45 Neb. 724 | Neb. | 1895
This is an original proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, on the relation of the attorney general, under the provisions of section 714 of the Civil Code, to determine the rights of the respondents, who claim to be members of the board of fire and police commissioners for the city of Omaha. By section 145 of the act of 1887, entitled “An act incorporating metropolitan cities, and defining, regulating, and prescribing their duties, powers and government,” hereafter referred to as the charter of the city of Omaha, provision is made for a board of fire and police commissioners consisting of five members, to-wit, the mayor, and four electors of said city to be appointed by the governor. In 1889 and 1891 said section was amended by the addition
“August 2, 1895, 10 o’clock A. M.
“Appointing board for the appointment of fire and police commissioners for cities of metropolitan class met pursuant to written notice heretofore given of said meeting. Present, H. C. Russell, Com. P. L. & B., and A. S. Churchill, Attorney General.
“ Whereupon the following proceedings were had: Hon. H. C. Russell was chosen chairman pro tern, and A. S. Churchill secretary. The meeting being called to appoint fire and police commissioners of the city of Omaha.
“Whereupon W. J. Broatch was appointed one of the said fire aud police commissioners of said city for the term*731 ending December 31,1895, Paul Yandervoort for the term ending December 31, 1896, and A. C. Foster for the term ending December 31, 1897, and commissions instructed to be issued accordingly.
“There being no other business, after waiting until 11 o’clock A. M. of said date the board adjourned.
“Record read and approved. H. C. Russell,
“ Chairman pro tern.
“A. S. Churchill,
“Secretary.”
Said respondents subsequently qualified in the manner prescribed by law, and will he referred to as the new board. Messrs. Strickler and Smith, upon the appointment and qualification of the new board, recognized' the title of the latter and refuse to join in resisting their claims to the offices in controversy.
It should be remarked, as preliminary to an examination of the cause on its merits, that this court is not the keeper of the legislative conscience, and that the motives of members of the respective houses, or the wisdom and propriety of the act involved, present no question of judicial cognizance. That act is, we may assume, as are most if not all measures of like character, wholly indefensible; still the caustic arraignment of counsel should have been addressed to another department of the government, since it is not within our province to criticise or defend it as a matter of legislative policy. It should be remembered, too, that all presumptions are in favor of legislative acts, and that no act will be declared invalid unless plainly and irreconcilably in conflict with the constitution. With these general observations we will proceed toa consideration of the questions discussed, and which will, so far as practicable, be examined in the order presented by counsel for the old board.
It is in the first place claimed that section 145 of the act of 1887 was repealed by the act of 1889 amendatory thereof, and that the attempted amendment of 1895 is ac
“Section 145 was amended by section 46, chapter 13, Laws, 1889, and the section as originally enacted was repealed, so that it ceased then to exist. Section 46, act of 1889, was carried into the Compiled Statutes as section 145, chapter 12a, entitled ‘Cities of the Metropolitan Class/ and was in turn amended by section 32, chapter 7, Laws, 1891, in the title of which it was designated as section 145 of chapter 12a, Compiled Statutes, and the section amended was expressly repealed. So that section 145, chapter 12a, Compiled Statutes then ceased to exist, and the law that continued thereafter in force was neither section 145 of the act of 1887, nor section 46 of the act of 1889, but section 32 of the act of 1891, and, as section 145 of the act of 1887 had not been in existence since 1889, the act of 1895 touches nothing and is absolutely void.”
Of the cases to which we are referred by counsel for the old board, Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me., 507, has been cited as an apparent exception to the rule above stated (see 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 515); but the later statute, as appears from a careful examination of that case, imposed upon stockholders of corporations a liability different from that of the former act, and was construed as a technical repeal rather than a mere re-enactment of the old law. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 134 Ill., 656, the facts are not fully reported, but it appeal’s from the opinion of the court that the legislature had attempted to amend a section which “had been previously amended by a distinct and complete section.” It cannot be determined whether the act referred to was amendatory merely, or whether it substituted new and distinct provisions for the original section. In State v. Renton, 33 Neb., 823, the act sought to be amended had been repealed by implication, leaving nothing to which the amendatory act could apply. In Hall v. Craig, 125 Ind., 523, the question of the validity of the later statute was not determined, the court preferring to treat the acts as in pari materia, although earlier decisions of that court seem to sustain the proposition here asserted, and may be regarded as exceptions to the rule. Other cases cited deal with repeals proper rather than amendatory acts, and need not be examined at length. The great object to be attained by the constitutional requirement is certainty in legislation, and to avoid the doubt and perplexity which would inevitably result from the amendment of statutes by reference to sentences or words. As said by this court in State v. Babcock, 23 Neb., 128: “All that the law requires is that the amendatory statute shall be definite and certain as to the statute amended, and germane to the title of the original act.” When tested by that rule it would seem that the reference
It is next argued that the provisions of the law of 1895 for the removal, by the officers designated as the appointing board, of fire and police commissioners for official misconduct is broader than its title, and accordingly invalidates the entire act; but that law is, as we have seen, amendatory of the law of 1887, and not an independent measure, hence we must look for its title to the act last mentioned. We shall not examine the eases cited from other states, since every phase of the question presented has been fully considered by this court. The constitutional requirement, viz., “No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in its title,” (Constitution, sec. 11, art. 3,) was intended to prevent surreptitious legislation, and not to prohibit comprehensive titles. The test is not whether the title chosen is the most appropriate, but whether it fairly indicates the scope and purpose of the act. (Boggs v. Washington County., 10 Neb., 297; State v. Ream, 16 Neb., 681; State v. Babcock, 23 Neb., 128; Kansas City & O. R. Co. v. Frey, 30 Neb., 790; Paxton & Hershey Irrigating Canal & Land Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation & Land Co., 45 Neb., 884.) Authority to remove unfaithful officers is a proper if not a necessary incident of municipal government, and the provision therefore is obviously within the title of the act “defining, regulating, and prescribing the duties and powers and government of cities of the metropolitan class.”
