26 N.W.2d 193 | Minn. | 1947
Lead Opinion
1. The referee, after an extended hearing lasting four days and after a view of the locus in quo with counsel, found as facts: That the village was incorporated in compliance with governing statutes; that the territory included in the village consists of a remnant of St. Anthony township, described as all of section six, the north one-half of section seven, and the southeast one-fourth of section seven, consisting of approximately 1,086 acres; that it is bounded on the south and west by the city of Minneapolis and on the east and north by Ramsey county; that the area so incorporated consists of both platted and unplatted lands; that the unplatted lands adjoin those which are platted "and are so conditioned as properly to be subjected to village government"; that the area contains seven contiguous areas, having in the aggregate 233.32 acres platted into blocks and lots, a golf course of 154.37 acres, a cemetery of 80.37 acres, another cemetery of 5 acres, two road plats covering 7.05 acres, and 606 acres of unplatted land; that the area as a whole is suburban in character, with the houses in the platted portions somewhat scattered and with those in the unplatted portions too near together to be altogether rural; that nearly all the inhabitants, with the exception of a few engaged in agriculture, are engaged in urban occupations; that the individual land holdings are small and indicative of suburban rather than rural use; that there is no nucleus of business buildings, but there is "a nucleus of resident population *151 of about 420 persons in the platted tracts, with about 240 additional on the unplatted land"; that there are 170 persons living in a trailer and tourist camp within the village; that "there are a few scattered business enterprises, which do nothing to give coherence to the area"; that the proximity of the lands used for agricultural purposes to the platted area gives every indication that they will be increasingly devoted to residential and industrial purposes; that the residents of both the platted and unplatted areas have a common interest, intensified by the governmental boundaries of the area, in law enforcement and whatever civic and urban facilities the area can afford; that "if any part of the area were to be separated from the rest and annexed to Minneapolis, or if any part were to be separately incorporated as a village, the rest of the area would suffer in consequence, because the likelihood of its obtaining such facilities would be diminished"; and, as conclusions of law, that the village is lawfully incorporated, and that the writ of quo warranto herein should be discharged.
We have carefully examined the voluminous record and have come to the conclusion that the evidence supports the referee's findings. Those mostly under attack relate to the finding that the village has a nucleus of resident population of 420 persons in the platted tracts; that some agricultural land was included; and that the rest of the unplatted land is suitable for village government. Under §
It must be obvious that a new community of this sort springing up all over such an area needs zoning, policing, water, sewers, lights, and all the municipal facilities usually furnished by village government.
The village was incorporated under §
"Any district, section, or parts of sections not in any incorporated village, and in the state, which has been platted into lots and blocks, also the lands adjacent thereto, when the plat has been duly and legally certified according to the laws of this state, and filed in the office of the register of deeds for the county in which the lands, or the larger portion thereof, lie, the territory containing a resident population of not more than 10,000, nor less than 100, may become incorporated as a village in the manner hereinafter prescribed. The unplatted part of the territory must adjoin the platted portions and be so conditioned as properly to be subjected to village government. Any village, whose incorporation shall be declared void by judgment of court, may reincorporate under this chapter, notwithstanding the fact that such village does not contain 100 inhabitants; and, in such reincorporation, may include all or part of the territory embraced in the original incorporation; provided, that any district, section, or parts of sections, which has been platted into lots and blocks and which is contiguous to the state line and having a population of not less than 50, may, upon a petition of not less than ten voters, residents therein, become incorporated as a village in the manner hereinafter prescribed." *153
No better definition of a "village" or the fundamental requirements of one under the statute can be found than that in State ex rel. Childs v. Minnetonka Village,
"A 'village' means an assemblage of houses, less than a town or city, but nevertheless urban or semiurban in its character; and the object of the law was to give these aggregations of people in a comparatively small territory greater powers of self-government and of enacting police regulations than are given to rural communities under the township laws. The law evidently contemplates, as a fundamental condition to a village organization, a compact center or nucleus of population on platted lands; and, in view of the expressed purposes of the act, it is also clear that by the term 'lands adjacent thereto' is meant only those lands lying so near and in such close proximity to the platted portion as to be suburban in their character, and to have some unity of interest with the platted portion in the maintenance of a village government. It was never designed that remote territory, having no natural connection with the village, and no adaptability to village purposes, should be included."
