115 P. 200 | Mont. | 1911
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
Application for an injunction. The purpose sought by this application is to have this court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction compel the several defendants to dismiss certain actions brought by them and now pending against the relator, the city of Helena, and to refrain from instituting others of a similar character hereafter. The actions described in the petition are: One instituted by the defendant Charles E. Bockus, as receiver of the Helena Waterworks Company, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Montana, to enjoin the issuance and sale of bonds by the city to procure funds for the purpose of installing its own water supply system; a second, brought
The defendants, in response to an order to show cause, made upon the presentation of the application, filed their answers, reserving, however, the right to question the power of this court to grant the relief prayed for. The cause was then submitted for final judgment, upon the pleadings, a transcript of the testimony of several witnesses in the form of depositions taken in the action brought by Lokowich and his codefendants, and other documentary evidence. The controlling question presented for decision arises upon the objection of the defendants to the jurisdiction of this court. Even without objection, what
This court was created by the Constitution. That instrument is the charter of its power. The assumption by it to exercise a power not expressly granted or necessarily implied would be a •usurpation. On the other hand, a refusal to exercise any power granted, when properly invoked, would be a clear violation of its duty. When we turn to the Constitution to ascertain the powers conferred, it is apparent that the purpose of the convention that formulated it was to constitute a court exclusively a court of review, with all the auxiliary powers necessary to the exercise of this jurisdiction, except in so far as it expressly declared otherwise. The provisions defining and limiting its powers are found in sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII, as follows:
“See. 2. The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state, and shall have a general supervisory control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.
“Sec. 3. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court shall extend to all cases at law and in equity, subject, however, to such limitations and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Said court shall have power in its discretion to issue and to hear and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and injunction, and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.”
The- different justices are in the latter part of section 3 clothed with power to issue, hear and determine writs of habeas corpus, and also writs -of certiorari to review proceedings for contempt in the district courts; but these powers are conferred upon the justices individually. Consideration of them is not pertinent here. In section 2 the grant is of “appellate jurisdiction only,” “except as otherwise provided,” and “a general supervisory control over all inferior courts.” The appellate
By section 3 the jurisdiction granted under section 2 is extended to “all cases at law and in equity.” The rule of interpretation to be applied in order to ascertain the limits of this jurisdiction is embodied in the maxim, “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius”; for in the Declaration of Rights this rule of interpretation is declared as follows: “The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.” (Article III, section 29.) In section 2, above, the word “only” is exclusive. It signifies “no other than,” as applied to the objects with reference to which it is used. Hence it excludes the notion of original jurisdiction in any case, except so far as it is conferred by some other provision. The word “all,” used in section 3, is inclusive, and signifies “the whole number of” with reference to “cases at law and in equity.” Thus again the affirmative words in this section operate to exclude the notion of original jurisdiction over
It will be observed that, while the supervisory and appellate jurisdictions conferred are to be exercised under limitations and regulations prescribed by law, the writs enumerated in section 3 are put into the hands of the court to be made use of at its discretion, to effectuate their appropriate purposes. All of them, except the writ of injunction, are common-law writs, and their uses were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution well defined and understood. It is not necessary to discuss them. The purpose and functions of the writ of injunction are discussed and defined in State ex rel. Clark v. Moran, 24 Mont. 433, 63 Pac. 390. Inasmuch as it (a non jurisdictional writ) is found grouped with five other jurisdictional writs, the rule “noscitur a sociis” was applied to determine the uses which it must serve, and the conclusion was reached in that case that it was the intention of the convention that it was not to be used as a provisional remedy in aid of an independent equity jurisdiction conferred upon this court, — because none such was conferred, — but as a new prerogative or quasi prerogative writ (the equity arm of the court’s original jurisdiction) which, together with its associates, would fully equip the court as a court of final resort “on all judicial questions affecting the sovereignty of the state, its franchises or prerogatives or the liberties of the people.” In this definition of its purpose w-e -adopted the view of the supreme court of Wisconsin, in Attorney General v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425, construing an identical constitutional provision, as follows: “And, plainly recognizing the intention of the Constitution to vest in this court one jurisdiction, by several writs, to be put to several uses, for one consistent, congruous, harmonious purpose, we must look at the writ of injunction in the light of that purpose, and seek its use in the kindred uses of the other writs associated with it. ‘Noscitur a sociis’ is an
Section 6255 of the Revised Codes, among other things, provides: “No action to obtain an injunction must be commenced in the supreme court, except in cases where the state is a party, or in which the public is interested, or the rights of the public are involved, but the proper district court has jurisdiction of all injunctions, and the commencement of all actions therefor, except as in this section provided. The supreme court may provide rules for the commencement and trial of actions for injunctions in that court.” As has already been said, the use
In this case no interest of the public — that is, of the state— is involved. In its comprehensive sense, the term “public” is. the opposite of the term “private,” and applies to the affairs, of the state or some division thereof, as opposed to those of a. private citizen. A municipality, such as the city of Helena,
In anything said herein we do not wish to be understood as holding that a state court may in any case issue an injunction to stop proceedings in a federal court.
The order to show cause is set aside, and the proceeding dismissed.
Dismissed.
: In State ex rel. Clarke v. Moran, this court determined that it does not have the jurisdiction sought to be invoked in this proceeding, and, while I do not subscribe to all that is said in that case, the decision ought not to be reversed except for the most cogent reasons. It is necessary that due consideration be given the former decisions of courts of last resort, to the end that litigants may know upon what they are to rely. I concur in the result reached by the Chief Justice, primarily upon the ground of stare decisis; but, if it be assumed that this court has original jurisdiction in equity cases, the record before us does not justify an order directing the dismissal of the suit in the federal court or the suit instituted by the Custer Mines Consolidated Company; and, with those cases pending, it is not made to appear that any advantage whatever would accrue to the city of Helena by having the Lokowich suit dismissed. If this court has jurisdiction, it ought to be exercised only in cases where the wrong to be averted is imminent and substantial relief can be awarded. The presentation of a mere abstract right, without any beneficial result to flow from it, is not sufficient to justify interference.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. While I agree, in a general way, with the conclusions of law reached by the Chief Justice, I am yet of opinion that the very extraordinary and remarkable circumstances leading up to the institution of the case of Lokowich et al. v. City of Helena, demand that this court enjoin the further prosecution of that action.