4 N.W.2d 361 | Minn. | 1942
The district court denied the motion of interested property owners to dismiss the proceedings. Over their objection, it appointed commissioners to act in the matter. From the order appointing the commissioners, the property owners appeal. The attorney general moves to dismiss the appeal.
The appellants contend that the appeal is from a final order in a special proceeding, citing In re Proceedings by St. Paul N. P. Ry. Co.
Mason St. 1927, § 6553, provides for the entry of a final judgment in condemnation proceedings. The final judgment may be dispensed with under Mason St. 1927, § 6557-1(d), where the condemnation is by the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions and the final certificate therein provided for is approved by the court and filed. The final certificate is in the nature of a final judgment. State, by Youngquist, v. Hall,
"Dispensing with the final decree therein mentioned does not change the statutory purpose and effect of the final certificate which is intended to and does take its place."
In any event, the proceedings contemplate a final judgment under § 6553 or § 6557-1(d). The law is well settled that an order appointing commissioners in eminent domain proceedings is not a final one and is not appealable. In Duluth Transfer Ry. Co. v. Duluth Terminal Ry. Co.
"The order appointing commissioners is not a final order, any more than an order denying a motion to vacate the former. If, as suggested by counsel for appellants, no final judgment is contemplated or authorized by the statutes in proceedings of this kind, clearly the order appointing commissioners would be final, and certainly appealable. But, as in the Fletcher case [Fletcher v. C. St. P. M. O. Ry. Co.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.
MR. JUSTICE STONE, being ill, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. *455