261 Mo. 631 | Mo. | 1914
This is an original proceeding in mandamus, instituted in this court by the relators,' the directors of Consolidated School District No. 1 of Daviess county, against John P. GHordon, State Auditor, to compel him to register and certify certain bonds of the district issued by it under section 10777, Revised Statutes 1909.
No question is raised as to the sufficiency of the pleadings, the proper formation of the district, the election of the directors or the regularity of the issuance of the bonds.
The sole questions here presented by respondent challenge the constitutionality of the Act of the Legislature of 1913, Laws 1913, pp. 721 to 725, under which the school district was organized.
Said act provides for the organization of consolidated schools and rural high schools, and provides State aid for such schools, with an emergency clause.
“Section 1. Consolidated district for elementary and high school ma-y be formed — The qualified voters of any community in Missouri may organize a consolidated school district for the purpose of maintaining both elementary schools and a high school as hereinafter provided. When such new district is formed it shall be known as consolidated district No. - of --county, and all the laws applicable to the organization and government of town and city school districts, as provided in article 4, chapter 106, of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1909, shall be applicable to districts organized under the provisions of this act.
“Sec. 2. Consolidated district — area and enumeration of. — No consolidated district shall be formed under the provisions of this act unless it contains an area of at least twelve square miles or has an enumeration of at least two hundred children of school age: Provided, that no district formed under the provisions of this act shall include within its territory any town or city district that at the time of the formation of said consolidated district has, by the last enumeration, two hundred children of school age.
“Sec. 3. Petition to form consolidated district filed with ivhom^-duties of county school superintendent — meeting—organization of. — When the resident citizens of any community desire to form a consolidated district, a petition signed by at least twenty-five qualified voters of said community shall be filed with the county superintendent of public schools. On receipt of said petition, it shall be the duty of the county superintendent to visit said community and investigate the needs of the community and determine the exact boundaries of the proposed consolidated district. In determining these boundaries, he shall so locate the boundary lines as will, in
“Sec. 5. Parts of districts remaining after consolidation-procedure. — Whenever, by reason of the formation of any consolidated school district, a portion of the territory of any school district has been incorporated in the consolidated district, the inhabitants of the remaining parts of the districts shall proceed in accordance with section 10882, providing for the annexation to city school districts, and the consolidated district shall be governed by the same provisions as govern city school districts in such cases. The inhabitants of the remaining parts of the districts may also annex themselves to any other adjoining district or districts by filing a petition asking to be so annexed with the clerk or clerks of the district or districts to which they desire to be annexed, and by also filing a copy of all such petitions with the clerk of the county court.
“Sec. 6. Settlement of property — original districts to continue — boio long. — Whenever any consoli
“Sec. 7. State aid — token granted — how.—Whenever a district organized under the provisions of this act has secured a site of not less than five acres for the central high school building of said district and has erected thereon a school building, suitable for a central school and containing one large assembly room for the meeting of the citizens of the district and has installed a modern system of heating and ventilating, the State shall pay one-fourth of the cost of said building and equipment, provided the amount thus paid by the State shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2000) for any one district. The State of Missouri shall, out of the general revenue fund of the State, make adequate appropriation for carrying out the provisions of this section, and the money due any district shall be remitted by the Auditor to the county treasurer of the proper county on receipt of a certificate from the State Superintendent of Public Schools stating that the conditions herein prescribed have been complied with.
“See. 8. Special State aid granted — when—how. —When a consolidated district has been organized as herein provided and has provided adequate buildings for school purposes, the State shall grant a special aid
. Section 9 is the emergency clause and need not be set forth.
I. The first objection urged against the constitutionality of the act under consideration relates to its title. It is claimed that it violates section 28 of article 4 of the Constitution of 1875', in this “that the title contains two subjects: First, the organization of consolidated schools and rural high schools; and, second, the granting of State aid thereto.”
This objection is without merit. The act relates to but one subject, namely, consolidated and rural high schools. While it deals with two phases of the same subject, the organization of the districts and their financial aid by the State, yet that fact constitutes no constitutional objection to the act, when it as an entirety relates to but one subject.
In Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64, l. c. 71, this court said: “Where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single, and if it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid.”
To the same effect are the following cases: State ex rel. v. Vandiver, 222 Mo. 206, l. c. 219; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, 497; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 444; State v. Morgan, 112 Mo. 202, 212; State ex rel. v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 275; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; 614; State v. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1, 16; Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 237, 251; State v. Doerring, 194 Mo. 398, 408; O’Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 633; State ex inf. v. Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 56 ; State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 25, 53; State ex rel. v. Williams, 232 Mo. 56, 75.
This question is therefore ruled against the respondent.
