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State Ex Rel. Bunker Resource, Recycling & Reclamation, Inc. v. Dierker
955 S.W.2d 931
Mo.
1997
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*1 suspect and Although that Coleman Stipulation resulted we Judgment and Consent parties any indispensable were at trial. Mardens from the introduction evidence rights regarding Wilderness determination Nor we reach issue need Lane, us to it would be Mardens, nonparties, Coleman and practical usefulness of the speculate as to Stipu- standing point. to raise that have Judgment entered Stipulation and Consent only to Judgment lation related and Consent Regardless, remains that below. one the lawsuit. from count of effectively and the sepa- Coleman Mardens the record that this count was resolved judg- apply intervention until after rately remaining Rule from the counts. See 74.01(b). become final and the ment had in the record There is indication jurisdiction of lost the case. introduction of evidence there remained regarding or trial counts that Preliminary in Prohibition is Order Our subsequently and that were dismissed. made absolute. Finally, Coleman the Mardens All concur. argue result inconsistent here is Davis, 334 City Investing Company with Investing, that real interests property Court noted

cannot taken from an without be individual joining party in the law that individual

suit. further The Court that: noted rights

If it became that his never RESOURCE, would be affected until the decree was rel. BUNKER STATE entered, RECLAMATION, he had the to intervene RECYCLING AND 507.090, 1(2), INC., Relator, we Sec. subsection think have been sustained. agree Invest- holding We with DIERKER, H. Honorable Robert ing. An cannot individual be divested Jr., Judge, Court, Circuit property having been

interest real without City, Respondent. party litigation. justifies add- No. 79716. ing such an to a even after individual lawsuit However, a decree has been entered. Supreme Court of power anything of the trial court to do En Banc. lawsuit after all issues have been resolved is Nov. thirty days, in Rule limited to as set out quotation upon relied In- 507.090.1(2) for au- vesting cites to section 507.090.1(2),superseded by

thority. Section Rule Rule that such 52.04 and upon “timely application”. intervention The initial documents Coleman filed incomplete and ineffective. Mardens They properly called completed, were not nor hearing, Stipulation until after the Judgment

Consent had become final and already of the jurisdiction trial lost court had applica- and the ease. Mardens’ Coleman’s timely. City Investing cannot was not help them. *2 Louis, Younger,

Robert D. for Relator. Silva, Cervantes, Mario G. P. Leonard Phillip Cervantes, Louis, Respon- A. dent.

BENTON, Chief Justice. 10, 1988,

On November Louis Coun ty, allegedly Genevieve Brune’s car collided with a tractor-trailer employee driven Resource, of Bunker Recycling and Reclama (doing Inc. business as Bunker Re Inc.). sources, 29, 1991, July On the Secre tary of administratively failure to file a correct 351.484(2) report, annual respondent Judge RSMo.1 The notes “the operate fact Bunker Resources ceased 29, 1991.” July 29, 1996, May On Bruñe sued Bunker Re- sources in the Circuit of St. alleged Louis. Bruñe venue under section statute for motor carri- ers, collision, because at the time of the operated Bunker Resources as a motor carri- er in the change

Bunker Resources moved for a County, arguing venue to St. Louis that ven ue was of St. Louis because at the time the suit was as a motor The trial carrier. court overruled the motion. After the Court Appeals peti Bunker Resources’ denied mandamus, tion for this Court issued an al ternative writ to transfer the case to St. V, County. Mo. Const. art. sec. 4.

I. venue is determined

solely by statute. rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 permissive Section 508.070 is statute that widens the field of venue suits ex rel. motor carriers. State O’Keefe Brown, 307[2] Section 508.070.1 four alternative ways to determine venue: 1. All references are to RSMo 1994. McMillen, 583, 585 motor brought against any Willman

Suit carrier 390, RSMo, county arise, the cause II. motor carrier town may be sued *3 the operates, or where circuit corporate name its even after administrative accrued, the de- of action or where See dissolution. sections agent.... an maintains office or fendant a is the sole When 351.486.3. second expressly invoked the The defendant, section 508.040 controls. State alternative, ruling “op- that where a carrier 445, Gaertner, rel. Coca Cola time of the erates” is determined at the 1984). (Mo. 447[1, 508.040 banc Section 2]

