{¶ 1} In September 2001, appellee Hamilton County Municipal Judge Ralph E. Winkler conducted a bench trial in which the defendant was acquitted of all charges. On Septembеr 27, 2001, the day after the trial’s conclusion, the defendant filed a motion to seal the official record of his case pursuant to R.C. 2953.52. On November 5, 2001 (almost six weeks after the trial), Judge Winkler held a hearing on the motion and later granted it. On December 6, 2001, the Cincinnati Enquirer, appellant, delivered to Judge Winkler a written request to inspect all records produced in the criminal case. Judge Winkler refused the paper’s request because the court records had already been sealed. Thereafter, appellant filed this mandamus action in the First District Court of Appeals against both Judge Ralph E. Winkler and Clerk of Courts James C. Cissell, appellees.
{¶ 2} Initially, the court оf appeals ordered Judge Winkler to weigh the individual’s privacy interests against the public’s legitimate interest in accessing the records, as required by R.C. 2953.52.
{¶ 3} Appellant presents three arguments in this appeal. First, appellant argues that it is entitled to the release of the court records, as they are public records as definеd in the Public Records Act. Second, appellant asserts that R.C. 2953.52 is unconstitutional, since it is overbroad and, therefore, it cannot be used as an exception to the Public Records Act. Third, appellant contends that in applying the balancing test, the court should have found in favor of releasing the records. Appellees, however, assert that R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional and that records sealed pursuant to this statute lose their status as public records. Appellees also contend that thе case was improperly brought in mandamus.
{¶ 4} Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to seek compliance with the Public Records Act under R.C. 149.43. State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Bond,
{¶ 5} We begin with the purpose of Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, which is to expose government activity to public sсrutiny. State ex rel. WHIOTV-7 v. Lowe (1997),
{¶ 6} However, there are exceptions to the general rule of openness. One exception, found in R.C. 149.43(A)(l)(v), is for “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.” Sealed court records fall within this exception, since R.C. 2953.55(B) makes it a fourth-degree misdemeanor to release sealed records. Thus, once the court records were sealed under R.C. 2953.52, they ceased to be public records. Since the sealed records lost their status as public records, Judge Winkler was justified in refusing appellant’s request.
{¶ 7} Appellant next argues that R.C. 2953.52 is unconstitutional on the ground that it viоlates the public’s right of access. We reject this contention.
{¶ 8} The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a qualified right of access to criminal proсeedings. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superi-
{¶ 9} The right of public access, as examined in the context of a criminal proceeding, serves several lofty goals. First, a crime is a public wrong, and the interest of the community to observe the administration of justice in such an instance is compelling. Harrison, How Open Is Open? The Development оf the Public Access Doctrine under State Open Courts Provisions (1992), 60 U.Cin. L.Rev. 1307, 1322. Also, the general right of public access promotes respect for and an understanding of the lеgal system and thus enables the public to engage in an informed discussion of the governmental process. Bechamps, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Publiс Have a Right to Know? (1990), 66 Notre Dame L.Rev. 117,127. The right, however, is not absolute. “No one has a right to any particular degree of openness or secrecy, except as provided by law.” State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Waters (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 321, 324,
{¶ 10} R.C. 2953.52 makes another exception to the general rule of openness. R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) allows a defendant found not guilty of an offense to apply to the court to have his or her record sealed.
{¶ 11} The only function of this statute is to allow a court, after balancing the public and private interests, to limit the life of a particular record. The public’s ability to attend a criminal trial is not hindered. The media’s right to report on the court proceedings is not diminished. The statute does not restrict the media’s right to publish truthful information relating to the criminal proceedings that have been sealed. In addition, the public had a right of access tо any court record before, during, and for a period of time after the criminal trial. In fact, the public’s access to the records is unrestricted until a decision is made to seal records. The statute ensures fairness by balancing the competing concerns of the public’s right to know and the defendant’s right to keep certain infоrmation private. Therefore, on its face, R.C. 2953.52 is constitutional.
{¶ 12} Nor is R.C. 2953.52 unconstitutional as applied. In this case, there was a full public trial with widespread media attеntion. Appellant’s reporters presumably attended the trial in its entirety. The court record remained open for more than five weeks after the trial had concluded. Thus, appellant had ample opportunity to report on and to access and copy the trial record for a substantial period of time before its sealing. Once a case is sealed, however, the basis for public access to the official records does not exist.
{¶ 13} We therefore conclude that R.C. 2953.52 does not violate the public’s constitutional right of access to public records and that the trial court complied with its dictates.
{¶ 14} The court of aрpeals’ judgment denying the writ is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The statute also permits a court to seal records following a dismissal of the charges or a grand jury’s no bill.