122 Ind. 462 | Ind. | 1890
Lead Opinion
The questions presented and argued in this case do not require us to do more than outline the pleadings, for the questions are general ones involving the validity and construction of a statute. It is sufficient to bring the questions clearly enough before the mind for investigation and consideration to say, that the relator petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the appellee, as school trustee of Monroe township, in the county of Howard, to certify to the county superintendent of schools the number of text-books required by the children of the township for use in the public schools, and to procure and furnish such books as the law requires; and that the return of the appellee to the alternative writ is so framed as to present the question of the constitutionality of the act of March 2d, 1889, and, also, the question as to the duties of the school trustee under that act. Elliott’s Supp., section 1289; Acts of 1889, p. 74.
If it be true that the power is a legislative one, then it is indisputably true, that the courts can not control the legislative discretion. This principle is elementary in constitutional law, and it needs no support from precedents or decisions ; but the principle has been so well expressed by Mr. Justice Bradley that we quote his language. Replying to an argument that the mode in which the power was exercised was improper, this great judge said : “ The answer is, the legislative department, being the nation itself, speaking by its representatives, has a choice of methods, and is the master of its own discretion.” Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (561). We have adopted and applied this rule, and, indeed, we could not depart from it, without a disregard of principle, that no decision or precedent would excuse. Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366.
As the power over schools is a legislative one, it is not exhausted by exercise. The Legislature having tried one plan is not precluded from trying another. It has a choice of methods, and may change its plans as often as it deems necessary or expedient; and for mistakes or abuses it is answerable to the people, but not to the courts. It is clear, therefore, that even if it were true, that the Legislature had uniformly entrusted the management of school affairs to local organizations, it would not authorize th¿ conclusion, that
It is impossible to conceive of the existence of a uniform system of common schools without power lodged somewhere to make it uniform, and, even in the absence of express constitutional provisions, that power must necessarily reside in the Legislature. If it does reside there, then that body must have, as an incident of the principal power, the authority to prescribe the course of study and the system of instruction that shall be pursued and adopted, as well as the books which shall be used. This general doctrine is well entrenched by authority. Hovey v. State, ex rel. Carson, 119 Ind. 395; Hovey v. State, ex rel. Riley, 119 Ind. 386; State, ex rel., v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98; State, ex rel., v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250. Having this authority, the Legislature
If the power over the school system is legislative and exclusive, then the Legislature has authority to impose upon all officers whose tenure is legislative, such duties respecting school affairs as it deems proper. All such officers take their offices oum onere, and must do what the Legislature commands or else resign.
It is a mistake to suppose, that the statute under consideration, imposes duties upon the school officers for the benefit of the book dealers. Not a word in it indicates such an intention. The purpose of the lawmakers, clearly manifested and expressed, is to secure a benefit to the public. The ob
It may be true that the book dealers are incidentally benefited by the services of the officers, but if that be a sufficient reason for condemning the act, then' all statutes providing for the award of contracts by public officers, the certification of accounts or the making of reports, where individuals are interested, must be condemned, since, in every instance, there is an incidental benefit to the dealer or contractor. The truth is, that in no event can a public officer award a contract or certify estimates, accounts, or the like,, without at the same time rendering a beneficial service to the person with whom he deals on behalf of the State. If the services of the officer benefit the public, and are imposed for the good of the public, the statute is rescued from successful attack, although the services of the officers may also benefit a private person. Either this is true, or else it is true, that no public officer can be required to award contracts, verify accounts, audit claims, or certify estimates to an individual who has a claim against the State, or any of its municipalities.
The statute is not within the constitutional provisions directed against monopolies. It designates as the standard for the guidance of the State board of education certain books, requires that the books furnished for the use of the schools shall be equal in merit to those named, requires the board to advertise for proposals to furnish the books in a newspaper published in each of the five large cities of the Nation, and
There is .no exclusion of bidders, no limitation of the right to furnish school books to the people of the State to any class; on the contrary, all who are prepared to supply such books as the statute makes the standard are invited to compete for the contract. No special privilege is granted to any one, no right denied to any one, for all are invited to enter the field as competitors.
It is true that the statute declares that the books shall conform to a designated standard, but this standard no one will deny the power of the Legislature to establish. The right to fix the standard is, indeed, a condition essential to the existence of the power; deny the condition, and it.must follow, that each father or guardian that controls a pupil may dictate what studies he shall pursue and what books he shall use. Such a result would be most deplorable, for it would produce such chaotic confusion, that the usefulness and efficiency of the school system would be completely and forever destroyed; but the provisions of the Constitution prevent such a result, for they make it the duty of the Legislature ■to establish a uniform system.
A standard must be fixed in order that there may be fair and open competition, since there could be no intelligent bidding if bidders were not informed what they would be required to furnish. If only a limited class own or control property that the public good demands, then that class is in
If no copyrighted books can be bought, then new discoveries and new methods, however important, may be denied the children of our common schools, and this without sufficient reason, for no rule of law prohibits the purchase for public use of articles protected by letters patent or by copyright. A familiar and forcible illustration is supplied by cases of the improvements of streets with patented pavements, at the expense of the property owners.
