*1 Wisconsin rel. Brian L. Buswell, State ex
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v. Area Tomah District, School Defendant-Respondent.
Suрreme Court
11,
Oral argument January
No. 2005AP2998.
Decided June
An amicus curiae brief was filed A. Melissa Cherney and Galinat, L. Christine Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Education Association Council.
An amicus curiae brief was filed J. Michael Verstegen, Lathrop Julka, F. LLP, Richard & Clark Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association School Boards, Inc. petitioner, 1. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The unpublished Buswell,
Brian seeks review anof court appeals affirming judgment decision that dismissed his *8 claims that the Tomah Area School District violated the public requirements meetings open notice of Wisconsin's appeals law.1He that asserts the court of erred when it provided concluded the that Tomah Board of Education 1 Dist., See v. Buswell Tomah Area 2005AP2998, School No. (Wis. 2006) unpublished op. 6, slip July Ct. App. (affirming a
186 considering adequate Tomah it would be the notice that 1, at June contract its master Education Association's hiring procedure for coaches a new 2004, and meetings. 2004, June and June at both its the notices violated advances 2. Buswell 19.84(2) reasonably § they were not because Stat. Wis. subject likely apprise the of the members of to meetings notices are incon- the and that the matter of meetings policies open law as set for the sistent with 19.81(1) (4). §§ essence, In and in Wis. Stat. forth adopt a reason- contends that this court should Buswell degree determining speci- for ableness standard identifying ficity required matter of in provision comply to with the order open meetings law. meaning plain of Wis. that the 3. We conclude 19.84(2) standard, sets forth reasonableness Stat. proper balance a standard strikes and that such 19.81(1) (4) §§ contemplated and between in Wis. Stat. government's public's right and the to information efficiently Applying that its to conduct business. need June notice was we determine that standard, 19.84(2) contrary poli- to under insufficient (4) 19.81(1) reasonably §§ it failed because cies apprise it would consider members contract Tomah Association's master Education determine, however, that the further We hiring procedure coaches new to detail the failure neither contract renders in the new master contained because the June 15 notice insufficient the June nor require detail in such it would be reasonable County, Michael J. for Monroe judgment of the Circuit Court (2003-04)(all references § 19.84 McAlpine, Judge); Wis. Stat. are 2003-04 version unless to the the Wisconsin Statutes noted). otherwise
these circumstances. we Accordingly, reverse the сourt and appeals remand cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
r—H 4. In 2004, June the Tomah Board of ¶ Education ("Board") held two meetings regarding new master contract between the Tomah Education Association ("TEA") ("School and the Tomah Area School District District") for the 2003-04 and school years. 2004-05 Prior to the meetings, June Tomah community members had expressed concerns over a proposal include a provision to TEA giving priority members over other candidates for athletic coaching in the new positions TEA master contract. The record reflects that no previ- TEA ous master contract contained a procedure for hiring athletic coaches. 5. Prior to the June meeting,
¶ 16 community members, including Buswell, sent a letter to the Board regarding School policy District's for coaches. hiring The letter expressed concern about possibility the Board would adopt hiring new for policy coaches objected to including any such in the TEA policy new contract. 1, On June School Board held a
special meeting in closed session to discuss the provi- sions the new TEA master contract. The Board had issued a agenda which stated:
Contemplated closed session for consideration and/or concerning action employment/negotiations with Dis- 19.85(l)(c).2 personnel pursuant trict to Wis. Stat. 19.85(1) Wis. Stat. procedures outlines the legiti 19.85(1)(c) mate purposes holding meetings. closed Section provides that may closed sessions be convened for: During session, the Board the June closed *10 tentatively approved the TEA master contract by the Board in and ratification to TEA ratification open included the The new master contract session. given hiring procedure preferential to TEA coaches applicants were not members over other who members of TEA. regular held a
¶ 15, 2004, the Board 8. On June stating, preceded by public in relevant a part: on the Action Business —Consideration
New and/or Following: Approval Employee
TEA Contract meeting, During open of the June 15 session officially TEA master contract that ratified the Board meeting. approved tentatively 1 at the June had been against District, ¶ the School filed suit 9. Buswell by failing open meetings alleging law it had violated (1) adequate give Board would notice that to: 1 at the June meet TEA master contract consider the (2) hiring ing; the new the Board would consider procedure contract at for coaches contained within (3) meeting; would consider 1 the Board the June hiring procedure for coaches the new ratification of granted The circuit court 15 June state a for failure to District's motion to dismiss School ruling appeals basing decision on the court claim, its Stoughton, City II, LLC v. ex H.D. Enter. in State rel. compensation perfor- promotion, or Considering employment, public employee any over which mance evaluation data responsibility. body jurisdiction or governmental exercises has (Ct. 1999). App. 480, 230 Wis. 2d N.W.2d The appeals concluding court of court, affirmed the circuit that notice of the met the standard under H.D. Enterprises. v. Dist., Buswell Tomah Area School No. App. (Wis. unpublished slip op., 2005AP2998, Ct. 2006). July petitioned 6, Buswell for review. I I ¶ 10. This case comes to the court on a review of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In such posture, reviewing court as takes true the facts alleged complaint. in the Methodist Manor Wauke sha, App Martin, Inc. v. 2002 WI 2, 255 Wis. 2d *11 707, 647 N.W.2d409.
¶ interpretation 11. Our focus here is on the of open meetings Wisconsin's statutes. We must discern provided whether the complied meetings notices for the two open meetings interpreta- with the law. The presents questions of tion a statute of law that we independently review of the determinations rendered appeals. the circuit court and court of v. Haferman Found., Inc., St. Clare ¶ Healthcare 15, 171, WI 286 Wis. 2d 707 N.W.2d853.
