48 S.C. 21 | S.C. | 1896
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The petitioner herein made application to his Honor, Judge D. A. Townsend, for a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the mayor and chief of police aforesaid from enforcing an ordinance of said city, making it unlawful for the said company to operate its electric street cars upon the streets of Columbia unless the same was in the charge of a conductor. The said ordinance provides that a violation thereof shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding $40. After trial for a violation of said ordinance, the petitioner company was sentenced to pay a fine of $10, hence the application for the writ of prohibition. The petitoner alleged as grounds for the writ that the ordinance aforesaid was ultra vires, null and void, and that the mayor did not have jurisdiction in the premises.
The application was heard and decided by his Honor, Judge Townsend, upon the petition answer of tile mayor and chief of police, and exhibits set out in the “Case.” His Honor, Judge Townsend, granted an order allowing the writ to be issued, from which order the mayor and chief of police have appealed to this Court, upon exceptions which will be se set out in the report of the case.
There seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question is, therefore, one of law, to wit: whether the ordinance was ultra vires, and the mayor without jurisdiction to impose the fine. It is alleged in the answer, “that in the judgment of the city council of the city of Columbia, the passage of the said ordinance was necessary for the safety and protection of the inhabitants of the city of Columbia; that the operation of electric cars, in charge of motormen,
The exceptions will not be considered seriatim, as they raise substantially the single question, whether the city council had the power and authority to make the ordinance in question. It is not necessary to cite authorities to sustain the general proposition that street railways are subject to reasonable regulations by the authorities of the municipality, where they are located, under its police powers. In this case the question whether the ordinance is reasonable is not before the Court for consideration.
We will proceed to consider whether the city council had tht power to make the regulation aforesaid that street cars should not be run unless in charge of a conductor. Not only is there an absence of legislative intent to prevent the authorities of the city of Columbia from exercising its powers of police in regard to the street railways, but the
It is the judgment of this Court, that the order of the Circuit Court be reversed and the petition dismissed.