THE STATE EX REL. CAMBRIDGE HOME HEALTH CARE, INC. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL.
No. 2008-1464
Supreme Court of Ohio
March 3, 2010
124 Ohio St.3d 477, 2010-Ohio-651
Submitted January 12, 2010
{¶ 1} Respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio awarded respondent Laura Horvat 175 weeks of compensation under
{¶ 2} Horvat’s 2004 workers’ compensation claim was allоwed for a right wrist sprain with arthritis. She later moved for scheduled-loss compensation under
{¶ 3} The physical therapy report did not comment on the degree of loss or whether Horvat had a total loss of use of her hand. Cambridge Home Health Care had the physical therapy report reviewed by Dr. Scott E. Singer, a licensed physician, who concluded that Horvat’s level of function, as rеcorded by Hornbeek, did not meet the standard for loss of use.
{¶ 4} A staff hearing officer awarded Horvat 175 weeks of compensation for total loss of use, relying exclusively on the рhysical therapy report. Reconsideration was denied, and Cambridge Home Health Care commenced this original action in mandamus.
{¶ 5} At issue is the hearing officer’s exclusive rеliance on a physical therapy report to award 175 weeks of scheduled-loss compensation. Cambridge Home Health Care argues that a loss-of-use award must be supported by a physician’s report and cannot be based solely on a physical therapy report. The commission now agrees that the hearing officer erred and joins Cambridge Home Health Care in asking us to vacate the award. Horvat responds that the hearing officer did not rely simply on the physical therapist’s report and that even if he did, that reliance was not fatal. We agree with the position of Cambridge Home Health Care.
{¶ 6} Contrary to Horvat’s representation, the hearing officer did rely exclusively on the рhysical therapy report. The closing boilerplate language, “all proof on file was reviewed and considered,” is not, as Horvat claims, proof that the hearing offiсer implicitly relied on other evidence in the file. See State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 483-484, 6 OBR 531, 453 N.E.2d 721.
{¶ 7} The reliance on a single physical therapy report is an abuse of discretion for several reasons. First, regardless of whether a loss-of-use award is considered an impairment award or a disability award—it has elements of both—a physical therapist is prohibited from giving an opinion on еither. The General Assembly has prohibited physical therapists from issuing disability conclusions.
{¶ 8} Second, while
{¶ 9} A physical therapist, of course, is not a physician. A physician is defined as an individual authorized under
{¶ 10} The Tenth District Court of Appeals has relied on this administrative provision to reject an effort to expand the class of profеssionals able to certify workers’ compensation disability. In State ex rel. Fries v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Franklin App. No. 01AP-721, 2002-Ohio-3252, 2002 WL 1377785, the claimant argued that because both physicians and licensed clinical counselors were defined in
{¶ 11} “While a physician is a practitioner under the [Health Partnership Program], those terms are obviously not equivalent. In other words, even if Ms. Schwartz, as a licensed professional clinical counselor, can claim ‘practitioner’ status under the [Health Partnership Program] definition, she clearly is not a physician.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 111.
{¶ 12} This holding is notable because a physical therapist is also a “practitioner” under
{¶ 13} Other jurisdictions have also disqualified physical therapists from offering disability or impairment conclusions. In Bolton v. CNA Ins. Co. (Tenn., 1991), 821 S.W.2d 932, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that a physical therapist’s permanent partial impairment assessment could not be used as evidence in a workers’ compensation case. Id. at 938. Health professionals, the court began, were competent “to testify as an expert only as to matters within the limited scope of his or her expertise and licensure.” Id. at 935. This scope, in turn, was defined by the state’s Occupational and Physical Therapy Practice Act, Tenn.Code Ann. Chapter 13—a statute with requirements similar to ones contained in
{¶ 14} Tennessee’s statute permitted physical therapists to evaluate and treat individuals “using specific means and narrowly defined methods.” Id. at 936. The act specifically prohibited the practice of mediсine and, with only a very limited exception, authorized physical therapy only upon referral by a physician.1 This referral requirement prompted the court to conclude thаt physical therapy is a narrow health specialty limited in scope.
{¶ 15} “[A] physical therapist is not qualified to form and express an expert opinion as to the permanent impairment or permanent physical restrictions of an * * * injured person. * * * [A] physical therapist’s testimony must be limited to objective findings and cannot encompass an opinion on ultimate disability.” Id. at 938.
{¶ 16} Citing Bolton, a United States Court of Appeals reached the same result in an automobile negligence action. Stutzman v. CRST, Inc. (C.A.7, 1993), 997 F.2d 291, held that a physical therapist could not testify that she hаd a rehabilitation plan that could improve the patient’s strength and coordination enough to permit light work. Id. at 298. The court characterized her statements as “a medical prognosis that a physical therapist was not qualified to render.” Id.
{¶ 17} Federal regulations have long excluded physical therapists from the list of “[a]cceptable medical sоurces” authorized to “provide evidence to establish an impairment” in social security disability cases.
{¶ 18} In the case at bar, the staff hearing officer relied solely on a physical therapy report to award 175 weeks of scheduled-loss compensation for an alleged loss of the use of a hand. The commission now concedes that this was an abuse of discretion, and our review supports that conclusion.
{¶ 19} We accordingly issue a limited writ of mandamus that vacates the commission’s order and orders the commission to further consider Horvat’s motion and issue a new order.
Limited writ granted.
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘CONNOR, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
Millisor & Nobil Co., L.P.A., and Michael J. Reidy, for relator.
Thomas C. Mays & Associates and Mark M. Sturik, for respondent Laura Horvat.