h-ih-i h-f Although ¶ 12. the current version of Wisconsin's open meetings years, law has been in force for over 30 degree this court has never addressed the issue of the of specificity required identifying subject matter of comply provision in order to with the notice open meetings of the law. Buswell contends that the provided by for its June 1 and June the Board notices general comply meetings аnd did not 15, 2004, were too 19.84(2). part: provides in relevant That section with governmental Every of a of a public notice date, time, subject body place forth the shall set including intended for meeting, of the matter session, any closed contemplated consideration at reasonably likely to apprise form as is members such .3 the news media thereof... meeting, respect Buswell to the June With the notice was deficient because did claims that upon act a new master indicate that the Board would not state that the TEA, and it did contract with procedure hiring upon the new Board would act argues contract. He that the coaches within the master con- the TEA notice would have had to mention both hiring provision in order to be and the new tract public" "reasonably likely apprise members respect With matter meeting, notice was Buswell claims that the June would it did not state that Board deficient because hiring provision upon for coaches. act the new argues the failure to further Buswell meetings TEA consider the would indicate contrary provision hiring to the contract and new meetings open polices law, in Wis. as set forth *12 19.81(1) 19.81(1) (4). § provides: Section Stat. likely "reasonably that a notice be requires The statute media" of the and the news apprise members of However, meeting. Buswell does not frame subject of the matter to the media. regards аdequate in argument his reason Rather, arguments all whether notices his address Accordingly, is the ably public. this apprise members we address. question recognition
In representative govern- of the fact that a ment type dependent of the American an upon is electorate, informed it is declared to be the of policy this state the public is entitled to the fullest and most complete regarding information govern- of affairs governmen- ment as is compatible with conduct of tal business. 19.81(4) open meetings subchap-
Section adds that the liberally purposes ter "shall be construed to achieve the set forth in this section ...Buswell maintains that policies require specific these more notice than that provided in the notices for the June 1 and June 15 meetings. argument At the heart of Buswell's is his appeals failing contention that the court of erred adopt apply a reasonableness standard determin- ing complied open whether the notices with Wisconsin's meetings law. appeals' 15. The cornerstone of the court of 19.84(2)
analysis interpretation in H.D. Enterprises. grocery application It involved a store's liquor city Stoughton. city license from the The published notice of a council at which it would application. published agenda consider the The for the meeting indicated that the council would discuss the application by listing the item as "licenses." At the meeting, the council denied the license. 230 Wis. 2d at however, 482. The council, reconsidered the denial second The notice for the second also meeting, listed the item as At "licenses." the second granted council the license. Id. plaintiff alleging 16. The filed a lawsuit that the 19.84(2).
city argued merely had violated It listing agenda provide an item as "licenses" does specific enough reasonably apprise information to members of the matter *13 meeting, the reconsideration of denial which was liquor grocery application Id. for a license. at store's disagreed plaintiff. appeals with the It The court of 485. apprise sufficed to the word "licenses" determined that subject of the of the matter members require meeting, not "that the and that the statute does subject any explained more a be with matter of adopted bright-line specificity." Rather, it Id. 486. general topic of items to be discussed is rule that "the satisfy Id. at 487. the statute." sufficient appeals present ¶ case, In the the court Enterprises compelled the conclu- determined that H.D. Because the terms were sufficient. sion that notices "employment/negotiations" and in the Board's notices— Employment Approval" no more "TEA general Contract —are appeals reasoned "licenses," than the court of provided matter that the Board sufficient unpub- meetings. Buswell, June 1 and June 15 for its slip op., ¶ 7. lished appeals
¶ further indicated 18. The court of required Enterprises, H.D. was to follow but it was argument. sympathetic It stated to Buswell’s "[wjhile argu- policy sympathetic to Buswell's we are differently might the issue ment, and have decided [H.D. Enterprises], clean prior on a we do write arguments any Id., Instead, noted that slate." Enterprises changing in H.D. the standard established to this court. must be directed very District maintains 19. The School "employment/negotiations" general terms such as provided Employment suffi- Renewal" "TEA Contract argument meetings. At oral for the cient notice the H.D. Enter- District contended that under School language, bright-line prises such as rule, even broader sufficiently provided personnel," would have "District specific disagree however, We, notice. that such broad *14 heading "reasonably per likely apprise is se to members public" of the the of the is a new master contract teachers. appeals'
¶ 20. The court of and the School interpretation Enterprises District's of H.D. a elevates provision. very provision general into a one-size-fits-all approach, meeting required Under their a is not to have any very specificity general notice with more than a provision such as "licenses." Allowing language
¶ 21.
such broad
as "licenses"
to constitute sufficient notice as a matter of law is
19.84(2)
contrary
§
plain languagе
the
of
and the
19.81(1)
policies
open meetings
§§
of the
set
law out
(4).
approach
and We therefore reevaluate the
of H.D.
Enterprises.
taking bright-line approach,
a
Rather than
any
general
where
notice that is no more
than "licenses"
adopt
approach,
is
we
sufficient,
a reasonableness
ac-
cording
reasonably specific
to which notice must be
under
circumstances.4 It is our view that
a
such
concurrence,
aIn
Roggensack
Justice
contends that H.D.
Enterprises did not
a bright-line
establish
rule and
accuses
majority
attacking
a
Concurrence,
straw
56,
man.
¶¶
II,
(citing State ex rel.
Stoughton,
H.D. Enter.
LLC v. City
(Ct.
1999)).
Wis. 2d
In an amicus Attorney General states that H.D. Enterprises created a "one-size-fits-all applicable standard all notices." It "bright-line concludes that standard of H.D. Enterprises is inconsistent 'reasonably with the apprise' stan- by 19.84(2)." dard Legislature established in Wis. Stat. is lan- plain standard required reasonableness meetings of the law. open guage policies 19.84(2) is language 22. Tо begin, plain re- to a rule. That section bright-line not amenable "reasonably likely apprise notice be quires added). The (emphasis use public" members a of factors. suggests balancing the word "reasonably" In analysis. balancing case-specific requires Such words, will sufficiently specific other whether under the circum- what is reasonable upon depend stances. determination in the find for this support We *15 ex Bd.