We conclude our discussion of this phase of the subject by affirming, that the statute can not be considered as creating a monopoly, because it does require that a certain class of books shall be used, and in doing this does favor some publishers to the exclusion of others.
We accept as correct the assumption of appellant’s counsel, that the statute does require the people of the State to buy the particular books designated by the proper officer, in obedience to the command of the law, and that, so far as concern^ the officers of the State, they must be bought from the
We can find neither reason nor authority, that suggests a doubt as to the power of the Legislature to require a designated series of books to be used in the schools, and to require, that the books selected shall be obtained from the person to whom the contract for supplying them may be awarded. It is to be remembered that the statute does not command that every pez-son shall buy the books ; it confines the requirement to those who receive the benefit of the public schools. These schools are owned and maintained by the
The regulation of the mode of securing books by the pupils of the common schools is not analogous to a regulation of general property rights, for books are peculiar to schools, and schools are the property of the State. It is no answer to this argument to affirm that the State may not give one person the exclusive privilege of selling fuel, clothing, or the like, to a community, for school books are unlike such property in their chief characteristics, and the Legislature does not assume to declare that any person may not sell books to a community; it simply assumes the power of declaring that the person whom the State board of education decides is the lowest bidder shall have the exclusive priv
Either the State has power to regulate and control the schools it owns or it has not; that it does not have this power, we venture to say, no one will affirm; if it does have this power, it must reside in the law-making department, for it is impossible for it to exist elsewhere. If the power does reside in the law-making department, then that department must exercise its discretion and adopt such measures as it deems best, and if the measures adopted lead to the exclusion of some book-owners, it is an incident that no ingenuity can escape, nor any system avoid. The denial of the right to select the books is the denial of the right of regulation and control, and we can not conceive it possible to deny this right. If the right of regulation and control exists, then the fact that the exercise of the right does exclude some publisher is an inseparable and unavoidable condition of the exercise of the right. Without it, the right is annihilated. If a clear and manifest legislative right can not be exercised without conferring privileges in the nature of a monopoly, then, as the authorities all agree, a monopoly may be created, for a denial of the right will not be suffered. This doctrine is discussed by Judge Cooley, in his work on torts, and by Mr. Tiedeman, in his work on the police power, to which we refer without comment, Cooley Torts, 277; Limitations of Police Power, 315, et seq. But we need not enter the field traversed by these authors, for here there is no denial of a right to sell books to a community; all that is here done is
Judge Cooley says that “ It is held competent for the State to contract with a purchaser to supply all the schools of the State with text-books of a uniform character and price.” Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 225, n. 1. In Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1 (33 Am. R. 450), it was held that the State might purchase books and compel the patrons of the school to buy the books from its officers. The question was presented in Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawyer, 502, in substantially the same general form that it is here, and it yms held that a State maj1' provide by legislation that a designated person shall have the exclusive privilege of furnishing all the text-books needed for the use of the public schools. This decision was made upon the Constitution of Oregon, which is very similar to ours, and the right to make such a contract is referred to the police power, the court saying: “ To authorize and provide that, by means of contract or legislative grant, a particular person or persons shall have the exclusive right to do or furnish a particular thing, upon certain conditions, for the use and convenience of the public, has always been a common mode of exercising the police powers of the State.” In the case of State, ex rel., v. State Board of Education, 18 Nev. 173, the power of the Legislature to require the adoption and use of the books of a designated publisher was assumed to exist by court and counsel, and this is true of the case of People, ex rel., v. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 331. The court held in People, ex rel., v. State Board of Education, 49 Cal. 684, that the decision of the State board of education as to the text-books that should be used was final, and must be obeyed by all of the local boards and officers. These authorities, and those to which we have heretofore referred, seem to us to so conclusively settle the question as to leave no room for debate.
Our conclusion upon the constitutional questions is in harmony with the judgment of the eminent judge who héard and decided the case of State, ex rel., v. Blue, post, p. 600, as well as with that of the learned judge who decided this case, for we agree with them that the statute is constitutional in all its essential features. Whether there are, or are not, isolated and detached clauses that may be invalid we have not inquired, for the reason, that the ease as it is presented by the record, and in the very able argument of counsel, requires no such investigation.
The remaining question requires a construction of the statute. The contention of the one party is, that it imposes no imperative duty upon the trustee that can be enforced by mandamus, and that of the other is, that such a duty is imperative and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy.
It is not necessary that a statute should, in direct terms, declare the duty of an officer in order to make it an imperative one. The duty may be deduced from the general provisions and scope of the statute, regard being had to the evil intended to be remedied, and the object sought to be
It is, as we have suggested, always proper to ascertain the ■object intended to be accomplished, and for this purpose it is proper to look to the history of the times, to the cause which induced the enactment of the statute, and to consider, also, the evil-intended to be remedied. Again and again has this doctrine been asserted- by this court, and in asserting it the court did no more than enforce a rule much older than the State. Krug v. Davis, 87 Ind. 590, and cases cited; Bell v. Davis, 75 Ind. 314; Clare v. State, 68 Ind. 17; State v. Canton, 43 Mo. 48; People, ex rel., v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43.
