delivered the opinion of the Court:
The defendant, Bowen, pleads—
1. Nul tiel record.
2. That the said alleged cause of action did not accrue within three years next preceding the bringing of this suit.
3. That at the time of said alleged recovery of judgment the defendant was not, and for several years theretofore had not been a resident of the State of Arkansas, but was then, and for several years prior thereto had been, and still is, a citizen of the State of Colorado, and that the defendant was nоt at any time between the commencement of the proceedings in which said alleged recovery was had, and the date thereof, to wit, the 2d day of August, A. D. 1875, within the jurisdiction of said county court of the county of Faulkner, in the State оf Arkansas, and that he had no legal notice of the pending of said proceedings by service of process or otherwise, and that he did not at any time during the pendency of said proceedings, either before or aftеr the date of said alleged recovery, voluntarily appear and subject himself to the jurisdiction of said court, nor did he authorize, empower, direct or permit, either directly or indirectly, any agent, attorney, counsellоr or other person whatsoever, to appear for him in the said proceedings pending in the said county court of Faulkner County, or to represent him in said matter, or in anything connected therewith, in any manner whatsoever.
It appears upon the face of this record, and especially by the transcript of the proceedings in the State оf Arkansas, that the foundation of the original suit was a collector’s bond! given by one Benton Turner, a collector, with the defendant and several others as sureties, for the faithful performance of his duty as collector of taxes, in the county of Faulkner, State of Arkansas. It is alleged in the declaration filed in the suit in Arkatisas, that Turner was indebted in a certain sum to the county of Faulkner for the amount of taxes collected by him as such collector and nоt accounted for. It is further shown by this record that not only was the original suit for this, but in the rendition of the judgment, pursuant to the provisions of the statute of Arkansas, there was included a penalty of 25 per cent, on the amount so found to be due from him as collector.
The question arises, whether, under such circumstances, this court should, by virtue of the laws of the United States or any comity that prevails between the States of this Union, entain jurisdiction of this action. It has been very well settled that one State will not take cognizance of or enforce the judgment of another State where such judgment is founded upon penal laws, or laws relating exclusively to the collection of the revenues of thе State wherein it is rendered. Such laws relating to the domestic economy of the State, and the
We find this principle clearly laid down in the case of The State of Wisconsin vs. The Pelican Insurance Co. of New Orleans, reported in 127 U. S., pages 289, 291, 292 and 293.
It was said by Justice Gray, in delivеring the opinion of the court: “By the law of England and of the United States, the penal laws of a country do not reach beyond its own territory, except when extended by express treaty or statute to offenses committed abroad by its own citizens; and they must be administered in its own courts only, and cannot be enforced by the courts of another country. ’ ’ Wheat. Internat. E. 8th ed., Secs. 113, 121.
Chief Justice Marshall stated the rule in the most condensed form, as an incontrovertible maxim: ‘The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. ’ ’
‘ ‘ The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for suсh penalties. If this were not so, all that would be necessary to give ubiquitous effect to a penal law would be to put the claim for a penalty into the
‘ ‘ The application of the rule to the courts of the several States and of the United States is not affected by the provisions of the Constitution and of the act of Congress, by which-the judgments of the courts of any State arе to have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the State in which they were rendered. Const., Art. 4, Sec. 1: Act May 26, 1790, Chap. 11, 1 Stat. at R., 122, Rev. Stat., Sec. 905.
1 ‘ Those provisions establish a rule of evidеnce rather than of jurisdiction. While they make the record of a judgment, rendered after due notice in one State, conclusive evidence in the courts of another State, or of the United States, of the matter adjudged, thеy do not affect the jurisdiction, either of the court in which the judgment is rendered, or of the court in which it is offered in evidence. Judgments recovered in one State of the Union, when proved in the courts of another government, whethеr state or national, within the United States, differ from judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other respect than in not being re-examinable on their merits, nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having jurisdictiоn of the cause and of the parties. Hanley vs. Donoghue,
“The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it; and the techinal rules, with regard to the original claim аs merged in the judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it, do not preclude a court, to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action (while it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim), from ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such á nature that the court is authorized to enforce it. Louisana vs. New Orleans,
The justice then prоceeds to cite and analyze the cases which have been decided by the Supreme Court from its first organization to the present time relating to this subject.
It clearly appears from the transcript offered in evidence, and which was admitted against the objection of the defendant that the judgment in Arkansas was predicated upon a bond given by an alleged collector of taxes for the county of Faulkner, for the faithful performancе of his duties, and that it related strictly to the collection of taxes in that county.
It belongs to the revenue system of the State of Arkansas.
It provided for heavy penalties, not only included in the judgment, but provided'that the judgment itself, including the penalty of 25 per cent., should have an added percentage of 50 per cent, every year until the judgment should be paid.
The amount of this judgment at the present time under the laws of Arkansas would be in the neighborhood of $30,000 if you add the 50 per cent, interest provided by the statute of Arkansas. Under the authorities to which I have called attention, it is entirely clear that all such statutes must be administered by the courts of the State that enact them; and that even the original cause of action could not be prosecuted in ‘in another State. As indicated by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, to which I have before referred, they cannot avoid this provision of law by first obtaining a judgment upon the cause of action in the courts of Arkansas, and then take a transcript of that judgment to another jurisdiction, and ask the courts of the latter to receive it as a judgment of the former jurisdiction. But the courts are
The judgment below will be reversed, and, the cause remanded to the Circuit Court, with direction to enter judgment for the defendant.