reasoning of State rel. Badke v. Vill. Vill. (1993). Greendale, 173 Wis. 2d 494 N.W.2d Likewise, that H.D. Enter- petitioner "[a]fter concedes are prises, general accept- if like 'licenses'... provisions able, equally general pass as then all notices that are muster." if agrees, asserting that respondent The also the word "licenses" Enterprises, H.D. then sufficiently specific deemed under was " Concerning Nego- Employment Action 'Consideration and/or enough than members of the apprise tiations' is more concerning the may Board consider act that School and/or negotiations." H.D. appeals agree the court of that
The circuit court and The a rule. circuit court deter- Enterprises bright-line creates Enterprises that under H.D. conclude mined it was bound The meetings adequate. court the notice for the was that notices that are no more similarly concluded that appeals Buswell, Enterprises. H.D. general than "licenses" suffice under slip op., unpublished Enterprises supports the
Finally very language of H.D. are general no than "licenses" that notices more interpretation in the statute that no adequate. requirement "There is per se more meeting explained any subject matter of a be with Wis. 2d at 486. specificity." village meeting regarding Badke,
In board a contro- special facility permit versial held at a use was that was quite large enough approxi- not mately to accommodate the people Twenty people who attended. could only foyer building, meeting enter a up in the not the main people hall, and to three were denied entrance altogether. they Some attendees testified that could not adequately proceedings spot hear the from in their foyer. Id. at 563. plaintiffs
¶ 24. The in Badke contended that be- gain cause some could citizens not entrance and others meeting, not could hear what was at the said requirement meetings violated the that be places reasonably in "held accessible members of the open and shall be to all citizens at all . . times . ." 19.81(2). § Wis. Stat. This court determined that the "reasonably suggests "open words accessible" to all require at all citizens does times" absolute accessi- bility. "reasonably" implies Rather, held reviewing case-by-case must on courts evaluate basis determining meetings sufficiently whether are accеs- sible. Id. at 580. We determine that the word "reason- 19.84(2). ably" has similar effect proposition ¶ 25. The that a statement general topic per of a should se constitute contrary policies sufficient notice runs to the articu- 19.81(1). "public lated in That section states that the *16 complete is to entitled the fullest and most information regarding government compatible the affairs of as is governmental with the conduct of Such business." in- meetings formation extends of notice under 19.84(2). § Badke, 2d at 577-78. Wis. 19.81(1) § too, note,We that states that the open meetings premise "repre- law is based on the that government [depends] upon sentative an informed elec- government that functions best torate." observe We people open have information and when when is merely operations. a not, however, It is matter about its enhancing government. Rather, the of the of functions governed. government to the It must be accountable people to the who underwrite must be accountable legitimacy. Having government provide finances its workings govern- the of access to information about arguments subterfuge ment undercuts ulti- mately promotes public Moreover, and confidence. trust require- Badke, in the this court determined notice as gives public information the ment the about business importance that alert them to the be conducted will they meeting, so that can make an informed deci- Badke, 2d at sion whether attend. 173 Wis. 573-74 and 577-78. 19.84(2) language and the Thus, underlying open meetings
policies law do abide bright-line general topic a a rule where the constitutes sufficient matter notice as matter they Rather, of law. demand reasonableness standard reasonably specific according notice must to which be Because the the circumstances of the case. under applica- is at odds with the reasonableness standard bright-line H.D rule, tion of a we therefore overrule Enterprises.5 Attorney brief submitted As noted an amicus
General, consistently approach comports approach with the this General, Attorney charged with inter by the who advocated meetings law under Wis. Stat. 19.98. preting open the state’s meetings published by law compliance guide open In the Justice, Attorney urges Department of General meetings, in mind noticing keep "should officers given can at the time is entitled to best be *17 requires ¶ 28. The reasonableness standard tak- ing into account the circumstances of the case in determining whether notice is sufficient. This includes analyzing providing such factors as burden of subject more particular notice, detailed whether the of is public interest, and whether it involves non-routine public unlikely anticipate. action that the be would (Vergeront, Enter., See H.D. 2d at J., Wis. dissenting). providing factor, 29. The first of burden specific body noticing
more on information 19.81(1). policy derives from It balances the providing greater requirement information with the providing "compatible such information be with governmental the conduct of affairs." Wis. Stat. 19.81(1). compatible Whether more detailed notice is governmental with the conduct of affairs is determined case-by-case may on a Such basis. a determination include, but is not to, limited the time and effort assessing pro- involved in what information should be vided in a notice and the inherent limitations of citizen aptly Badke, boards. In this court described the de- public mands on officials: Wisconsin,
In many there parttime are citizen boards long relatively work homs for or no pay. little These boards' real compensation comes from satis- It very faction service. difficult these myriad anticipate boards to may of situations that question call into parameters open meeting recognize law. We that most diligently officials try to abide the law .... notice is prepared." Dept, Justice, Wis. Open Wisconsin 2005). Guide, A
Meetings Compliance Law: p. (Aug. *18 The crucial is that the point 2d at 570. 173 Wis. efficient should not thwart demands of specificity business. governmental administration factor, are In the second we considering ¶ in subject interest public persuaded particular in greater specificity matter of a meeting may require may Particular interest he public notice. hearing interested and the of both the number of people matter interest, in and of The level of of that interest. intensity Rather, it must be itself, however, is not dispositive. on a basis. case-by-case balanced with other factors Third, may notice degree specificity of the is routine subject meeting on whether the depend of a recurs subject meeting regu- or novel. Where the need for because may specificity there be less larly, more likely anticipate members of the are public are more However, novel issues it will be addressed. may unaware. Novel issues to catch the likely notice. therefore more require specific of whether notice is suf- 32. The determination information is avail- should be based what upon ficient at the time meeting noticing able to the officer it would be is and based what upon provided, there Thus, to know. whether reasonable for the officer of a subject meeting interest is particular public subject within the or whether a issue specific that affects the covered, and how meeting will be from the cannot be determined specificity required, takes place. the meeting actually of when standpoint of when Rather, standpoint it must be from gauged noticed. objections ¶ 33. The School District raises several adoption to the of a reasonableness standard deter- mining complies whether a notice with Wisconsin's meetings open persuasive. quoting First, laws. None is Enterprises, case-by-case analysis H.D. it asserts that municipalities obligation "burden with an would every every detail issue that will be discussed under agenda during meetings item when that is not man- Enterprises, dated statute." H.D. 2dWis. at 487. reasonably apprise A notice must members of the matter of a under the circum- require A stances. reasonableness standard will not *19 every every always agenda that issue on be enumerated requirement because such a would be unreasonable. general subject headings may Rather, suffice cases general heading reasonably apprises where a members subject public meeting. of the of the matter In reasonably apprising public cases, other members of the may require greater specificity. argues
¶ 34. Second, the School District a that inappropriately reasonableness standard would con- meetings governmental strain discussion at bodies their because deliberations would be limited to topics. disagree. noticed narrow We Under a reason- meeting participants standard, ableness would be free any aspect subject matter, to discuss of the noticed as reasonably well as issues that are related to it. It is true topics that a cannot address unrelated to the information in the However, notice. that is because the requirement notice functions to assure members of public reasonably apprised are of what is discussed meetings. objection topics may at such The that other freely objection is therefore not an to not be addressed require- standard, to a reasonableness but ment itself. argues Third, a the School District impose unacceptable standard would an