One who would give a just interpretation to the language of a statute must always give due consideration to the history of the enactment. Speaking of the duty of one who undertakes to interpret a statute, the author quoted says: “He must refer to the history of the times to ascertain the reason for, and the meaning of the provisions of a statute, and to the general state of opinion, public, judicial and legislative at the time of the enactment.” Endlich Interp. Stat., section 29. Illustrations of this well known rule are supplied by the cases of Aldridge v. Williams, 2 How. 8; United States v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72 ; District of Columbia v. Washington Market Co., 108 U. S. 243; State, ex rel., v. Nicholls, 30 La. Ann. 980; Keyport, etc., Co. v. Transportation, etc., Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 13; Delaplane v. Crenshaw, 15 Gratt. 457. The information imparted by the inaugural address of the Governor of the State, by the debates in the General
Before turning to the language of the statute it is proper to refer to an ancient and well known rule of law, which is not without influence here. An English writer says : . “ It has, indeed, been said to have become an axiom, that (in public statutes words only directory, permissory or enabling, may have a compulsory force where the thing to be done is for the public benefit, or in advancement of public justice.’ ” Heard’s Shortt Extraordinary Rem. 255. An American' court has thus stated the rule: “ The grant by the Legislature, of an official power, involves a corresponding public duty; and where the power is not expressly discretionary, its exercise is a peremptory public duty.” The same court also said: “ Public official powers must be supposed to be granted from public motives, and for the public good, and their exercise is not a matter of discretion, unless expressly made so,” People, ex rel., v. Supervisors, 11 Abb. Pr. 114. The rule was thus expressed by our own court: “ Where the words of the statute are .permissive merely, in cases where public interests or rights are concerned, and where the public or third persons have a claim de jure, that the powers should be exercised, they will be construed as obligatory.” Gray v. State, ex rel., 72 Ind. 567. Other cases declare the same doctrine. Bansemer v. Mace, 18 Ind. 27; State, ex rel., v. Buckles, 39 Ind. 272; City of Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. 587. That the statute here under examination contains provisions concerning public rights, and rights in which individual patrons of the schools have an interest, is too clear for denial-; and therefore this rule forcibly applies.
An analysis of the provisions of the statute submitted to the light of the principles we have stated will make clear its meaning and object. Section 1 constitutes the State board of education commissioners for the purpose of making selec
From this synopsis these important things are made manifest : The books are to be secured for all the schools of the State. Everywhere throughout the statute the terms employed refer to the entire State, never to localities. Every provision indicates an intention to establish a uniform system, and not a provision indicates an intention to put it in the power of any officer to break the uniformity. The duty is enjoined upon all of the trustees of the State; none are excepted. The books are all to be furnished under the contract, and furnished without exception for all the schools of the State. The only method for securing the books is through contract. The conclusion that the law is obligatory upon every school trustee within the State is, therefore, irresistible, From beginning to end there is no hint or suggestion that some of the trustees may, and some may not, obey the law, and procure or decline to procure the books under the contract made by the State board. There is not the remotest suggestion from which it can be inferred that the system constructed shall be treated otherwise than as a unit. Nor is there a word from which it can be inferred that the Legislature intended that inferior school officers might exercise discretionary power, and thus break and deform the uniformity and symmetry of the system. All we know of the history of the enactment, all we can discover as to the object of the statute, and all that we have learned of the evil sought to be remedied, combine with the words of the statute (words clear in themselves, but clearer still from the light shed upon them by extrinsic facts which it is our duty to know and which we do know) in support of the conclusion, that the statute creates a uniform system, requires that all books be procured under the contract, and that school trustees may
Upon the petition of a. citizen, courts have enforced a duty less clear and imperative than that which rests upon the appellee, but the length of this opinion (excusable, if excusable at all, because of the magnitude and importance of the questions involved) forbids that we do more than refer to the cases. State, ex rel., v. School Directors, etc., supra; School Commissioners, etc., v. State Board, 26 Md. 505; Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121 (55 Am. N. 540).
For the error in holding that the duty imposed upon school trustees is not imperative, the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion. ■
Concurrence Opinion
Separate Opinion.
I concur in the conclusion reached in the principal opinion, but not in all the statements and arguments contained in it.
I do not think the statute in question in conflict with any express provision of, or the spirit of the State Constitution, nor do I think it an encroachment on the rights of the citizens of the State not delegated to the legislative department of the State government by the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion I do not concur in the broad statement of counsel for the appellant that before the law can be declared unconstitutional and void, some express provision of the Constitution must be pointed out which prohibits such legislation; but I adhere to the doctrine recently enunciated by this court, that the grant of power to the legislative department is a grant only of all legislative power, and that there are some rights of the people which can not be taken away by legislative enactment, notwithstanding there is no -pro
The common schools of the State are in the main supported by the State, and the tuition is free. The Constitution expressly enjoins on the General Assembly the duty “to encourage by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvement, and to provide by law for a general and uniform system of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge and equally open to all.” By the Constitution the common schools of the State are expressly placed under the control and supervision of the General Assembly. It is made the duty of that department of the State government to provide for a uniform system; this must relate to books, as it is manifestly essential that there must be a uniformity in books to secure proper efficiency in the schools, and such uniformity can only be brought about and maintained by legislation, providing for the adoption and use of certain books. Whether there should be a unifoi'mity in the books of but a single school, or whether one system and the same class of books should extend to all schools in a township or county, or in the schools of the whole State, is a matter of policy to be considered by the General Assembly in the passage of laws to govern the common schools in this respect. This uniformity in books has always been controlled by legislation, and I think properly so, and it is committed to the General Assembly by the provisions of the Constitution.
