37 Neb. 521 | Neb. | 1893
This was an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel and require the respondents, as the board of public works of the city of Omaha, to enter into a contract on behalf of said city, with the lowest responsible bidder, for the paving of improvement district No. 512, and submit the same to the mayor and city council for their approval, and on their approval thereof to cause said work of paving to be done in accordance with the terms of said
The facts alleged in the application, and by the demurrer admitted to be true, may be summarized as follows:
The city of Omaha is a city of the metropolitan class, having a population of more than 80,000 inhabitants. The respondents, Peter W. Birkhauser, St. A. D. Balcombe, and John B. Furay are the members of the board of public works of said city. On the 14th day of March, 1893, an ordinance was passed by the city council of said city, which was duly approved by the mayor on March 17, 1893, creating numerous paving districts, among others, street improvement district No. 512] which comprises Twenty-sixth street from Farnam street to Half Howard street, and ordering the curbing and paving of the streets, avenues, and alleys in said districts-,■. authorizing and directing the board of public works to advertise for bids for said work and ■ giving the property owners in said district thirty days’ notice within which to select the materials to be used for paving, and making other provisions relating to said improvements. In pursuance of said ordinance, the board of public works, on the 22d day of March, 1893, published a notice in the Omaha Bee, the official paper of said city, that sealed bids would be received until April 7, 1893, of the following kinds of paving materials, viz.: Sioux Falls or other granite, Colorado sandstone, sheet asphaltum, and vitrified brick, for paving said street improvement districts.
After the publication of said advertisement for bids, for the length of time and in the manner required by the ordinance, bids were received and acted upon, the bids for asphaltum were rejected, and a second and third advertise
Subsequently, on April 14, 1893, the respondents published, for the time required by the ordinances, a notice in said official paper of said city, to the owners of the real estate in said improvement district, to designate and select the materials they desired used for paving. After the publication of said notice, petitions of lot owners abutting upon that part of Twenty-sixth street from Farnam street to Half Howard street, representing a majority of the foot frontage on s*aid part of' said street, and a majority of the area within said district, were duly presented to the mayor and city council, asking for the paving of said district, and selecting vitrified brick, class A, price $1.89 per square yard, with five years’ guaranty, as the material the petitioners desired used in such paving.
■ In pursuance of said proceedings, and in accordance with said petition, the city- council, on the 22d day of June, 1893, duly passed ordinance No. 3590, which was approved by the mayor the next day, providing for the paving of Twenty-sixth street from Farnam street toHaI£ Howard street, in said improvement district No. 512; that, by the terms of said ordinance the board of public works was ordered and directed to cause said work to be done, and to enter into a contract for the same with the lowest responsible bidder, the lowest bid being $1.89 per square yard for vitrified brick, class A, five years’ guaranty, and expressly required that vitrified brick, class A, be used for said paving.
After the passage and approval of said ordinance a certified copy thereof was furnished the respondents, and it thereupon became their duty to make and-execute a contract on behalf of the city with J. E. Riley, who was, and who had been declared by the board of public works, vba lowest responsible bidder for said material so desig
The respondents claim that the ordinance passed by the mayor and council of the city of Omaha creating improvement district No. 512 is invalid, for the reason the same was adopted without a petition being presented by the property owners asking for the creation of said district and the paving thereof; in other words, that the council of a city of the metropolitan class has no jurisdiction, either to form a street improvement district, or to order the paving of the streets and alleys therein, until there has been first presented to the mayor and council a petition therefor signed by the owners of lots representing a majority of the feet frontage of the property abutting upon .the streets or alleys included within the proposed improvement district. The case of Von Steen v. City of Beatrice, 36 Neb., 421, is relied upon as an authority to sustain the foregoing proposition.
At the hearing of the case at bar, upon a hasty reading of section 69 of the act governing cities of the metropolitan class, the court reached the conclusion, and so announced, that the mayor and council of a metropolitan city have no power or authority to create a paving district, except upon a petition signed by a majority of the property owners of the proposed district; but after a more careful reading and consideration of said section, we are now convinced that its provisions are not susceptible of such, construction.
The section already mentioned, and it is the only one bearing upon the question which we have been able to find, and counsel have not called our attention to any other, declares that “the mayor and council shall have power to open, extend, widen, narrow, grade, curb, and gutter, park,
A perusal of the numerous provisions of the foregoing section is sufficient to carry conviction to the mind that the law-makers never intended to limit the jurisdiction of the city council to form paving districts to cases where the property owners have petitioned for the same. It will be observed that the statute under consideration contains no provision which in express terms requires that the lot owners must petition for the creation of a paving district before the same can be established, except where the entire improvement is to be done without expense to the municipality. The legislature has provided by language that cannot be misunderstood that certain street improvements can be made alone upon a petition of the property owners. Thus, where a street is to be graded otherwise than at the established grade, the owners representing a majority of the front feet of the lots abutting upon the portion of the street to be so graded must petition for such improvement; and when three-fifths of such lot owners petition for the grading of a street or alley without expense to the city, the work may be ordered done and the costs thereof assessed against the abutting property. Likewise, it is provided that a street, avenue, or alley which has not been ordered paved, the city council cannot require to be curbed and guttered,
This construction of the statute does not conflict with the decision in Von Steen v. City of Beatrice, supra. That was an action to enjoin the making of a contract for the grading and paving of two districts in the city of Beatrice. The petition for paving of one of the districts was signed by less than a majority of the lot owners, and the same is likewise true of the petition for improving the streets of the other district, not counting the names of those who signed conditionally. The court held that a petition to confer jurisdiction upon the council of a city of the second class, having over 5,000 and less than 25,000 inhabitants, to order the paving of streets in a paving district, must be signed unconditionally by the owners of the majority of the feet frontage therein. Whether a city council possesses authority to create a paving district, except upon a petition,
It is urged by counsel for relator that the mayor and council have jurisdiction to order the paving of the streets, alleys, and avenues of a city, even though no petition of property owners for paving is submitted to the council prior to the passage of the ordinance ordering the improvement. The proposition was decided adversely to the contention of counsel in the Beatrice case, to which reference has already been made. True, that decision was not under the same statute we have been considering, but an examination of the provisions of the two statutes will show that they are substantially alike. We are entirely satisfied with the decision in Von Steen v. City of Beatrice, and it will be adhered, to. Petitions of property owners of paving district No. 512, signed by the requisite number of petitioners, were presented to the council prior to the passage of ordinance No. 3598, ordering the paving of the streets within such district. Said petitions were in every particular sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the city council to act, and the paving was by said ordinance directed to be done in accordance with said petitions.
The remaining question to be considered is this: Was it necessary to advertise and receive bids for paving after the designation by the lot owners of materials to be used?
Under section 104 of the act incorporating metropolitan cities, it is made the duty of the board of public works to make contracts on behalf of the city for the performance of all such works and the erection of such improvements as shall be ordered by the mayor and city council, subject to their approval. Under the facts admitted by the demurrer, it was clearly the duty of the respondents to enter into a contract on behalf of the city with the lowest responsible bidder for the paving of improvement district No. 512 with the kind of material selected by the property owners of said district. The demurrer to the application is overruled and a peremptory writ of mandamus is allowed.
Writ allowed.