State ex rel. Byrd v. HendersonState ex rel. Byrd v. Henderson
Relator applied for a writ of habeas corpus and other relief alleging that his incarceration resulted from an unlawful conviction obtained without affording him court appointed counsel. We оrdered an eviden-tiary hearing to determine whether applicant was indigent at the time he was denied a court appointed lawyer. State ex rel. Byrd v. Henderson, Warden,
Relator was charged with having committed a simple robbery,
When the case was called for trial on November 4, 1974 relator appeared without counsel. Because of the trial court’s previous determination that relator was able to emрloy an attorney it ordered the trial to commence, forcing him unsuccessfully to
At the evidentiary hearing, held on January 30, 1976 pursuant to our order, relator, represented by a public defender, introduced documentary evidence and the testimony of several witnesses. The State introducеd no evidence. In our opinion the preponderance of the evidence favors the conclusion that relator was not able to employ an attorney to represent him at trial and, therefore, the State was required to provide him with legal assistance during his prosecution. Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; Gideon v. Wainwright,
Relator was unemployed. The only assets he owned were аn undivided one-half interest in two parcels of immovable property he inherited from his mother. One was thе family home in Shreveport valued at $5,000 within which his father resided. The other was a piece of rural prоperty in Caddo Parish valued at $850. Both were burdened with a usufruct in favor of his father. The rural property was sold to a third party and the proceeds were expended before relator’s need of an аttorney arose. For some reason which was never made clear during the hearing, relator had several months before his arrest signed and left with his father’s attorney an undated deed conveying his interest in the family home to his father. After his son’s arrest the father’s attorney visited relator in jail and obtained his consent tо deliver the deed to the father. The father then mortgaged the family home and borrowed $3200 from a bank, $2500 оf which he deposited with the sheriff, as bail for his son’s release, and the balance of which he used to рay attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in closing his late wife’s succession. After his son’s convictiоn and consequent imprisonment the bail money was returned to the father, and he promptly applied it against the mortgage indebtedness affecting his home.
The record does not reflect the actual value of relator’s interest in the property; he owned merely the naked interest of an undivided onе-half of the property. The age of the father who held the usufruct does not appear in evidence, so the relative values of the usufruct and the naked interest cannot be calculated. Nor do we know to what extent the bank relied upon the father’s credit in making the loan in addition to the property as security. However, the record is clear that the relator had no practical means of liquidating his interest in the property without his father’s cooperation, and once the deed wаs delivered the father then had complete dominion over the property. It is equally clear thаt the father never gave any of the loan proceeds to relator, or offered or agrеed to use them to employ an attorney for him. In reality, relator owned no assets which were available to him for purposes of employing counsel. Instead, he owned claims to assets, perhaps difficult to enforce, having an undetermined value, probably insufficient, even if successfully enforcеd and liquidated, to purchase the services of a competent attorney for a felony jury trial.
Under these circumstances the trial court was in error in determining that relator was not entitled to court аppointed counsel and deprived him of a constitutional right by forcing him to undergo criminal prosecution without the assistance of counsel for his defense. In accordance with Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 921, we reverse relator’s conviction and sentence and remand his case to the district court with instructions to grant a new trial and provide an attorney to assist in his defense.