When once admitted that it is subject to legislative control at all, as it seems to me it must be, then it is exclusively within the province of the General Assembly to determine whether there shall be a uniformity of books in a single school or the schools of a township, county or State, and the manner by which the books to be used shall be adopted, and courts can in no way interfere.
I do not believe the General Assembly has power to create a monopoly, nor do I believe they have done so in the pas
While the contract entered into between the State board of education and the school-book company does not possess the usual elements of mutuality, and may be of doubtful validity as a contract, yet I think the action of the State board of education, under the law, amounts to an adoption of the particular books to be used in the common schools.
It has been suggested by counsel that if this act be valid, then the Legislature may pass laws of the same character relating to any merchantable article which citizens purchase one from another, or even relating to the clothing of school children, or some matter about which there is no necessity for uniformity. But as between the law under consideration
The services to be performed by the township trustees, who are school officers, are to be done for the public. The paramount object of the services to be rendered is to put in force the law and execute it, by requiring the school officers of the townships to keep the particular books where all patrons of the schools may easily obtain them, and to require that such books be used in the schools, and while the services of the trustees may incidentally benefit the persons furnishing and selling the books, yet I do not regard that this fact renders the law invalid.
As to whether the law repeals the old law, and whether it is mandatory or not, it seems to me that from the reading of the whole act there can be no question as to what was the legislative indent, and that such intent was to establish a uniformity in school books throughout the State, and that it was intended to supersede and take the place of all other laws on the same subject.
As to whether the law is a salutary one or not, and as to whether it will prove beneficial or detrimental to the common school interest of the State, are matters about which the court has nothing to do ; these questions were with the General Assembly, and determined by them in the passage of the law.
Filed March 13, 1890.
Dissenting Opinion
I can not agree to the conclusion reached in the opinion of the court, and feel called upon therefore to state in as few words as possible my reasons for the position which I assume; and th'at the conclusions which I draw as to the provisions and requirements of the act of March 2d, 1889, may be the better understood, I herein set out most of the sections of the act in full.
The first section provides, that the State board of education shall constitute a board of commissioners for the purpose of making a selection or procuring the compilation for use in the common schools of the State of Indiana of aseries of text-books in certain branches named, and fixes a standard as to the matter and quality of the books.
Section 2 is as follows: “ The said board of commissioners shall, immediately upon the taking effect of this act, advertise for twenty-one consecutive days in two daily papers published in this State, having the largest circulation, and in one newspaper of general circulation in the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati,Chicago and St. Louis, that at a time and place to be fixed by said notice, and not later than six months after the first publication thereof, said board will receive sealed proposals on the following: First. From publishers of school text-books for furnishing books to the school trustees of the State of Indiana for use in common schools of this State, as provided in this act, for a term of five years, stating specifically in such bid the price at which each book will be furnished, and accompanying such bid with specimen copies of each and all books proposed to be furnished in such bid. Second. From authors of school textbooks, who have manuscripts of books not published, for prices at which they will sell their manuscript, together with the copyright of such books for use in the public schools of the State of Indiana. Third. From persons who are willing to undertake the compilation of a book or books, or a series of
Section 3 is as follows: “ It shall be the duty of such board to meet at the time and place mentioned in such no-, tice, and open and examine all sealed proposals received pursuant to the notice provided for in section two (2) of this
Section 4 is as follows : “ If, upon the examination of such proposals, it shall be the opinion of such board of commissioners that such books can be furnished cheaper to the patrons for use in the common schools in this State by procuring and causing to be published the manuscript of any or all of such books, it shall be their duty to procure such manuscript and to advertise for sealed proposals for publishing the same, in like manner as hereinbefore provided, and under the the same conditions and restrictions. And such contract may be let for the publication of all of such books, or for any one
Section 5 is as follows : “ It shall be a part of the terms •and conditions of every contract made in pursuance of this act that the State of Indiana shall not be liable to any contractor hereunder for any sum whatever; but that all such contractors shall receive their pay and compensation solely and exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the books, as provided for in this act.”
Section 6 is as follows : “As soon as such board shall have entered into any contract for the furnishing of books for use in the public schools of this State, pursuant to the provisions of this act, it shall be the duty of the Governor to issue his proclamation announcing such fact to the people of this State.”
