265 F. 305 | E.D. Mo. | 1920
The facts in this case, as these facts are disclosed by the bill of complaint, while somewhat voluminous, are yet in the last analysis fairly simple and fall within a narrow compass. As appears from the face of the bill, by the allegations of which movant is, of course, concluded, these facts run in brief substance thus:
At the September term, 1918, of this court, defendant here, a corporation under the laws of New York, as plaintiff therein, filed in this court an action in equity to restrain one James J. Croke, as collector of the revenue of St. Francois county, Mo., from enforcing, against defendant the collection of certain. state, county, road, bridge, and school taxes, assessed against the real estate of defendant for the year
Following the filing of the above answer and counterclaim, and on March 3, 1919, Croke and this defendant entered into and filed in this court a stipulation wherein Croke, defendant therein, in his capacity as collector of the revenue of St. Francois county aforesaid, admitted that the taxes assessed against this defendant for the year 1918 were “discriminatory and excessive” to the extent of 27 per cent, of the assessed aggregate thereof, and that the same ought to be reduced 27 per cent., and thereupon a decree embodying this reduction, but with certain penalties and attorney’s fees, was accordingly entered in this court. By the terms of this decree this defendant was adjudged to pay and did pay to Croke, as collector as aforesaid, the sum of $100,000 then in the registry of this court, plus the additional sum of $56,513.39 as taxes, together with $2,150 as statutory penalties and $2,150 as commissions to Croke as collector, and an attorney’s fee of $5,375, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of' $166,188.39, plus the interest on the sum of $100,000 paid into court, the amount of which interest is not disclosed. By this decree Croke, as collector, and his successors in that office, were perpetually enjoined from enforcing against this defendant the collection of all taxes assessed against it for the year 1918.
Relator bottoms his right to set aside such decree on the general allegation that the acts of Croke, his predecessor in the office of collector, in entering into the stipulation pursuant to which the decree was made in this court, were “fraudulent and void.” This general allegation is eked out by the averments that Croke had no authority under the laws of Missouri to settle or compromise the injunction suit, or 'to enter 'into the stipulation above mentioned, or to consent to a decree for any sum less than that shown by the tax books, in his hands as collector; that there are provided by applicatory statutes of the state of Missouri a county board of equalization and a state tax commission, in which is vested the sole power to adjust and equalize taxes ;■ that by entering into the said stipulation Croke, as collector, and this defendant, unlawfully and wrongfully deprived the said board of equalization and the state tax commission of their lawful statutory powers of adjusting and equalizing the taxes assessed against defendant; that it was not true, as conceded in the stipulation signed by Croke, that the assessment against this defendant was discriminatory and unjust; and that this court was not advised of the true facts when it entered the decree here sought to be set aside. Thus, in fair substance, run the whole of the allegations of fraud and of a meritorious defense to the action wherein the decree here attacked was entered.
Barring the inference from an offer, contained as well in the body of the petition as in the prayer for relief, to credit defendant herein' with all payments made by it to Croke as collector, as aforesaid (except the sum of $5,375 paid to Croke’s attorneys, which is not mentioned), there is no direct admission that St. Francois county ever got the $161,813.39 paid to Croke under the decree of March 4, 1919; nor, save this, is there any offer to pay the latter sum into court, nor is there any other tender, or offer to do equity.
Defendant filed its motion to dismiss the bill (among other grounds, either not well taken or duplicated in substance), for that (a) the bill sets up no ground for equitable relief; (b) that plaintiff has not done equity, nor offered to do equity; (c) that there is no allegation that the taxes sued for as ancillary relief here are delinquent, or were ever returned delinquent by Croke as collector; (d) that there is a defect of parties defendant, in that Croke is not made a party herein; (e) that it appears on the face of the bill that Croke, as collector, had the authority to compromise the suit against him; and that his action in that behalf was legal and binding on the county of St. Francois.
The policy of the state of Missouri, as expressed in the decisions of the Supreme Court thereof, is clearly opposed to the view that any officer, such as a collector, can bind the county, save and except by such performance of incumbent -duties as is prescribed by statute. Lamar Township v. City of Lamar, 261 Mo. 271, 169 S. W. 12, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 740; Mullins v. Kansas City, 268 Mo. 444, 188 S. W. 193; Ex parte Tartar (Mo.) 213 S. W. 94. There seems to be no Missouri statute conferring power on the collector to take a less sum in payment of the taxes charged to him on the tax books than the amount of such taxes as shown by such tax books. At least the diligence of counsel has disclosed none such, and after a diligent search, aided by some prior knowledge of the subject, I have been unable to find any such statute. Neither is there any statute in existence which expressly places authority on a county court of Missouri to compromise taxes as such, and which have been levied and assessed and made up into a tax book, in a case such as is here before me. County courts in Missouri are empowered to compromise back taxes, when the lands against which such taxes ,have been assessed are not worth the taxes assessed thereon (section 11496, R. S. Mo. 1909); to refund taxes collected on an illegal levy, provided fhe fact of such illegality has theretofore been judicially determined by the ’ Supreme Court of the state (section 11523, R. S. Mo. 1909); to correct erroneous assessments, for that the lands were not subject to taxation, or were assessed twice for the same years, or assessed to two different persons (section 11522, R. S. Mo. 1909). None of the above statutes, it is obvious, applies to the situation here presented.