It has been consistently adhered to in our subsequent cases. State ex rel. Burnquist v. Village of Leetonia,
Here, the only real questions are whether the area included in the village meets the requirements of the statute to the effect that the unplatted part of the territory must adjoin the platted portions and *154
that it be so conditioned as properly to be subjected to village government. The unplatted lands in fact do adjoin the platted portions. Under our decisions, they are suitable for village government. State ex rel. Hilton v. Village of Kinney,
"* * * The final test is whether the platted territory and the adjacent territory are so limited in area and have such a natural connection, and the people residing thereon have such a community of interest, that the whole may be properly subjected to village government."
We think that, as the referee found, the whole area included in the village, both platted and unplatted, have such a community of interest that the whole may properly be subjected to village government.
It is no objection that the village has no established business center. A nucleus of dwellings only is essential. State ex rel. Childs v. Minnetonka Village,
Our conclusion is that the village was legally incorporated. In coming to this conclusion we have not invoked the aid of the rule of State ex rel. Town of Stuntz v. City of Chisholm,
2. Relator contends that the referee erred in receiving testimony of persons who prepared exhibits showing the names and occupations of persons living in the village, to the effect that in some instances the information concerning the occupations was hearsay — that someone had told the witness what the occupation was. The testimony, other than the alleged hearsay, was all to the effect that the occupations of the inhabitants claimed to be urban in fact were such. We do not stop to consider whether the objection is otherwise tenable. Under the circumstances, no possible prejudice could have resulted. The evidence showed that the area as a whole was a suburban one. Except in the case of the farms, which do not come under the objection because of the fact that the alleged hearsay did not relate to them, all the land holdings are small. It is obvious that the persons living on them did not derive their living from working them. The inference is inescapable that they worked at some occupation away from their lands in order to make a living. The hearsay, if such it was, related to what was obvious anyway.
Motion for new trial denied and writ of quo warranto discharged.
Dissenting Opinion
I am of the belief that the prerequisites for the incorporation of a village as outlined by this court in State ex rel. Hilton v. So-called "Village of Minnewashta,"
The area sought to be incorporated here constitutes 1,086 acres, of which only 188.18 acres (exclusive of roads and highways) have been platted into lots and blocks. In the platted portions, the houses, for the most part, are widely scattered. Nearly all of the unplatted land, and some of the platted land, is used for agricultural purposes. There is no nucleus of business buildings in the area, and, *156 as the referee stated, the "few scattered business enterprises * * * do nothing to give coherence to the area."
The closest approach to a nucleus of resident population is a small tract known as Bonnie View Heights, near Stinson Boulevard. It is remote from the property east of Silver Lake Road and could scarcely be regarded as the population nucleus of all the wide territory sought to be incorporated in the proposed village.
"Nucleus of population" as defined by this court would seem to contemplate something more than the community of interest found here by the referee. Rather, it must mean residences in some more or less compact urban center, with commercial establishments in close proximity supplying their trade requirements and making the whole a more or less self-sufficient community. It should give coherence to the area sought to be incorporated, and community of interest alone is not a sufficient substitute for such nucleus.
The facts here presented would seem to bring this case well within the principles of State ex rel. Hilton v. So-called "Village of Minnewashta,"
"* * * The territory is not rendered otherwise than agricultural by reason of the fact that many of the homes are those of Minneapolis business and professional men. The fact that a goodly number of the occupants of the homes in the proposed village are really Minneapolitans does not change the character of their country homes and agricultural activities from rural to urban.
"The respondents have deliberately and frankly refrained from any final or binding choice of any one location having the characteristics of 'a compact center or nucleus of population on platted lands' which it was held in State (ex rel. Childs] v. Minnetonka Village,
"Finally, the whole area is so exclusively agricultural and rural, so obviously and wholly otherwise than urban in character, that it has not adaptability for village purposes and is not so conditioned as to be subjected to village government."
For the reasons outlined, I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE LORING and MR. JUSTICE JULIUS J. OLSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.