Section 7 is as follows : “ "When such proclamation shall have been duly issued, it shall be the duty of the school trustees of each and every school corporation in this State, within thirty days thereafter, and at. such other times as books may be needed for use in the public schools of their respective corporations, to certify to the county superintendent of their respective counties the number of school textbooks provided for in such contract required by the children for use in the schools of their several school corporations. Such county superintendent shall forthwith make such requisition for books, as the schools in the said several counties may require, upon the State superintendent of public instruction, and the said State superintendent of public instruction shall immediately thereafter make a requisition for said books upon the contractor, who shall within ninety days ship the books so ordered directly to the county school superinten
Section 8 reads as follows : “ At the expiration of three months after the receipt of such books by the county super
Section 9 is as follows: “ If, at the expiration of ten days from the time required by this act for the making of such report of any school superintendent chargeable with books under this act, any such officer shall have failed, neglected or refused to make such report, or turn over any moneys with which he is chargeable, it shall be the duty of the county school superintendent, within fifteen days, to enter suit upon his official bond for an accounting and recovering of any moneys due from him on account of such books with which he is chargeable ; and all judgments recovered upon such bonds shall include a reasonable attorneys’ fee for the attorney prosecuting such suit; and such judgment shall be without relief from valuation or appraisement laws, and shall be without stay of execution.”
Section 10 reads as follows: “It shall be the duty of the several county school superintendents of this State, within thirty days from the issuing of the proclamation by the Governor, as hereinbefore provided for, and of every county school superintendent hereafter elected,before he enters upon the discharge of his official duties, to enter into a special bond, with at least two freehold sureties of such county, payable to the State of Indiana, conditioned that they will faithfully and honestly perform all the duties required of them by this act, and account for and pay over all moneys that may come into their hands pursuant to the provisions of this act, in a penal sum which shall be equal in amount to one hundred dollars for
Section 11 is as follows: “ It shall be the duty of each county school superintendent in this State, within ten days after the quarterly reports of the school trustees, as hereinbefore provided for, to make a full, true, complete and detailed report to the contractor of all books sold by the several school trustees of his county, and of the number of books in the hands of the trustees of each school corporation, which report shall be accompanied by all cash received by him from the school officers from sales of books by them sold, and which report shall be duly verified by him, and a duplicate thereof shall be filed in the office of the auditor of his county. Upon the failure of any county school superintendent to make the report and to transmit the cash, as required by this section, a right of action shall immediately accrue to the contractor against the said school superintendent and the sureties upon the bond provided for in this act, for an accounting and for the recovery of any moneys received and not transmitted by him, and for any damages which may have resulted from his neglect or failure to comply with the provisions of this act, and any judgment upon any such bond shall include a reasonable fee for the attorney prosecuting such suit, and such judgment shall be without relief from valuation and appraisement laws and shall be without stay of execution.” Section 12 makes it a misdemeanor for a school trustee to charge or receive more than the price fixed by the contract with the State for the books.
Section 13 makes it embezzlement in any trustee or county
In my opinion the whole act is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of section 23, article 1 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, and, therefore, void. Said last named section reads as follows: “ The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
In my judgment, under and by virtue of said act, the Indiana School Book Company is “ granted privileges and immunities” which upon the same terms do not belong to other citizens, natural or artificial.
It is true that the act provides that the board of commissioners named therein shall advertise for sealed proposals from publishers, authors, and persons willing to undertake ttie compilation of books to be used in our public schools, and authorizes the said board to accept the bid which seems to be the most advantageous under all the circumstances, and to enter into a contract with such bidder. But it is expressly provided in said section 5 that under no consideration is the State to become liable to any contractor in any sum whatever.
The books to be furnished, therefore, are not sold to the State, nor are they sold to the patrons of the schools by virtue of the arrangement which the State and the contractor make.
It requires another transaction, complete and perfect in itself, between the contractor and the patrons of the school, to divest the ownership of the contractor in the books which he is to furnish, and to vest the ownership thereof in the patrons of the'school, and just the same character of transaction as though there had been no arrangement or contract between the State and the contractor.
When the books are received by the county superintendent it is made his duty to notify the trustees, and it then becomes their duty, to take charge of the books going to their respective townships, first receipting therefor to the county superintendents. And after receipting for and taking into his possession the books for his township, it is made the duty of the trustee to put them on sale, and on demand for cash, at the price fixed upon by the State and the contractor to furnish them to the patrons of the schools of his township; and to the patrons of other schools than public schools, and to any child over six and under twenty-one years of age, it is made the duty of the several county superintendents to make requisition for and furnish books for cash and at the price fixed upon by the State and the contractor. And it is made the further duty of the trustee to report to the county superintendent quarterly the state of the book trade, giving the number of books sold, the amount of money received therefor, and the number of books unsold and on hand; and at the same time to pay over to the county superintendent all moneys received by him or with which he is chargeable; and if he fails to make the report or to pay over the moneys, it
The several county superintendents are required to give a separate bond for the benefit of the contractor, and if any superintendent fails to give this bond, his office is declared vacant.
Each county superintendent, within ten days after he receives the quarterly reports of the trustees, is required to make a full and complete report, not to his superior officer, the superintendent of public instruction, but to the contractor, of all books sold, and of those still unsold in the hands of the trustees; which report shall be accompanied by the money in his hands, the proceeds of the sales made by the trustees.
To what extent the county superintendent must travel, or the point to which he must go to make this report, the law does not provide; it must be, therefore, to the headquarters or place of business of the contractor, wherever that may be (if he reports in person), as the rule is that whenever an inferior officer is required to report to a superior, he is required to go to the headquarters or place of business of his superior. It may be that the county superintendents can make their reports to the contractor by mail or express, and thus transmit the moneys in their hands at their own risk; as to that I am not prepared to say.