Another criticism of the act under consideration is that it conflicts with certain other sections of the city’s charter not therein referred to, among which are mentioned section 149a, chapter 12a, Compiled Statutes, authorizing the appointment of a police matron by the mayor, and section
It is argued that the act under consideration violates the constitution of the state and the constitution of the United States by making party affiliation a qualification for office. The particular provision of the act assailed is the following : “The said appointing board shall, within thirty days from and after the passage of this act, appoint as the commissioners above named three citizens, at least one from the two political parties casting the largest number of votes for governor at the last preceding general election. One of these shall be designated in said appointment to serve until December 31, 1895, the second until December 31, 1896, and the third until December 31, 1897.” The constitutional restrictions above referred to are section 3 of our bill of rights, viz., “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and section 15, article 3, as follows: “The legislature shall not pass local or special laws * * * granting to any corr poration, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever;” also section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, viz., “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” The question here presented was considered in
Of the cases cited by counsel for the old board, Attorney General v. City of Detroit, 58 Mich., 213, cannot be regarded as authority, in view of the express restriction of the constitution of that state, which, after prescribing the form of oath to be taken by public officers, concludes as follows: “And no other oath, declaration, or test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust,” while the only provision of our constitution upon the subject is that found in section 4 of the bill of rights, viz., “No religious test shall be required as a qualification for office.” City of Evansville v. State, 118 Ind., 426, appears to be in point, but that case, if not indeed overruled, is opposed to the doctrine stated in the subsequent case of Hovey v. State, 119 Ind., 386, in which Elliott, C. J., uses this language: “It is within the authority of the legislature, by virtue of its general power, to require that the officers of this class shall be selected from different political parties, or that they shall be persons of peculiar skill and experience.” Opposed to the contention of counsél are two classes of cases, of which the first, and more numerous, assert, without qualification, the power of the legislature, in the absence of express constitutional restriction, to prescribe particular qualifications for holding office, such as political affiliation. Other cases regard like provisions as directory, or, more accurately speaking, advisory merely, and binding upon the appointing power only within the limits of the comity existing between different departments of government. Of the first class may be mentioned the following cases: Hovey v. State, supra; State v. Finger, 28 N. E. Rep. [O.], 135; Rogers v. City of Buffalo, 123 N. Y., 173; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill., 587; Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St.,
It is said that the act is inconsistent and incapable of execution by reason of the provision therein for the appointment of the board of fire and police within thirty days from and after its passage, to-wit, April 3, 1895, whereas said act did not take effect until three calendar months after the adjournment of the legislature for that session. (Constitution, see. 24, art. 3.) To one familiar with legislative methods in this state, the apparent inconsistency suggests its own explanation, viz., that the bill, as originally introduced, contained an emergency clause providing that it should take effect upon its passage, and which was subsequently eliminated without amending the other provisions thereof so as to conform to its altered condition. It is evident that by the expression, “within thirty days from and after the passage of this act,” is meant thirty days from the time when-said act took effect as a law. Where a statute is ambiguous the courts, following established rules of construction, adopt that interpretation which will best promote its general object. (Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 196; State v. Allen, 43 Neb., 651.) The cases are numerous in which the foregoing general principle has been held, applicable to facts substantially like those here involved. (See Harding v. People, 10 Col., 387; Charles v. Lamberson, 1 Ia., 435; Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich., 327.) In Harding v. People, supra, it is said: “In. the absence of any emergency clause in view of the constitutional provision,, the expression ‘after the passage of the act,' as used in the law, can have but one meaning, namely, after the act goes into effect.” With the view thus expressed we are entirely satisfied.
Finally, it appears from the record that the. governor,, for reasons to him appearing sufficient, but which need not
Judgment accordingly.