State ex rel. Brooks v. O'MalleyState ex rel. Brooks v. O'Malley
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of prohibition to prevent a juvenile court judge and a magistrate from proceeding in a case of alleged child
{¶ 2} Appellant, Charisse Brooks, is the mother of two minor children who reside with her. Belinda Bailey, a social worker employed by the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, filed a sworn complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, on behalf of the agency, alleging that Brooks’s two minor children were neglected and requesting that the court grant custody of the children to the agency. Bailey is not an attorney. Appellees, Judge Thomas F. O’Malley and Magistrate Wayne Strunk of the juvenile court, preside over the cases.
{¶ 3} In November 2007, Brooks filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge O’Malley and Magistrate Strunk from exercising jurisdiction in the neglect and dependency proceedings. Brooks alleged that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the cases because the complaint, which was prepared and filed by a nonattorney on behalf of the agency, was a nullity. Brooks cited the dissenting opinion of an appellate case in support of her claim.
{¶ 4} Before the juvenile court judge and magistrate had responded to the prohibition complaint, the court of appeals denied Brooks’s request for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals held that the judge and magistrate did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed in the cases and that Brooks had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to raise her claim.
{¶ 5} In her appeal as of right, Brooks asserts that the court of appeals erred by in effect dismissing her prohibition action. Dismissal of the case is appropriate if, after presuming the truth of all of the material factual allegations of Brooks’s complaint and making all reasonable inferences in her favor, it appears beyond doubt that Brooks could prove no set of facts entitling her to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition. State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka,
{¶ 6} For prohibition claims, “unless jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, a tribunal having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by appeal.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland,
{¶ 8} First, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over children who are alleged to be neglected or dependent.
{¶ 9} Second,
{¶ 10} Third, it has been held that the “question of standing, that is, of who is a proper party to bring a complaint [pursuant to
{¶ 11} Fourth, insofar as Brooks claims that
{¶ 12} Fifth, the cases cited by Brooks in support of her prohibition claim concerning the unauthorized practice of law were all resolved in the ordinary course of law instead of in an action for an extraordinary writ. See State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker (1999),
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, Judge O’Malley and Magistrate Strunk do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the child-neglect and dependency cases. Brooks has adequate remedies to raise her claim in the ordinary course of law by motions to strike the complaint and appeals from any adverse judgments. See, generally, Union Sav. Assn. v. Home Owners Aid, Inc. (1970),
{¶ 14} Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals’ denial of Brooks’s prohibition claim. By so holding, we express no opinion on the merits of the underlying issues, including the applicability of our decisions in cases involving the unauthorized practice of law, see, e.g., Dayton Supply & Tool Co., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision,
Judgment affirmed.