If a county superintendent fails to make the report required of him, or to pay over the money in his hands, a right of action at once accrues to the contractor upon his said bond, and the judgment rendered is increased over and
To me this seems to be one of the most remarkable laws ever enacted by any legislative body, to say the least of it. It not only creates a monopoly, but, in my judgment, as bad and as offensive one as could well be created by a legislative body.
Blackstone’s definition of a monopoly is as follows : “Monopolies are a license or privilege allowed by the king for the sole buying and selling, making, working or using of anything whatsoever, whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing, using or trading which he had before.” Cooley’s Blackstone, Bk. 4, p. 157.
This definition is accepted and adopted by. Justice Field in Butchers, Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent City, etc., Co., 111 U. S. 746, and is recognized everywhere as authoritative.
The exclusive privileges granted to the Indiana School Book Company under the legislative act in question fall exactly within Blackstone’s definition, and clearly and unmistakably within the inhibition of the State Constitution.
Not only is the school book company granted the exclusive right for the period of five years to supply the common schools with certain text-books, but local public officers, at great expense to the people of the State, and if needs be to the neglect of their public duties, are made the agents of the contractor to dispose of its books, and placed under most severe penalties, criminal as well as civil, in case they fail to perform the duties which under the law they owe to the contractor.
Under the severe and strict requirements of this act every
It is claimed by the appellant that the law is mandatory upon all the public servants of the State, upon whom it imposes duties, and with this contention I agree. It is not only mandatory, .but is so to that extent, that though text-books from the same plates from which are issued the books to be furnished by the Indiana School Book Company were placed in the hands of the trustees, they would not be authorized to put them on sale to be used in the schools, for the law and the contract entered into between the school book company and the State grants to the company the privilege of furnishing the books, and this means all the books, and places the duty upon the trustees of carrying out the promises of the State, and should the trustees sell books belonging to other persons, and allow them to be used in the schools, the promises of the State would be broken.
I purposely omit the word obligation, but use the word promise, because under the arrangement I do not think the State has obligated itself.
But to pass on; the State having promised the school book company that it should have the privilege of furnishing all the books, in my judgment the promise of the State is broken, if the school trustees allow books purchased anywhere to be used in the schools except through them as the agents of the school book company.
The law requires the trustee to certify the number of books the schools of his township need, for which a requisition is made, and these books are placed in the hands of the trustees; and out of the books so furnished, the contractor is entitled to have all the children supplied, and if more are needed that a further requisition be made.
It was evidently the intention of the General Assembly that the books required for the schools should be furnished by the contractor as provided for in the act. Otherwise some
The law grants such privileges and immunities to the Indiana School Book Company as were evidently, in my judgment, intended to be inhibited by the Constitution, and can not be upheld (if that would remove the objections to it) on the ground that it falls within the police power of the State as a law to improve the sanitary condition of the public, or to protect it against immorality. Indeed, this is not seriously contended. The act in question must stand, if at all, upon section 1, article 8 of the State Constitution, which reads as follows: “ Knowledge and learning generally diffused throughout a community being essential to the preservation of free government, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement, and to provide by law for a general and uniform system of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.”' But this constitutional provision must be construed with other constitutional provisions, and in the light of the Federal Constitution, and I claim when it is so construed, exclusive privileges and immunities can not be granted by the Legislature to one citizen or to a class of citizens under the pretence of building up or providing for a general school system. It is wholly unnecessary to the maintenance of a general and uniform system of common schools, that exclusive privileges and immunities be granted to any citizen or class of citizens, and nothing of the kind was ever contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. But it is contended that the exclusive right to supply the common schools with textbooks was sold to the lowest bidder, and as an opportunity was then offered to all persons who desired to bid and compete for the privilege, that the right which the school book company claims to have acquired is free from all the elements of a monopoly.
The argument is fallacious and unsound. The modus op
Exclusive privileges or immunities granted to one or more citizens are none the less objectionable, and none the less within the constitutional inhibition, because sold to the lowest bidder,than if granted without an opportunity for competitive bids.
I do not controvert the proposition which was suggested in argument by way of illustration, that if the State desired to purchase any number of school books to be delivered at once or in the future, or to build a State-house, or to let a contract for supplies for its benevolent institutions, that to let the contract to the lowest and best bidder would be a very proper thing to do, although I apprehend if there was no fraud, the State might go into the market and contract with whom it pleased, and its contracts would be valid and binding. In either case there would be no monopoly, but a simple case of bargain and sale, as between two natural persons. But that is not this case. The State has no interest in the contract, nor in the subject-matter of the contract. After the requisition for the books upon the school book company (which is a mere notice to it) by the superintendent of public instruction, the books are shipped to the county superintendent, and'by him delivered to the trustees, by them sold, and the money paid over to the county superintendents, and by them paid over to the school book company. Neither the State, nor its officers, have any control over the books at anytime or place, nor anything to do with the proceeds arising from sales, nor have the local officers any relations in any way with the State or its officers. If the local officers fail to do their duty, all rights of action for the failure accrues to the contractor. Until the books are sold they remain the property of the school book company.