reasonableness governmental gauge predict and burden on bodies to every meeting's agenda. interest item on a it While is correct that reasonableness standard will require anticipate at times and account for bodies noticing meetings, not interest when will impose per requirement predict gauge public se subject every meeting. pre- interest on each Where dicting gauging public imposes interest an unrea- required burden, not sonable the bodies will be to do so. Applying standard, the reasonableness we hearing determine that the notice for the June was sufficiently specific "reasonably likely to be apprise public" members matter of "Contemplated The June 1 notice stated: concern- closed session consideration action and/or ing employment/negotiations personnel with District 19.85(l)(c)." description pursuant Stat. This Wis. vague, negotiations any group for it could cover with any personnel employee or individual district with within the district.6
6 Boards, The Association of School Inc. and the Wisconsin Education Association Cоuncil submitted amicus Wisconsin body" arguing "governmental briefs the Board was not a 19.82(1) meaning § the terms of within the of when discussed 1 That bargaining agreement a collective at the June "governmental body" section excludes from the definition purpose entities "formed for or for the of collective I, bargaining under subch. IV or V of ch. 111." Wis. Stat. 19.82(1). 1 in part § Because the Board met on June to discuss
201 1 Moreover, the June notice was misleading. was to Wis. pursuant It stated that the closed session 19.85(l)(c).7 That for closed provides Stat. section related to sessions for matters individual considering collective considering bargaining not employees, As the School District conceded at oral agreements.8 cite statute to would have argument, appropriate contract, argue the TEA master the briefs that the provisions of requirements the notice required Board was not to follow meetings Neither the School District nor Buswell open law. Further, argument. raise this issue in briefs or oral the record that the Board met on June 1 for the purpose does not indicate Rather, bargaining. of collective it indicates that it met to bargain- approval consider of the terms reached via collective ing. decline here. We therefore to address issue 7 argues The School District that notice for closed sessions may open than notice for due the fact specific be less sessions may City that the not attend. It cites to Olson v. Baraboo Joint Review Bd. for the view that less detail is allowed, required public input as in closed where session. 15, 628, 2d App 2002 WI Wis. N.W.2d However, only notice of a implies adequate Olson closed may not whether on a require session information about a vote occur, long subject will so as the matter of the vote is justification per Id. Wedo not see a for a adequately specified. se may specific rule that notice for closed sessions be less than notice for open sessions. contrast, Attorney
In General contends an amicus may require specific brief that closed sessions more notice than justification open per sessions. We likewise do not see for a se always specific rule that notice for closed sessions must be more open than notice for sessions. Notice of closed sessions must enough contain information for the to discern whether the 19.85(1). subject matter is authorized for closed session under The minutes for the June 1 that the Board show high school applications position principal, considered for the *21 19.85(l)(e).9 Because notice was vague § been "reasonably likely apprise it not misleading, was matter of the members of the public" the TEA master contract.10 this case meeting —in case, the circumstances of this Examining 38. ¶ that those factors the conclusion support we determine First, 1 required specificity. that the June notice greater the TEA master that importantly, stating and most meeting the June 1 would discussed at contract be a It a only not to the Board. requires would be burden Further, the notice for the June 15 words. few TEA on agenda, listed the master contract actually a it was listing there is contention that there no burden. 19.85(l)(c). Thus, citing is fall under that statute
which would misleading personnel as matters were insofar individual not Rather, meeting. misleading it is because considered be personnel were to suggests only that individual matters at the considered 19.85(1)(e) closed sessions when: provides Section (e) public properties, Deliberating negotiating purchasing or specified investing funds, conducting other or require business, competitive bargaining a reasons or whenever session. closed City Joint cites Olson v. The School District of Baraboo on a incorrect information Bd. for the proposition
Review inadequate. render that notice public notice does not per agree that is not se rule 14. We there ¶ Wis. 2d 19.84(2) incorrect on any time there is information is violated however, Here, specify notice. the notice does a public employment individual consider whether closed session the cited bargaining agreements, and or collective matters only cover suggests will misleadingly statute com matters. The mistakе therefore employment individual being offset rather than pounds inadequacy id., in the notice. other information See Second, the TEA master included contract *22 hiring provision new for coaches that of was interest to community. people a number of in the Several citizens petition regarding had made the effort to the Board put provision hiring a whether to for coaches into the master contract.
¶ Third, TEA master contract was a hiring routine insofar as it contained a new provision for coaches to which number of members of objected. community suggests This that the notice should have mentioned the TEA master contract. analyzing Thus, of circumstances provide case, we conclude that the Board did not sufficient notice the June The notice was vague misleading. circumstances, Under the it was sufficiently specific likely "reasonably not apprise to be public"
members of the that the con- cerned the TEA master contract. Although
¶ 42. we determine the notice for meeting required greater specificity the provided June than it contract, as to TEA master we do not agree with Buswell's contention that the notice violated 19.84(2) by failing to state that the Board would act upon hiring provision the new for coaches set forth Again, apply within the master contract. we the factors to the circumstances of the case to dеtermine whether providing specific the more information would be rea- sonable. pro-
¶ 43. The first of factors, burden viding greater weighs against requiring information, that the notice for the June state hiring provision. Admittedly, Board would address the weigh requiring the second and third factors in favor of that the Board address the that the notice state would hiring provision. particular There was interest hiring hiring provision provision, and the within However, novel. we determine that the the contract was particular provisions providing notice of burden bargaining great enough contracts is collective requiring un- that information would be unreasonable circumstances. der the may complex and con- 44. Master contracts be any provisions. Requiring that school
tain number similarly anticipate bodies, boards, or situated other provisions in a notice would and list all of those likely disproportionate amount of their consume may significant require a More- limited time and effort. *23 argues, requiring public over, as the District that School provisions of notice list which individual collective agreements bargaining in will be discussed closed ses- governmental could serve undermine bodies' sion place bargaining positions, would a substantial which considering balance of Thus, on the them. burden including a factors, we the burden of determine that provision particular in 1 its notice for the June contract meeting еnough required not is that it is substantial 19.84(2).11 under
11 it that for reason that Justice Butler contends the same provide notice the not that have been burdensome would at June master under consideration the TEA contract would be notice of meeting, provide it also burdensome to would not be coaches, in each case "a few hiring provision new for for the Concurrence/dissent, in the notice would have sufficed." words hiring is adding coaches Admittedly, a few words about However, required for the number of words not burdensome. only the consideration. provision is particular contract be Rather, degree specificity will the question what describing of a contract aspects required particular pro- be under It is our determination will consideration. reject argument ¶ 45. We also Buswell's that the meeting notice for June 15 was insufficient. Unlike meeting, the notice for the June the notice for the meeting Employee Ap- June 15 listed "TEA Contract proval." Thus, a member of the could determine by TEA that the master contract would be discussed reading the As notice. with the notice June 1 meeting, the notice for the June need not specified hiring provision have that the new for coaches part would be of the TEA contract. The burden of specifying particular provisions in a multifaceted con- great. acknowledge given tract would be too We may level of interest in mattеr, have been hiring provision beneficial to list the new that was contained the TEA However, master contract. we do specificity not mandate such here.