incident.2 provides: language of indicates the statute corporations be com- against shall Suits statute language the of a otherwise. Where in the either the where menced clear, mean regard a court “should laws as is ... in coun- cause of action accrued or Assembly they say; the is ing what General or shall have ty where exactly it presumed to have what intended the usually keep agent or office directly In re unambiguously.” states customary of their usual and transaction Thomas, 74, 743 76 Estate S.W.2d business. commenced, Re- Bunker When sup elements to required Three are keep, any county, an office sources did not in port under the venue second the of its usual and agent or transaction (1) (2) bringing against section 508.070.1: suit customary business. the cause ac- Because a motor carrier which is to County, in crued St. (3) oper it under where subject to suit there section 508.040. is under time to ele ates. The measure these three City of was in the Venue suit is “brought” ments is when because duty to Respondent has a ministerial Louis. present alternative is in tense. second court of underlying transfer case to a analogous general This is to venue stat A writ proper venue section 476.410. ute, section venue is deter require is of mandamus mined as the case See stands when De performance of ministerial act. See rel. DePaul v. Mum Health Center Paul, at mert, 870 The alternative of mandamus parties agree that when Respondent transfer shall not, did Louis Coun- cause to the Circuit Court of St. fact, operate in matter of as a motor carrier ty- Therefore, section in not available authorize venue 508.070 is ROBERTSON, PRICE, LIMBAUGH, City of Louis. HOLSTEIN, JJ., concur. COVINGTON respondent, ar- Echoing the the dissent WHITE, J., separate dissents in gues public give rights against filed. the same corporations. The active

tions WHITE, Judge, dissenting. has, however, Assembly declared the General policy. per- question case turns contrary public 508.070 Section be read “operates,” in section 508.070 should mits venue where motor carrier “operates at the cause of operated. the time where it Venue is within to mean accrued,” “operates time suit must legislature, a court province of opinion holds that says. brought.” guided by legislature what expresses opinion on the Only section Louis. This second alternative 508.070.1 could explicitly 508.070is linked. The the time to measure the elements of venue any county as a contract carrier in brought “oper- the word when suit is because privilege specific in Missouri which present argument ates” is tense. This permission regulatory circular, must be obtained assuming its conclusion that price priv- authorities.3 for that One exacted tense the statute refers to the time suit is ilege is that a carrier becomes liable to be brought. This is far from clear. any county through into court in haled statute, first enacted is a operates. legislature that the draftsmanship. all model confused Where regards particularly haz- motor carriers as lying other venue statutes refer to venue subjected operations, ardous and has to them counties, suggests section 508.070 regulatory expand- to extensive burdens and county, lie in a in a “town or they may the fora in which That ed be sued. circuit,” “judicial county,” or in a as if these legislative judgment judi- is ill-served *4 three distinct choices. The statute is cially allowing created rule of construction particularly sloppy maintaining a consis- motor carriers to restrict a choice tense, key princi- tent verb factor of action has ac- of venue—after pal opinion’s analysis. The statute refers to crued—merely by ceasing in a apparently two identical events in different county until suit is filed. tenses, tense, mandating, verb im- disserves another proper where “the cause of portant statutory by effectively holding goal arise,” using past tense to corporation only be that a dissolved place “the cause of action venue where the to suit in the where a cause of only way to see accrued.” By reading corporate action accrued. unambiguous impose a blanket rule of is to narrowly, principal opinion venue statute presumptively construction de- differently treats a far to the time at which termined reference continuing operations. This one with principal opinion legislative policy announced contravenes by analogizing this case to does this corpora- in section which allows rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert.1 That just existing entities tions to be sued like rule. In case does not such broad spe- they even are dissolved. Absent a DePaul, respondent refused to transfer ven- specifying legislative pronouncement cific dif- that, despite although ue venue was corpora- ferent venue treatment for dissolved on, proper motion was ruled at the time the ones, ongoing I would hold tions relative to proper time filed.2 it was not that, may be sued in long Thus, DePaul stands for no more than the name, proper venue for corporate that, proposition prop- if venue unremarkable any place such a suit is filed, subsequent erly lies when a suit subject to suit at the time dissolu- tion was improper. In events do not make venue tion. case, given repeated holdings this Court’s short, principal opinion supplies entirely that venue is determina- readily that is not meaning to section 508.070 I construc- find broad rules statute. Because the face of the analyze inappropriate these cases. ambiguous, statute is I would construe it itself, I to the statute Instead would look legis- way as to fulfill the manifest therein, embodied to resolve ambi- Accordingly, quash I lative intent. would guities on its face. proceed in allow suit to alternative writ and purpose of this venue statute City. is, principal opinion recognizes, as the of venue in suits “widen[ ] the field goal is consistent with

motor carriers.” to which the broader aims of scope alternatives in section Id. at 823 the other 3. Section 1. 870 S.W.2d 820

Case Details

Case Name: State Ex Rel. Bunker Resource, Recycling & Reclamation, Inc. v. Dierker
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: Nov 25, 1997
Citation: 955 S.W.2d 931
Docket Number: 79716
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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