' But, further, in this connection, until the books are sold to the patrons of the school, they have not been furnished to anyone. The school book company has delivered them to the trustee for sale, the same as the manufacturer delivers his wares to the middle-man to dispose of to the consumer. Under this law the trustee occupies the position of middle-man between the school book company and the patrons of the school.
What is it, then, which the school book company acquired by its so-called contract with the State ? The privilege, pure and simple, of supplying the common schools of the State with text-books to the exclusion of every other person, natural or artificial. All other school-book publishers and dealers are cut off from furnishing books to be used in the schools; the patrons, as we have said, must purchase in the manner provided, and from the dealer who by virtue of the law has been designated.
The Slaughter-House Cases, found in 16 Wallace, beginning with page 36, sustain the act of the Louisiana Legislature upon the one ground that the subject-matter which the act covered came within the police power of the State, and in those cases four out of the nine judges dissented, on the ground that in their judgment the law was unconstitutional.
In the case of Butchers’ Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent City, etc., Co., supra, the law that had been sustained in the former cases was again before the Supreme Court, and it was held that the power of a State Legislature to make a contract, which can not be abrogated or modified,
It will hardly be conceded by the appellant or the Indiana School Book Company, that the law here in question may be repealed or modified by the Legislature, so as to abrogate or modify the school book company’s privileges acquired under the law. Upon the other hand, the claim of the school book company must be, and is, that its contract with the State is a valid and binding contract, under which it has acquired valuable privileges which the Legislature can not abrogate or modify, and that it has acquired the exclusive right to furnish the common schools with, text-books for the period of five years, and if the contract extended over a period of fifty years the claim would be the same, and would rest upon an equally solid foundation. This position may well be assumed if the law in question is constitutional, and the contract or arrangement which has been entered into binding. Authorities to support this claim or position are abundant, and among others, is the case of New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, and two other cases in the same volume which immediately follow the case named. But those cases rest upon the ground that the party who obtains the privilege is acting in the capacity of an agent for the State, or has undertaken to perform a public duty or public service for the State. None of which has the Indiana School Book Company undertaken or assumed.
The State was not preparing, and has at no time proposed, to furnish the patrons of the common schools with textbooks, nor did it owe any duty in that direction — at least, if
It was not, and is not, necessary for any publisher or dealer in school books to obtain a grant or license from the State to do business within the State. Any school book publisher or dealer in school books, may carry on his business in Indiana, the same as may the manufacturer of furniture, cotton or woolen goods, paper, or any other article or commodity.
The exclusive privilege granted to the Indiana School Book Company restricts other school book publishers and dealers in the use and enjoyment of their property in a particular manner; that is to say, they are deprived of the privilege of dealing with the patrons of the schools, and furnishing them school books for the use of their children in the schools; hence the school book company is enabled to enjoy its property to a greater profit, than it could, except for the monopoly which has been granted to it. But I claim that it is plain to be understood from the opinion of the learned judge in New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., supra, that had there been at the time the grant was made such a constitutional provision as we have in- our Constitution, in the Louisiana Constitution, the law creating the grant would have been held unconstitutional, and refer to what is said in the opinion, beginning on page 672 of the volume, and I make the same claim for the case of Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Co., supra. In that case the grant was upheld
But our Constitution makes no exception ; the provision is a sweeping one : “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens" Art. 1, sec. 23. It is impossible for any other citizen under the law in question for five years, upon any terms, and especially upon the same terms, to furnish text-books to the patrons of the schools for use therein, even if he had for sale the same series of publications.
Suppose that any citizen, or class of citizens, were to offer to enter into a contract with the State upon the same terms as provided in the contract with the Indiana School Book Company, and that his or their books be placed in the hands of the county superintendents or trustees for sale, could the State enter into any such contract or grant the same privileges under this law ? Certainly not. See Citizens, etc., Co. v. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 332 ; Soon Hing v. Crowley,, 113 U. S. 703; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Minneapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26.
But to return to the contract once more. I insist that if the law were unobjectionable on constitutional grounds, then under its provisions no valid or binding contract could be made, and hence none has been made.
It is common law that without mutuality between the parties there can be no contract. There must be obligations on both sides or there is no enforceable contract. This is so well understood that I do not feel called upon to cite authorities.
Now the contract in question is one to furnish school boobs, not to the State, but to the patrons of the schools. The contract, as we have already said, and which will not be controverted, is with the, State, and not with the patrons. The
The law expressly stipulates for the State that it assumes no legal liability; then we inquire where is the legal obligation on the side of the State, and in what does the mutuality of the contract consist? There is no legal obligation to the school book company from any one.
But it may be said that the school book company obtains the privilege of putting its books on sale to the patrons of the schools to the exclusion of any other person, and the services of the county superintendents and trustees to sell if any one wishes to buy, it is left, after all, discretionary with the State whether it will comply with its part of the engagement, and if it does not, it is expressly provided that it is not liable for such failure. In the first place, under the law, the school book company was required to enter into bond that if awarded the contract it would enter into a satisfactory contract, but the law does not provide that a bond shall be given for the performance of the contract. An action for its default in performing the conditions of the contract must be brought on the contract against the school book company. We inquire, who is damaged by the default, and what the measure of damages ? The State is not damaged, for it purchased no books from the company, and expressly stipulated against liability to the company. The patrons of the schools are not damaged, for the school book company had no contract with them, and they are under no obligations to purchase its books. And if it were possible to find one to whom the book company is bound to respond in case of its default in the performance of the contract, I imagine that it would be a little troublesome to ascertain the measure of damages.