II. The second objection made to the validity of the act is stated in this language: “The act in question is in violation of section 43 of article 4 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, in that sections 7 and 8 of said act attempt to grant money as aid to said school districts, when as a matter of fact there was no appropriation by the Legislature of such money. ”
This objection is also untenable. ' For when we read said sections 7 and 8 in connection with the biennial school appropriation bill, which we must do, it constitutes “a regular appropriation made by law,” and does not therefore do violence to said section 43 of the Constitution.
By parity of reasoning we must read said sections 7 and 8 in connection with said general appropriation bill for school purposes; and by so doing, we are of the opinion that the proper appropriation was duly made. '
We, therefore, rule this objection against the respondent.
III. It is next contended that said act is unconstitutional because it violates “section 46 of article 4 and article 11 and more particularly sections 2 and 6 of said article 11 of the Constitution.”
Section 46 prohibits the Legislature from making any grant, etc., “to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation.” This section has no reference to corporations belonging wholly to the State, organized wholly for governmental purposes under public laws and governed by officers duly elected or appointed according thereto; for instance, the various eleemosynary institutions of the State, State University, normal schools, public schools, drainage and road districts, etc. This has
Sections 2 and 6 of said article are applicable to the ordinary school funds to be disbursed to the ordinary public schools of the State, and not to those funds which the State specially appropriates to the University, normal schools and those of the character here under consideration; otherwise, State aid could not be rendered to the University or to the various normal schools of the State. This contention is without merit.
It has been further suggested in this connection that the general revenues of the State, collected, as they are, from all parts thereof, cannot lawfully be expended for the purposes of purchasing grounds, constructing buildings and paying teachers in the various local districts formed or to be formed under the act in question. In my opinion this suggestion is also without merit, for the reason that the State, at the present time and for many years previous, has been collecting taxes from all over the State and applying them to the uses of the local district schools, normal schools and the University. The two latter are supported solely by taxes so collected, and the former very largely from the same source, amounting to many hundreds of thousands of dollars. This is upon the theory that money acquired by the State or county by taxation is not the private property of any county or school district, but is the property of the State, which may be used for any public purpose the Legislature may deem’wise.
In discussing this question this court, in Banc, unanimously held in the case of State ex rel. v. Taylor, 224 Mo. 393, l. c. 468, that:
“And the statute authorizing the county to pay out of its revenues claims of this character against such district does no violence to any constitutional provision to which our attention has been called.
“And in the case of the City of Hannibal v. Marion County, 69 Mo. 571, this court held that the Legislature had the authority to say what shall be done with the taxes levied and collected from any. county. There an act of the Legislature required the county to pay to the city out of the general revenue of the county the sum collected from the city for bridge tax and poll tax, and was not unconstitutional.
“The rule announced in these cases clearly applies to the facts of this case. This district is as much a public corporation as were the cities of St. Louis and Hannibal; and the taxes collected by Chariton county were no more 'the private property of the county in this case than were-the revenues involved in those cases the private property of Marion and St. Louis counties.
“If the Legislature had the authority to apply the revenues of those counties for the purposes therein stated, then for stronger reasons it had the authority to apply the revenues of Chariton county for the purposes herein stated, because the drainage district in question is not independent of the county, but, upon the other hand, it owes its being to and is subject to its authority and control in the same sense in which townships of a county are subject to its control. Tt does not even have the independent government like townships have under the township organization.
“The cases before cited and the views expressed are not in conflict with section 46 of article 4 of the Constitution, as contended for by relators. That section reads as follows: ‘The General Assembly shall have no power to make any grant, or to authorize the making of any grant of public money or thing of value to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever: Provided, that Ibis shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in a case of public calamity. ’
“That section of the Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from making use of an individual or a corporation as a means through which it may .apply appropriations to lawful purposes.
“In the case of State ex rel. v. Seibert, 123 Mo. 424, it was held that a private corporation or individual may be the recipient of funds raised by taxation provided the use to which they are to be devoted is a public one. And in the case of State ex rel. v. City of St. Louis, 174 Mo. 125, it was also held that an ordinance of the city appropriating the expenses that a policeman incurred while in the performance of his duty as such officer, in removing a nuisance from a public street, as expressly required by law, was not a donation of public money to an individual in violation of said constitutional provision.
“ While this court in the case of State ex rel. v. County Court, 142 Mo. 575, held that an act of the Legislature transferring county taxes to the town of Kirkwood for street purposes was a violation of said constitutional provision and void for that reason, yet that opinion was based upon the fact that the county in that case had no concern or control whatever over the streets of the town. In that ease the streets were vested in the town, and its charter gave-it the exclusive jurisdiction of and control over its streets.