IV As above, discussed whether a open meetings is sufficient under law is determined applying analyzing a reasonableness standard specifics departure of the case. This ais from bright-line Enterprises, rule in HD. announced accord ing stating only general topic which notice to be discussed is sufficient. 230 Wis. 2d at *24 Ordinarily, 486-87. this court adheres to the doctrine that a decision which an overrules earlier decision is retrospective operation. Picotte, in v. State 42, 2003 WI ¶ (citing 42, 249, 261 Wis. 2d 661 N.W.2d381 Harmann (1986)). Hadley, v. 371, 128 2d 377, Wis. 382 N.W.2d673 viding notice that a contract will a meeting be discussed at is burdensome, not but specifying particular provisions of a multifaceted significantly contract is more burdensome.
206
a of new rule can be unset-
Yet,
application
retroactive
contrary
reliance on a
view
justifiable
of
because
tling
pro-
court will therefore on occasion
of
law. This
to limit such unset-
precedent
overrule
spectively
past
Harmann,
2d at
128 Wis.
378.12
effect.
tling
whether
inform the
inquiry
47. Three factors
¶
retroactive ver-
determination
should have
our judicial
Co.,
v.
Wenke Gehl
2004 WI
prospective application.
sus
220,
Those
70-71,
2d
mental bodies
mitigate
any
hardships
result
from a
change
law,
we will
apply
rule
announced here only to this case and to cases challeng-
Thus,
future
ing
notices.
any challenge to the specificity
matter of public notice under Wis. Stat.
19.84(2)
that was issued
to the
prior
date this opinion
is mandated will be examined under the requirements
Enterprises.
of H.D.
We
rule
apply
new
to this case
because Buswell has acted as a relator on behalf of the
19.97(3).
state,
pursuant
Wis. Stat.
such,
As
he has
worked to vindicate his and others'
right
to open
Hodge
government. State ex
Lake,
rel.
v. Town Turtle
(1993).
62, 78,
180 Wis. 2d
V 50. Having determined the June 1 insufficient, was and that will we apply reasonable- case, ness standard this we turn to the question of In his remedy. amended complaint, Buswell requests *26 hiring provision voiding in for the master coaches the meetings, adopted forfeitures in the June contract knowingly against any at- the board who member of meetings meeting violating open law, the and tended a attorney fees. reasonable provision Voiding is not an avail-
¶
a contract
51.
remedy
the
The
advised that
here.
court was
able
hiring provision
adopted
has
the
contract that
master
expired
argument
provision
expired.
in
a
an
The
incongruous.
appears
voided
contract can be
master
Similarly,
aas
¶
forfeitures are not available
52.
provides
remedy
for forfei-
in
19.96
this case. Section
body
governmental
"[a]ny
who
a
member of
tures
knowingly
body
in
such
held
a
of
attends
meetings
open
decision over-
law. Our
violation" of the
Enterprises
bright-line
and estab-
rule of H.D.
rules the
place.
Members
a reasonableness standard
its
lishes
complied
governmental
as
bodies who
with
law
for violation
sanctioned
based
then existed cannot be
today.
interpretation first announced
on an
attorney
respect
¶
fees, Wis. Stat.
to
53. With
19.97(4)
bringing
provides
person
as
an action
(as
here) for
case
of the state
relator on behalf
may
meetings
open
law
receive costs
of the
enforcement
attorney fees:
[i.e.,
brings a case as a
pеrson
where a
In such actions
necessary
may
actual and
relator],
court
award
attorney fees
including reasonable
prosecution,
costs
....
prevails
if he or she
to the relator
19.81(4) requires
provisions
that the
Section
liberally
meetings
open
construed
be
of the
law
interpreted
purposes.
has
court
the law's
This
advance
awarding attorney
requirement
fees to
to merit
prevailing
doing
pur-
where
relator
so advances the
poses
open meetings
Hodge
law.
v. Town Turtle
Awarding
Lake,
§ contrary policies §§ and to the in аnd (4) reasonably apprise because it failed to the it would consider the TEA's master contract at that further determine, however, We that the failure hiring procedure to detail the new for coaches contained in the new master contract renders neither the June 1 nor the June 15 notice insufficient it because would not require be reasonable to such detail in these circum- Accordingly, appeals stances. we reverse court of pro- remand the cause to the circuit court for further ceedings.
13The appropriate
of attorney
award
by
fees is determined
the "lodestar" methodology.
Co.,
Anderson v. MSI
Ins.
Preferred
62,
39,
2005 WI
66,
281
2d
Wis.
210 Rights By declared. Wereverse court the Court.— appeals to the circuit court. and remand the cause ROGGENSACK, DRAKE J. PATIENCE {concurring). 1, I the June conclude that Because satisfy meeting open was insufficient Wis. notice of the 19.84(2) (2005-06),1 join § I the mandate Stat. my separately in I write because view However, court. satisfy for the June does the notice Enterprises requirements II, LLC v. State ex rel. H.D. (Ct. Stoughton, City 480, 230 Wis. 2d 602 N.W.2d 19.84(2). sepa- § 1999), regard App. I also write analyzing rately instead of whether because given is matter of the notice June 19.84(2), Enterprises H.D. sufficient under "bright majority opinion up straw-man, its line sets Enterprises Majority op., says rule," H.D. creates. proceeds majority opinion ¶¶ 19, The then by knocking Enterprises down the straw- H.D. overrule Majority op., majority opinion created. man that the my served ¶¶ would be better 27,52. view, In compliance guidance with about additional 19.84(2) given Enterprises or in either H.D. than majority Accordingly, respectfully opinion. I concur.