“Errors in Tax Boohs may be Corrected, When, — In all cases wliere tbe county court, or assessment board, or .any city council or assessment board, shall have assessed and levied taxes, general or special, on any real estate, according to law, whether the same be delinquent or otherwise, and until the same are paid and collected, with all costs, interest and penalties thereon, the city council of any city and the county court of any county shall have the full power to correct any errors which may appear in connection therewith, whether of valuation, subject to the provisions of the Constitution of this state, or of description, or ownership, double assessment, omission from the assessment list or books, or otherwise, and to make such valuations, assessment and levy conform in all respects to the facts and requirements of the law. Any description or designation of property for assessment purposes by which it may be identified or located shall be a sufficient and valid description or designation.” Section 11492, R. S. Mo. 1909.
It will be noted that the section of the Missouri statutes above quoted confers authority upon the several county courts to raise or lower valuations and to correct errors, “subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the state.”' Without going into other of the exceptions and limitations of the Missouri statutes touching matters not here relevant, it seems obvious that the power conferred on the several county courts by the section of the statutes, supra, is derived from section 36 of article 6 of the Constitution of Missouri, which, so far as pertinent, reads thus:
“In each county there shall be a county court, which shall be a court of record, and shall have jurisdiction to transact all county and such other business as may be prescribed by law.”
It is also obvious that the above constitutional provision, in conferring upon the county courts of the several counties power to transact “all county business,” has the effect of making such county courts the general agents of the counties. If this view is correct, it is clear that the above statute and the constitutional provision above quoted have a very important bearing upon the issues presented, in this case. For, absent some statutory inhibition, and I know of none, and subject to some prohibitions of the Constitution of Missouri not here relevant, the county courts are authorized to deal with all county business just as any other general agent of an individual principal might do.
It is true that the county court of St. Francois county did not, by any explicit order made by it to that identical effect, lower the assessed valuation of the property of the defendant. The collector, however, without any statutory authority, as I have tried to show, stipulated in the former case that the assessment was 27 per cent, higher on the property of the defendant than it lawfully ought to have been. In effect, then, the collector lowered this valuation, and I think that the county court ratified the act of the collector in so doing, as I think it had a right to do, pursuant to the statutes which I have quoted, and
However, the bill of complaint herein, in obvious effect admits that the collector paid into the statutory custody the moneys received by him'pursuant to the stipulation and the consent decree. This admission, I think, sufficiently appears from the offer made by plaintiff in this case to credit such payment on the amount of taxes now alleged to be due from defendant. It follows, therefore, that there is no necessity to resort to any presumptions about this matter. I f the collect- or did not pay the money received by him pursuant to this consent decree to the state treasurer and to the county treasurer, and lay before the county court the receipts of such treasurers as the basis for his settlement with the county court, then a suit will lie against him and his sureties upon his official bond. Clearly the county court here either ratified by its subsequent action, or inaction, the unauthorized act of the collector in lowering this valuation, or it did not ratify that act. If it did not ratify such act, then it ought to have brought suit against the colled or on his bond, and it follows that this action will not lie.
I am of opinion, then, that the taking of this money from the county collector by the county court, in the mode stated, had the legal effect to ratify upon the part of St. Francois county that which the colled or had theretofore done without authority. Persuasive toward this view is the somewhat analogous case of St. Louis, etc., Railroad Co. v. Anthony, 73 Mo. 431. For I repeat, while the collector had no authority to stipulate that the valuation of the defendant’s lands was erroneous. the county court, perforce the provisions of section 11492, supra, did have such authority. That court could act in such behalf either directly, by themselves making an order to reduce the valuation by 27 per cent., or indirectly, by approving, in their settlement with the collector, his act in so reducing this valuation, by the proportion named. It took the latter course. It accepted the fruits of this valuation, or revaluation, as made by the collector, and kept and still keeps the money of defendant, paid by it pursuant thereto. The case on this phase practically resolves itself into the simple legal proposition that a principal may, by ratification, become bound by the unauthor
Other points, some of them serious and of substance, it may be, are urged against the right of plaintiff to maintain "this action. Some of these points are obviously such as may be cured by amendment. Oth-. ers of them, as forecast, may possibly wholly preclude plaintiff’s recovery. Deeming that the point above discussed disposes of the cas'e,' no occasion arises why these views should be lengthened by a discussion of any of the other points which have been raised by the defendant’s motion to dismiss the bill.
It follows, for the reasons given above, that the motion to dismiss the bill of complaint should be sustained; and it is so ordered.