97 Minn. 402 | Minn. | 1906
The city of Minneapolis, pursuant to chapter 204, p. 333, Laws 1893, as amended by chapter 128, p. 281, Laws 1895, submitted to the voters at the general election in November, 1904, two propositions, one for the issuance of $100,000 of school bonds for graded school buildings and additions to graded school buildings, and the other for the issuance of $100,000 of bonds for high school buildings and additions to high school buildings. Neither proposition received a two-thirds majority of all the legal voters present and voting at the election, as required by chapter 204, p. 333, Laws 1893. State v. Hugo, 84 Minn. 81, 86 N. W. 784. In 1905 the legislature passed two acts known as chapters 76 and 77, pp. 93, 94, of the Laws of 1905. One of these statutes provided in effect that all bonds theretofore voted by any city for graded school buildings and additions to graded school houses, and the other
The appeal presents the single question of the constitutionality of chapters 76 and 77, pp. 93, 94, Laws 1905. The proposition to issue the bonds to raise money for the construction of necessary school buildings was submitted to the voters in the city of Minneapolis at the general election in November, 1904. While it received more than two-thirds of the votes of all who voted upon the proposition to issue the bonds, the aggregate vote in its favor did not amount to two-thirds of the number of those who voted at the election. But the legislature of 1905, influenced undoubtedly by the fact that the wishes of the people of Minneapolis had been clearly expressed in favor of the issuance of the bonds, and with full knowledge of the conditions which i endered the issue of such bonds desirable and necessary, removed the restriction, imposed by the act of 1903, and legalized and authorized the issue of the bonds without compliance with one of the conditions imposed by the original enabling statute. Chapter 76, p. 93, Laws 1905, is entitled:
An act legalizing school bonds heretofore voted upon by cities for graded school buildings and additions to graded school houses under the provisions of chapter 204 of the General Laws of the state of Minnesota for the year 1893 and acts amendatory thereof.
Section 1 of the act provided
That all school bonds heretofore voted upon by any city for graded school buildings and additions to graded school*404 houses, under or pursuant to the provisions of chapter 204 of the General Laws of the state of Minnesota for the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three (1893), as amended by chapter 128 of the General Laws of the state of ' Minnesota for the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five (1895), and other acts amendatory thereof, are hereby declared to be, when issued and sold, legal and binding obligations of said city; providing that the proposition to issue said bonds received a two-thirds majority of all votes cast upon the proposition to issue said bonds at the election when said proposition was voted upon; and provided further that all other, requirements of law have been fully complied with.
Chapter 77, p. 94, is in the same language, except that it purports to legalize bonds theretofore voted upon for high school buildings and additions to high school houses.
It is now contended that both chapters 76 and 77 are special legislation and invalid under sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the constitution of the state, because the classification upon which they rest is arbitrary, illusive, and restrictive. More specifically it is contended that the acts are special because: (a) They do not include bonds of all kinds, one being limited to high school bonds and the other to graded school bonds; (b) they are limited to those cities wherein at the election a two-thirds majority of the votes of those voting upon the proposition was obtained in favor of the issuance of the bonds; and (c) they classify cities that have voted for the issuance of bonds under the 1893 law as amended.
Neither upon principle nor precedent should these statutes be treated as special legislation. They are remedial, curative acts, and apply to all subjects of legislation which are within the conditions and subject to the evils sought to be remedied. They resemble statutes which cure and make valid all deeds which were defectively executed or acknowledged. The matters classified by these acts are improperly and defectively authorized school bonds, and the acts apply to all bonds of the kind which come within the conditions. The two statutes might possibly have been as well consolidated into one, but the general policy
The legislature had imposed extremely onerous and impracticable conditions upon the issue of such bonds, and unsuccessful attempts had been made to comply with the conditions. A vote had been taken upon school'bonds only, and more than two-thirds of the voters who were intelligent enough to be interested had voted for the bonds. The whole matter was under the control of the legislature, and bonds could only be issued by its authority and upon the terms by it prescribgEb. It could impose or waive conditions; it could ratify what it could at the time authorize. In 1905 it had the power to authorize the issue of school bonds upon a two-thirds vote or a mere majority vote of those who voted upon the proposition. The only limitation in this respect was upon the manner of legislative action. It appeared to the legislature that the conditions were such as to require remedial legislation, and we are satisfied that the statutes enacted by it for this purpose are not in violation of the constitutional prohibitions. The only serious question is whether the basis of classification is proper and reasonable.
