property are mandatory. Such being the case, it was the duty of the board, when it found that the property of Salt Lake county was assessed too low, before making any order, to determine how much pie valuation on the real estate ought to be raised, how much that of the improvements thereon, and how much that of the personal property, respectively, so as to make all the valuations conform to the constitutional standard, and then to make an order accordingly. The statute not having been pursued, the order was defective. It was also defective because it included money in its operation. It clearly cannot be held operative as to money, for, as appears from the record, each dollar of the relators, on
The legal value of a dollar in money is a dollar, and therefore to value and assess'it at more than a dollar cannot be a valuation and assessment, “ according to its value in money.” This being so, the court will take notice, as matter of law, that money cannot be assessed for more than its legal value. Hence, from the nature of things, the state board cannot change the valuation of money on the assessment roll already assessed at its legal value, and thereby make it cease to conform to the mandate of the constitution. People v. Dunn, 59 Cal. 328.
It may be that the failure to except money' of itself might not render the order void; but when that fact is considered in connection with the further fact, as shown by the record in this case, that the action of the board did not conform to the statute, the order cannot be upheld as a proper exercise of authority, and is therefore void. Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to discuss any other question presented in this case. Judgment must be entered in favor of the relators that the order in question be set aside.