I am aware that there is a class of contracts where a valid contract may be entered into by one of the parties for the
It is an anomaly to say that while engaged in transacting the business of a private corporation solely for its private gain, the trustees and county superintendents are serving the people. They are the simple agents of the private corporation, and it is begging the question to assume that they are performing the duties of public officers.
This brings me to a consideration of the question of the right of the people in the several subdivisions of the State, to manage the local details of their schools, as they have a right to do in other local affairs.
Most certainly the public schools in which a majority of the children and youth of the State must begin and finish their education, is not of all local affairs the one of least importance.
When the territory now comprising our State was given a territorial government, and from that time down to the present, township and county subdivisions have existed.
The act of 1877, Acts of 1877, p. 122, organized a county board of education, with power to select and adopt the textbooks that should be used in the schools of the county. This board was composed of the county superintendent, the trustees of the different townships, and the chairman of the board of trustees of each town and city in the county. In this board the people of every township, through their trustee, had voice, and after the books were adopted any person or persons had a perfect right to go into the county and sell to the patrons of the schools any of the books adopted. And the patrons of the schools might purchase the books from whomsoever they could, for cash, on time, or in any other manner.
In my judgment the act in question deprives the people of the school townships of the State of an important local privilege or right, and on that ground ought not to be upheld. But as this question has so recently and thoroughly been gone over by this court, I do not desire to do more than call attention to what had been decided. In State, ex rel. Jameson, v. Denny, 118 Ind. 32, on page 398 this Court, by Coffey, J., said : “ It is, therefore, perfectly apparent from the Constitution itself that it was framed with reference to then existing local governments of counties, towns, townships and cities. Did the people, then, in the adoption of the Constitution, surrender the right to local self-government which they at
It is true that section 1, article 8 of the State Constitution, supra, made it the duty of the Legislature to create a general and uniform system of common schools, but it never was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and no such construction can reasonably be placed upon the said section, that the Legislature could or would assume to control the local affairs and details of the schools. The creation of a general system is one thing, and the control of such matters as pertain to that general system, and which are purely local to the people of the school townships, is another and very different thing. Applying the principle as enunciated by Judge Cooley in the quotation above, the Legislature may mould the system but the local government of the schools exists as an absolute right.
The State may declare how the schools shall be governed, teachers elected, and the branches to be taught therein, but the local control and management of the schools must be left with the people of the districts and townships or their local representatives. What would be thought of a law enacted by the Legislature appointing a State board of commissioners to take charge of the schools in all their details? See the individual opinion in the case last above cited; State, ex rel. Holt, v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, and City of Evansville v. State, ex rel., 118 Ind. 426. In Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, the court said : “It is possible, and only possible, to build up an efficient system by leaving local school matters, under proper general laws, to the people of the different localities. The Legislature have clearly realized this fact, and the law challenged, is an expression of their judgment and that of the people, for it has stood unquestioned for more than eighteen years. We do not affirm that this long acqui
This case clearly recognizes the right of local self-government in the control and management of the public schools, and agrees with what I have said already as to what is to be understood as a general school system under the Constitution, and is in line with the unbroken practical construction of the people of the State from the organization of the State government. But, I inquire, if the present law can be upheld, why may not the Legislature provide by law that all school-houses which the districts might be called upon to build for the following period of five years, or more, should be let through the State board of education to the lowest and best bidder, and in the same way all chalk for blackboard exercises furnished to the patrons of the schools; and the school trustees required to superintend the building of the school-houses and the distribution of the chalk among the patrons for the benefit of the contractors? This would have the effect to make the school system more general and uniform.
In City of Evansville v. State, ex rel., supra, I said, speaking for myself, and not for the Court, that practical construction was of very little consequence when what had been done was in violation of a plain constitutional provision, and I am of that opinion still'.
But local control of the common schools by the people of the townships is in violation of no provision of the Constitution, but in harmony with the spirit and letter of that instrument.
From the year 1824 to the passage of the act of 1889, the peojrle of the districts and school townships have had unbroken control of their local school affairs, including the adoption and purchase of text-books without any claim by the Legislature that it had the power to deprive them of any of these privileges. In the individual opinion, to which we have referred, it is said: “ Continued and uniform ex
With what force the foregoing language comes to the law in question, whereby the Legislature has assumed to appoint a board of commissioners with power not only to say to the people the particular series of text-books which their children shall carry to school, but from whom they shall purchase them, the price to be paid, and the manner of payment. The case of Hovey v. State, ex rel., 119 Ind. 386, by a majority of the Court, was affirmed solely on the ground of practical construction in the appointment of trustees for the benevolent institutions, and yet there had been no such uniformity nor so long continued, as has been enjoyed by the people of the local school subdivisions in the local management of their schools, including the adoption and purchase of their text-books.
My judgment is, that the law is in violation of the Constitution, and that it is invalid for other reasons which I have stated.
For the reasons given, I dissent from the conclusion reached by a majority of the court.
Filed March 13, 1890.