Appellant, in his proposition of law, contends that:
The application of R. C- 4123.651 was before this court in State, ex rel. Campbell, v. Indus. Comm. (1971),
This court, in the Campbell ease, at page 157, determined that R. C. 4123.651, although allowing injured employees to select their own physicians and medical services, also grants “broad discretion to the Industrial Commission to approve or disapprove the cost of such services.”
In addition, R. C. 4123.66 requires the Industrial Commission to “* * * disburse and pay from the State Insurance Fund such amounts for medical * # * services # # * as it deems proper.” The statute further authorizes the Industrial Commission to “* * # adopt rules and regulations with respect to furnishing medical, nurse, and hospital service and medicine to injured or disabled employees entitled thereto, and for the payment therefor.”
Pursuant to that authorization, the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation promulgated the rules set forth in the Medical Handbook, Rules, Regulations, Procedures. Rule 9 of the rules, which is applicable to physicians, states specifically that: “Physiotherapy must be authorized.”
Both parties in the present action have stipulated that appellant never requested authorization for the 52 additional treatments. Medical testimony adduced at the hearing before the deputy administrator established that all the examining physicians agreed in the diagnosis, but they disagreed as to the necessity and extent of physiotherapy treatments.
A long line of Ohio cases has established that a writ of mandamus will issue only to compel the performance of a clear legal duty or where a clear legal right to the remedy has been shown, and it will not lie to control the discretion confided in an officer, commission, or inferior tribunal, unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused. State, ex rel. Coen, v. Indus. Comm. (1933),
The appellees are not bound by any statutory duty to act in this matter, and have not abused their discretion in refusing to approve the additional fees. The judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ is, therefore, affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