“Nor has the drainage district itself any authority or control over the ditches, nor does the law require it to keep the ditches free from obstructions.' That is obvious from the fact that it has no officers or means by which it could do so. It is without autonomy, and, as before stated, the exclusive regulation and control over these ditches is vested in the county court, and the Drainage Act imposes the duty' upon it to see that they are constructed, maintained and kept free from all obstructions.
“We have discussed these matters somewhat extensively for the prupose of showing that they are not only public corporations, but that they are under the sole and exclusive charge and control of the county court, and that the money the court is- au
“The very case cited and relied upon by counsel for relator, State ex rel. v. County Court, supra, recognizes the very distinction we have here drawn, and in express terms distinguishes that case from the cases of State ex rel. v. Seibert, and City of Hannibal v. County of Marion, supra, which we have before cited and discussed.”
Prom these observations it is seen that so long as the revenues expended are used for public purposes, that is, for purposes which are governmental in character, the Legislature has the constitutional authority to authorize their expenditure, whether they are expended through the agency of a purely public corporation or a municipal corporation, which acts in a dual capacity — for the public proper, and for itself in its private capacity. These views are firmly supported by numerous authorities in this and other States.
IY. It is finally insisted that the Act of 1913 does not confer authority upon consolidated school districts organized thereunder to issue any bonds whatsoever. '
Literally speaking this insistence is true, but when we take into consideration the fact that the Legislature was dealing with the general education of its citizens and authorized this higher class of instruction, it is apparent that it intended that the general school laws of the State, in so far as applicable, should be read in connection with this class of schools, in order to carry out the general design and intention of the legislative body.
The Legislature knew that this class of schools had no school property — lands, buildings or other instrumentalities — with which to carry on the school work, no more than the ordinary public school has when first organized, without resort should be had
In the discussion of the subject of the construction of statutes in pari materia this court in the case, of Sales v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 166 Mo. l. c. 677 to 678, held, and quoted with approval from Mr. Sutherland,.the following language:
“ ‘All consistent statutes relating to the same subject, and hence briefly called ■ statutes in pari materia, are treated prospectively and construed together as though they constituted, one act. This is true whether the acts relating to the same subject were passed at different dates, separated by long or short intervals, at the same session or on the same day.’ [Sutherland, Stat. Construct., sec. 283.]
“And ‘A statute must be construed with reference to the system of which it forms a part. And statutes on cognate subjects may be referred to, though not strictly in pari materia. ’ [Id., sec. 284.]
“Further on, the learned author discussing and discoursing upon the same subject, says: ‘Where enactments separately made are read in pari materia, they are treated as having formed, in the minds of the enacting body, parts of a connected whole, though considered by such a body at different dates, and under distinct and varied aspects of the common subject. Such a principle is in harmony with the actual practice of legislative bodies, and is essential to give unity to the laws, and connect them in a symmetrical system. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one
This language was also approved by this court in the cases of State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. l. c. .355, and State ex rel. v. Patterson, 207 Mo. l. c. 144.
In the case of State ex inf. v. Amick, 247 Mo. 271, l. c. 290, this court in discussing the samé subject quoted approvingly from the case of Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. l. c. 284, the following:
“In the case of Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. l. c. 284, the Supreme Court of Indiana, speaking through Elliott, J., said: ‘A statute is not to be construed as if it stood solitary and alone, complete and perfect in itself, and isolated from all other laws. It is not to be expected that a statute which takes its place in a general system of jurisprudence shall be so perfect as to require no support.from the rules and statutes of the system of which it becomes a part, or so clear in all its terms as to furnish in itself all the light needed for its construction. It is-proper to look at other statutes, to the rules of the common law, to the sources from which the statute was derived, to the general principles of equity, to the object of the statute, and to the condition of affairs existing when the statute was adopted. [Citing authorities.] . . . “Construction has ever been a potent agency in harmonizing the operation of statutes with equity and justice.” Statutes are to be so construed as to make the law one uniform system, not a collection of divers and disjointed fragments. When this principle of construction is adopted, “an enactment of to-day has
This act is progressive and in keeping with the forward movement of the State and country at large — ■ bringing home better schools and higher grades of instruction, which the ordinary public schools do not teach, and are incapable of teaching on account of the lack of means to construct appropriate buildings and to employ competent teachers. By this scheme of the Legislature thousands of our children can and will be instructed in the higher branches of education not taught in the ordinary school, who. are unable to go to city high schools, colleges and universities away from home.
The design of the Legislature is good and wise, and before the act conferring this benefieenee upon the youth of the country should be declared invalid, the reasons therefor should be so clear and unanswerable that no reasonable doubt should exist as to its unconstitutionality; and after a careful reading of the briefs of the respective parties and having investigated the authorities cited, we are of the opinion that no such reason has been pointed out.
It is so ordered.