1. The subject of special legislation has been so frequently before the court since the adoption of the several constitutional amendments that the principles by which acts of the legislature of this character are tested should be fairly well recognized and understood. In considering the constitutionality of such statutes it is necessary to bear in mind the established rule that every statute enacted by the legislature of the state is presumed to be the result of the- exercise of its constitutional right to enact legislation. Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of a regularly enacted statute, and the courts will hold a statute unconstitutional only when satisfied after the most careful consideration that it is in conflict with some provision of the state or national constitution which is binding upon the legislature and courts alike. We must also remember the purposes for which the constitutional amendments were adopted, and construe them and the statutes enacted thereunder in the light of these purposes and the evils which it was sought to remedy. Special and local legislation in many states had become an efficient means for the easy enactment of laws for the advancement of personal rather than public interests. State v. Village
The extent of such legislation was so great that the people finally adopted the various amendments to the constitution which prohibit special legislation in certain cases, but it is fair to assume that they did not intend to put a straight jacket upon a growing young commonwealth. As said by a learned and discriminating writer: “While the absence of all restriction upon special and local legislation is unquestionably a serious evil, yet the absolute or nearly absolute prohibition produces in its turn results which are far from satisfactory. That this is inevitable is clear from the fact that such legislation, when properly regulated and employed, is not only a perfectly legitimate exercise of legislative power, but is a valuable means of providing for the needs of the different parts of a state, and even of corporations or individuals under exceptional circumstances. There is nothing essentially wrong in the thing itself. It is perfectly natural and fitting that some legislation should be of this character, and what it needs is to be adequately regulated, as is done in England, so as to secure its proper use while preventing its abuse.” 32 Am. Law Reg. 622. Reasonable restraint upon the manner of legislative action only was intended. It could not have beeh the purpose to deprive the legislature absolutely of the power to legislate upon any subject-matter which required legislation. An extremely strict construction would have led to this result. To avoid this it was necessary to classify the subject-matter of legislation, and this was done upon principles which had been developed and established by the courts in dealing with-the general subject of class legislation. For illustrations, see Lavallee v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 249, 41 N. W. 974; Johnson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 43 Minn. 222, 45 N. W. 156, 8 L. R. A. 419.
Thus, in State v. Ritt, 76 Minn. 531, 536, 79 N. W. 535, 537, Justice Mitchell said: “It is also urged that the legislature must be allowed a large discretion in the matter of classification by population. This is true, but all that this means is that a classification of municipalities by population, in statutes relating to their structure, machinery, and powers, is legitimate where population bears a reasonable relation to the subject of the legislation; and, classification in such cases being committed to the judgment of the legislature, its judgment should prevail, unless the classification be manifestly arbitrary, illusory, or applied for the purpose of evading the provisions of the constitution.” So, in State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 57 L. R. A. 297, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571, Chief Justice Start said: “Courts ought never to be unmindful of the fact that the lawmaking power is vested in the legislature. Therefore, if there be any facts fairly calling for the exercise of legislative discretion in the classification of particular subdivisions of the state for the purposes of legislation, courts cannot review such discretion, and declare statutes making such classifications invalid, simply because they differ with the legislature as to the propriety of the classification. It is only when the classification is so manifestly arbitrary as to evince a legislative purpose of evading the provisions of the constitution that the courts may and must declare the classification unconstitutional.”
2. The general principles which underlie and control the theory of permissible classification are now well settled in this state. The basis of classification must not be arbitrary or illusory. Having reference to the particular legislation, there must be some substantial distinction
In 1898 the people adopted section 36 of article 4 of the constitution (Laws 1899, p. vi), which authorizes a certain classification of cities upon the basis of population. In Alexander v. City of Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 448, 80 N. W. 623, it was held that this amendment did not repeal section 33 and section 34 of article 4, but authorizes the legislature to make population a basis of classification, although there is no natural relation between the subject-matter of the proposed law and the number of people in the classified cities. It authorizes the classification of cities for purposes of general legislation on the basis of population therein specified, although such cases would not previously have been germane to the purpose or subject-matter of the proposed law. Le Tourneau v. Hugo, 90 Minn. 420, 97 N. W. 115.
But, as said in State v. Justus, 90 Minn. 474, 97 N. W. 124, it does not follow that for other reasons an act may not be unconstitutional within the prohibitions of sections 33 and 34 of article 4. It was held that chapter 356, p. 575, Laws 1901, was void, because it adopted as a basis of classification cities having a population of ten thousand or
3. It may be worth while to call attention to some of the cases in this state which illustrate the application of these general principles and show the course of the decisions upon the construction of the constitutional provisions in question.