I. BACKGROUND *28 complaint by of a This case arises out citizen (Buswell) of the Tomah Buswell that the board Brian board) (the comply with the did not Area School District 19.84(2), § provisions Stat. notice Wis. meeting regard 1 the TEA Em- to a where both June applicants position ployee for Contract 1 are the 2005-06 version All further references to noted. Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise 211 high principal alleges school were discussed. Buswell also provisions that notice were violated for a meeting alleges 15, second on He held June that "subject meetings reasonably matter" of both was respective they described in notices because did not give considering notice that the board would be new hiring procedures give for athletic coaches that would hiring preference to current TEA members. He also meeting asserts that the notice for June 1 was misleading a because that notice included to reference 19.85(l)(c), § statutory Stat. Wis. as the con- basis for ducting part asserts, closed session. He 19.85(l)(c) § City agrees, applicable and the discussing is not Employee the TEA Contract in closed session. ¶ 58. The board contends both notices were meeting provided: sufficient. The notice fоr the June 1 Contemplated Closed Session for Consideration and/or Concerning Action Employment/Negotiations with Dis- 19.85(l)(c). trict Personnel Pursuant Wis. Stats. statutory The board admits that the reference in the misleading, notice have could been it but asserts that State ex rel. v. City Board, Olson Joint Review of Baraboo App 64, 2002 WI 628, 252 Wis. 2d N.W.2d concludes that incorrect information in of a public meeting sufficiency is not fatal to the of the notice. by noticing The board also contends that that it would Employee Approval" consider "TEA Contract at the June 19.84(2).2 meeting, complied with Stat. Wis. meeting, 59. Prior to the June board community proposal knew that there was the TEA agree
2I majority with the opinion's conclusion that notice for the June 15 satisfy sufficient Wis. Stat. 19.84(2); therefore, I do not address notice further in this concurrence. *29 give priority
Employee to current that would Contract jobs. regard hiring coaching for TEA members presented Majority question op., ¶ for The is meetings of whether both review is this reasonably public apprised the news media of and hiring subject meetings when the matter of those regard to the June mentioned, not and in coaches was Employee TEA Contract notice, whether, because the misleading as well. mentioned, not the notice was was
II. DISCUSSION A. of Review Standard interpret requires various 60. This review us
statutory
apply
provisions
them to the facts
and to
interpretation
application
presented
The
herein.
subject
independent
questions of
to our
are
law
statutes
County
DNR,
96,
10, 293
v.
2006 WI
Jackson
review.
2d
B. Stat. Wisconsin 19.84(2) provides in rel- ¶ Stat. Wisconsin part: evant governmental of a
Every notice of a time, date, subject place body set forth shall meeting, including intended matter of the session, closed any contemplated consideration likely reasonably apprise members form as is such thereof. public and the news media sufficiency challenge of the notice not Buswell does place Rather, he of the time, date or sufficiency challenges matter de- claiming incomplete, mislead- notice, scribed in the apprise reasonably ing of what tbe and does will discuss. board *30 Meeting 1. Notice of the June 1 undisputed ¶ 62. It is the that board intended to topics meeting and did discuss two at the June under subject topic: Employee one matter the TEA Contract applications position high princi- for the school pal. give required public Therefore, the board was subject notice of both, if there are two different matters during meeting. were be discussed "Subject ¶ 63. matter" is not defined in Wis. Stat. open 19.84 or in the elsewhere statutes that address meeting requirements. Dictionary Black's Law de- "subject scribes matter" as: consideration; The issue for presented thing right or duty asserted; which has thing been dispute. (8th 2004). Dictionary
Black's Law ed. is a This gives guidance definition, broad inclusive but it us little particularity about how much or in what form one subject should describe matter that will be ad public body. dressed at a aof Enterprises, appeals In H.D. the court of "subject Stough- addressed matter" in the context of the ton Common Council's consideration of Pick 'N Save's application liquor Enterprises, H.D. license. application Wis. 2d at 482. Pick 'N Save's had been published licensing requirements in accord with alcohol 125.04(3). found in Wis. Stat. Id. at 482. The agenda was used the common council as liquor notice that it would consider the on license January agenda 27. Id. The listed "licenses" an as agenda topic. Id. This notice was first of three liquor occasions on which the discussed, license was Enterprises alleged City before H.D. its violated liquor obligation. application The for a Id. after that first common council denied license was allege Enterprises meeting. did not However, Id. H.D. insufficiently described the notice meeting. Id. at 487. of the first matter again meeting, "licenses" was At the second agenda gave notice council's on the common listed application meeting. Pick 'N Save's Id. at 482. Enterprise granted had Id. H.D. at that was objected meeting, appeared second application. Id. Pick 'N reconsideration of Save's days approximately after the second Therefore, six *31 meeting meeting, a third council convened the common Enterprises the com- attended and in which that H.D. Enterprises' request that H.D. mon council considered liquor Id. at 482-83. Pick 'N Save's license. it rescind Id. 483. H.D. to do so. The common council refused Enterprises claiming City Stoughton sued the of then description general of too "licenses"was that the term satisfy meeting subject Wis. of second matter 19.84(2). Id. Stat. the notice was concluded 66. The circuit court concluding Enterprises appealed. In
sufficient H.D. subject description of the that "licenses"was sufficient public, reasonably apprise the court matter to surrounding appeals circumstances examined all the liquor application for a Pick 'N Save's consideration notice It noted that the Id. at 483-84 and 487. license. of the consideration the common council's first subject Id. matter. to describe the "licenses" matter used Enterprises had H.D. noted that at 487. The court meeting therefore, had appeared at that council City's description. experience Id. use of with Enterprises appeals did H.D. noted that The court complain the first lack of notice for about the appeals Id. The court also balanced the municipalities, burden to which would be caused detailing every subject may facet of a matter that be agenda every item, addressed under with the suffi- ciency public. of the Id. appeals opinion guidance
¶ 67. The court of
took
from
Lare,
State ex rel.
v.
Schaeve Van
125 Wis. 2d
(Ct.
1985),
App.
3 City Stoughton The of meeting entire agendas used the as State ex public notices for Enterprises rel. H.D. v. meetings. its City Stoughton, (Ct. 480, 482, 230 Wis. 2d 602 App. N.W.2d 72 of 1999).
216 Moving court, the to before ¶ the case now 69. upon of and circumstances of the facts consideration by provided Area of the Tomah the board the notice meeting, regard I the 1 in June School District Enterprises's H.D. it was insufficient under conclude 19.84(2). interpretation I conclude that of Stat. Wis. meeting 1 insuffi- June was the notice the board's present for that are here and on three facts cient based impor- countervailing present in and facts were which Enterprises. in decision H.D. tant to the topics very were ad- ¶ different First, 70. two heading the in the notice for board's under one dressed applicants meeting, e.g., the consideration June high principal provi- position the for the school Employee Contract. In H.D. for a TEA sions new topic liquor Enterprises, noticed license was the sole the meetings. Id. at 487. and discussed at both provisions TEA the master Second, the 71. going presented Employee at the Contract were be meeting, for contract i.e., this was brand-new June Enterprises, the In H.D. second to consider. board given Id. as the first. the same was liquor com- discussed license was Because the topic previously, mon council under subject experience in matter as media had the news Enterprises at- Id. H.D. had notice. described meeting previous council that was common tended by using agenda form, noticed in the same subject topic Id. "licenses" as a matter. with the And, third, notice for the June Employee misleading regard Con- the TEA was Stat. referenced Wis. because the notice tract 19.85(l)(e) taking up for as the basis the board's 19.85(1)(c) session. Section matter in closed applicants appropriate cite the consideration *33 position high principal, for apply school it not but does agreements bargaining to collective such as 19.85(l)(e) Employee TEA Contract. Section is permits public body section the statutes that to bargaining agreements consider collective in closed 19.85(l)(c) (e) By failing session. to include both public notice, in the the board misled the about both subject meeting matter the closed and the number of topics Enterprises, that would be discussed. In H.D. allegation misleading. no there was that the notice was Accordingly, I conclude that notice of the June meeting subject of the board did not set forth the reasonably apprised public matter ain form that Employee and the news media that the TEA Contract portion in would be discussed the closed session of that Therefore, the notice for the June requirements comply did not with of Wis. Stat. 19.84(2), interpreted Enterprises. as in H.D. though However, even I conclude that the notice for the June 1 was not to sufficient satisfy § 19.84(2), interpreted Stat. as Wis. in H.D. Enterprises, appears guidance given by that the H.D. Enterprises achieving sufficient to in аssist com- pliance give required those bodies that are meetings.4 notice of the matter of The 4 There are times opinion when one authors an and believes presented sufficiently addressed, the issues were but hindsight, they As were not. the author of H.D. I Enterprises, myself now find a position similar to that of Justice Robert problem, Jackson. remarked, When faced with similar he "The appear matter does not to me now as it appears to have Kristensen, appeared me then." 162, 178 McGrath v. 340 U.S. (1950) (further omitted). (Jackson, concurring) J. citations H.D. Enterprises appears differently to me now a bit than it appears written, to have appeared to me in 1999. itWhen was the court appeals Enterprises decision in H.D. appeared provide *34 subject requires notice of the matter be set that statute reasonably likely apprise" the as out "in such form is public advise, I would but the news media. adopt public require, a standard format for bodies that agenda meeting agendas. for meet- entire the The their 19.84(2) § ing the notice. This as should then he used experience give public in the news media the would recurring apt under are to be addressed what issues subtopics agendas suggest topics. the contain I that pne under one more than matter is be discussed when including agenda topic. a in the notice I also recommend agenda questions can be ad- that about the statement public body, representative the whose a dressed to appropriate phone an time to call name, number and subject body public If has described would be listed. the way generates questions or confusion in a that matter suggest I a more discussed, is detailed about what to be meeting agendas. agenda topic employed In for future be specificity body way, public learn both what will subject required matter of the to describe the public and the news form assists the and what best meetings. transpire understanding in what will media 2. Concerns Other majority part company I with 74. also Village
opinion's Board ex rel. Badke v. use of State Village Greendale, 2d 494 N.W.2d 173 Wis. (1993), support its contentions about as subject specificity matter in a Wis. Stat. which the with 19.84(2) Majority op., given. public be notice is to speci- or refers to the ¶¶ Badke never addresses 23-26. subject in matter guidance on the form in which sufficient reasonably in provided be order notice should public would be news media of what and the apprise public was needed. However, guidance more appears now discussed. ficity subject matter ain notice. And this good any Badke, is for In reason. there no was notice type given village going board was to meet. Badke, 173 2d at Wis. regard specificity Furthermore, to the
with which the matter of a must be majority opinion notice, described asserts topic "рarticular public if the is of interest," "greater specificity" may required be in the notice. Majority op., qualifier ¶¶ I 29-30. see no in Wis. Stat. 19.84(2). The and the news media are those to *35 my majority whom view, reasonable notice is due. In the opinion's requirement is an invitation for additional litigation claiming the notice was insufficient. For ex- ample, public prepares how is the servant who the "particular public notice to know that there' ais inter- est"? Will the notice be if insufficient he or she should "particular public have known aof interest" did but not? duty "particular Does he or she have a to learn of a public subject in interest" matters that will be public considered? Furthermore, does a member of the who has an interest in the matter of the expressed but who has never to interest others complete deserve less notice?
¶ subjective 76. I would not venture into these Rather, woods. I conclude that the standard set Wis. 19.84(2) § objective Stat. is an standard. Notice is to be persons simply And, reasonable. to be noticed are public, not, media, interested or and the news interested or not. finally, disagree
¶ majority 77. And I with the opinion's "[i]t broad assertion that is true that a meet- ing topics cannot address unrelated to the information Majority op., majority in opinion ¶ the notice." 34. The authority majority cites no for this conclusion. Does the agenda typical other opinion item оf "such that the mean provide may body"can never come before matters as 19.84(2) § a matter Stat. notice under Wis. sufficient requires unexpectedly presented the board and to attorney general did one attention? At least immediate Att'y Op. Gen. the case. be not believe (1977). facts and circumstances on the Notice based given is sufficient when the case affect the reasonably apprise and the news media. Accordingly, above, for the reasons set forth majority only joining concur, the mandate of I opinion. {concurring JR., in BUTLER, J. LOUIS B. join portions dissenting part). of the
part, I those (a) majority opinion Stat. Wis. conclude that which 19.84(2) (2003-04)1 § stan- forth a reasonableness sets (b) proper balance strikes dard; contemplated such standard (4) 19.81(1) § and between
in Wis. Stat. government's public's right and the information (c) applying efficiently business; conduct its need to notice was 1, 2004, standard, the June reasonableness 19.84(2) poli- contrary to the under insufficient (4) 19.81(1) reasonably failed to because it cies apprise contract that the master members *36 ("TEA")would be Education Association of the Tomah (d) meeting; rel. H.D. Enter- State ex at that considered City Stoughton, 2d 602 prises II, 230 Wis. LLC v. (e) (Ct. 1999), App. overruled; this should be 72 N.W.2d (f) applied prospectively; this and be decision should court to to the circuit remanded should be matter appropriate attor- costs and as to award determinе ney fees.
1 to the are Wisconsin Statutes references to the All noted. otherwise version unless 2003-04 separately ¶ I 80. write I because conclude that majority apply fails to the reasonableness standard adopts question in this case to the of whether the posting provided regarding June sufficient notice ("Board") Tomah Board of Education's consideration of hiring procedure Applying a new for athletic coaches. majority's standard, I conclude that June reasonably notice was insufficient because it failed to apprise public members of the that the Board would be considering proposal particular that was a matter of community, interest to the involved a non-routine public unlikely anticipate, action that the was easily could have been included in the notice. accurately ¶ 81. The facts are set forth in the majority opinion,2 repeated will be in full here. import Of is the fact that in June 2004 the Board held meetings regarding two a new master contract between ("School TEA and the Tomah Area School District District") years. for the 2003-04 and 2004-05 school meetings, community Prior to those a number of mem- expressed proposed bers had procedure concerns over a new hiring prior
for athletic coaches.3No TEA procedure hiring master contract contained a for ath- letic coaches. 2 Majority op., 4-9. ¶¶
3 The broad community interest exhibited in this case prior to the June 2004 meetings establishes was aware that a proposal was under hiring consideration new policy giving priority to TEA members over other for ath candidates coaching letic positions in the TEA Major new master contract. ity op., Consequently, majority's I accept conclusion that the notice for meeting, the June 15 which listed TEA contract sufficient. See approval, legally was majority op., Never theless, practice, better given the level of interest here, was shown would have to give been procedures for hiring coaches would be discussed the June 15 *37 Board set- issued ¶ The notice meeting agenda ting stated, June of the forth the part: relevant for Consideration
Contemplated Closed Session and/or egotiations with Dis- Concerning Employment/N Action 19.85(l)(c). Wis. Stats. Pursuant trict Personnel 19.85(l)(c) may provides be closed sessions that Section promotion, considering employment, com- convened any public employee. performance pensation The or referencing any information not contain notice did hiring procedures any proposed or TEA master contract coaches. for athletic provided for notice 83. At issue whether general not in too 1, 2004, was June 19.84(2). compliance That section Stat. with Wis. part:
provides, in relevant governmentаl Every of a public notice . of the the.. matter body shall set forth at including intended for consideration meeting, session, form as is in such any contemplated closed public.... reasonably members likely apprise ("Buswell") that the contends ¶ 84. Brian Buswell not indicate because did was deficient June notice upon contract a new master act Board would that the Board that the it did not indicate TEA, and with hiring provision upon for athletic the new act would agree, majority I concludes, and The coaches. apprise the TEA master failed to the June under consideration would be
contract disagree respectfully Majority op., with 36.1 majority's was sufficient that the notice conclusion provision hiring respect for athletic new to the with Majority op., ¶ 42. coaches. *38 majority
¶ respect 85. The notes that with to the given vague contract, TEA master the notice was be- any negotiations any group cause it could cover with of personnel any employee district or with individual Id., ¶ within the district. 36. Moreover, it was mislead- ing, provides as the statute referenced4 the notice for employees, closed ering for sessions individual not for consid- bargaining agreements. Id., ¶ collective adopted 86. The reasonableness standard the court takes into account such factors as the burden of providing subject notice, more detailed whether the particular interest, and whether it non- involves unlikely routine action that anticipate. would be majority points Id., ¶ 28. The first out that unduly it would not burden the Board to include a few words in the notice about fact that the TEA master contract would Id., be discussed at the June 1 majority ¶ 38. Second, the notes the TEA master hiring provision contract included a ofwas interest people community, ato number of in the as several petition citizens had made an effort to the Board regarding put provision hiring whether to a for the coaches Id., ¶ into the master Third, contract. majority recognizes that the TEA master contract was subject, provision not a routine as it contained new hiring coaches which members the commu- nity objected, of which had never before been included Id., ¶¶ in TEA contract. 4, 40. very majority 87. For the reasons concludes respect June 1 notice was insufficient with to the TEA master contract, I conclude the notice was insuf- respect provision regarding ficient with to the new hiring incomprehensible of athletic Thus, coaches. it is 19.85(1)(c). Wis. Stat. analysis reject majority its own when would discussing to the new 1 notice as relates the June hiring provision of coaches that is set forth for the provision, As to the coaches contract. the TEA master vague because it fails to discuss notice is still the June procedures all, and could to hire coaches or coaches per- any group any negotiations of district with cover any employee within the individual or with sonnel June 1 notice was still mislead- Moreover, the district. ing provision, as Wis. Stat. to the coaches as *39 19.85(1)(c) again provides for for closed sessions once considering employees, for new and not individual general. hiring provisions The for athletic coaches inadequately explains majority an no- how insufficient regarding public the TEA master tice as to respect an item buried with is sufficient contract very particularly item in contract, when the that within subject of question contract before been the has never public. negotiations special the interest to and was of applying ¶ with the factors associated 88. When majority standard, concedes the the reasonableness weigh in favor of factors5 second and third that the requiring address the the Board would notice Majority op., provision. ¶ Thus, the 43. coaches analysis majority's factor, the burden stands on the first just providing greater what was the Yet, information. of again, notice would words in the Once a few burden? the factors, again, include whether These non-routine action interest, involves particular and whether The had unlikely anticipate. public would he public the hiring provi the athletic coach great interest already shown negotia sion, employment contemplated the June 1 notice district, but any еmployees individual tions for within for athletic general hiring procedures provide for did not coaches.
225- simply by indicating procedure sufficed, have that the hiring athletic coaches would be discussed. For public matter of considerable concern, this was no "burden." majority If, concludes, as June apprise public
notice was
insufficient
members of the
TEA master contract would be considered at
meeting,
necessarily
the June 1
then it was
insufficient
apprise
public
provision
to
regarding
members of the
that a new
hiring
of athletic coaches contained
within the TEA master contract would be considered.
"[T]he
requirement gives
notice
information about the business to be conducted that
importance
meeting,
will alert them to the
theof
so that
they can make an informed decision whether to attend."
Majority op.,
(citing
Village
¶ 26
State ex rel. Badke v.
Village Greendale,
Bd.