(a) State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N. W. 781; Lavallee v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 249, 41 N. W. 974; Johnson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 43 Minn. 222, 45 N. W. 156, 8 L. R. A. 419; and Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, 3 L. R. A. 532, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707, apply the general principles which have guided the courts in determining what is class legislation. In the , Donaldson case a classification of dealers in medicines based upon the location of their place of business in respect to the distance to drug stores was held reasonable. In the Lavallee and Johnson cases a classification of employers for the purpose of legislation relating to fellow servants was sustained. In State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150, the question of classification received very full consideration, and it was held that a law special in form, might, nevertheless, be general in fact. In Bausher v. City of St. Paul, 72 Minn. 539, 75 N. W. 745, chapter 248, p. 459, Laws 1897, which required notice to cities and villages of injuries for which damages are to be claimed as a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action, was held to be a general law. In State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 75 N. W. 8, it was held that population was a proper basis for the classification of counties for the purpose of fixing the compensation of county and city officials. The
In Alexander v. City of Duluth, 57 Minn. 47, 58 N. W. 866, chapter 210, p. 348, Daws 1893, was held to be special legislation because it adopted and applied existing special legislation contained in the charters of various cities. So, in State v. Johnson, 77 Minn. 453, 80 N. W. 620, it was held that chapter 40, p. 38, Laws 1899, was special legislation regulating the affairs of school districts, because it was an attempt to adopt as part thereof the provisions of a number of diverse special laws relating to the management of public schools in the cities. But in State v. Minor, 79 Minn. 201, 81 N. W. 912, this case was overruled, and it was held that chapter 77, p. 80, Daws 1899, was not special legislation, because it did not necessarily rest upon existing special legislation, but might be carried into effect through existing general laws. In State v. District Court, 84 Minn. 377, 87 N. W. 942, section 1, c. 292, p. 358, Laws 1899, was held valid. The statute provided that:
Whenever the common council in any city of this state having at the last preceding state census more than 50,000 inhabitants shall consider it necessary to procure grounds for a public market, such common council shall appoint a committee, etc.
It was contended that the census referred to was the one “last preceding” the enactment of the law, and that therefore no cities could in ' the future enter the class by increase of population; but it was held that the words “last preceding” referred to the state census which might immediately precede in point of time the action of the council, and that the law was therefore general. See State v. Rogers, supra, page 322. In State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 57 L. R. A. 297, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571, chapter 237, p. 348, Daws 1901, providing for the Torrens system of registering land titles, was held to be general legislation against the contention that population was not a proper basis for classification for such purposes. It was said that
In State v. Stoffels, 89 Minn. 205, 94 N. W. 675, chapter 252, p. 398, Laws 1901, prohibiting and punishing the keeping of blind pigs within the limits of any prohibition district, was held to be general legislation. The court said: “True it is that the statute places the prohibition districts of the state in a class by themselves, but the ■classification includes all localities and districts wherein the issuance ■of licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors is or may be prohibited 'by law, and the statute applies equally to all persons and places within such districts.” In Le Tourneau v. Hugo, 90 Minn. 420, 97 N. W. 115, It was held that an act (chapter 75, p. 79, Laws 1901) authorizing cities having a population of more than fifty thousand to issue bonds to con•struct a bridge across any navigable canal in such city was a general law, as it applied to all cities having the designated population, and the presence of the navigable canal was not an element of classification. In State v. Ames, 91 Minn. 365, 98 N. W. 190, chapter 151, p. 154, Laws 1899, regulating the manner of drawing jurors in counties having a population of two hundred thousand, was held constitutional. The court said: “The classification is not arbitrary and is not based upon
existing circumstances only, but has reference to a condition which in the opinion of the legislators exists in largely populated counties.” In State v. Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N. W. 325, 64 L. R. A. 510, 103 Am. St. Rep. 521, it was held that chapter 362, p. 652, Laws 1903, which prohibited the keeping open of butcher shops for the sale of meats, .and other business places, on any portion of Sunday, while it authorized the selling of tobacco and confectioneries, was not such an unreasonable discrimination between occupations as to make the statute invalid ■under the constitution.
(b) There are, on the other hand, numerous cases in which legislation which clearly violated the constitutional provisions has been held invalid. In Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. 800, the statute classified counties for the purpose of locating the county seat. Counties in which within six months the question had been submitted to a vote of the people constituted one class, and all others another class. In the former a three-fifths vote was made necessary to locate the county seat, while a majority was sufficient in all other cases. The court said: “There is nothing in the event which is the basis of classification which suggests any necessity or propriety for a different rule.” The classification was therefore held to be purely arbitrary, and the statute void. In State v. Sheriff of Ramsey County, 48 Minn. 236, 51 N. W.
. In State v. Ritt, 76 Minn. 531, 79 N. W. 535, the statute under consideration attempted to classify counties on the basis of population for the purpose of determining the manner of choosing assessors. The act (chapter 140, p. 139, Laws 1899) provided that in each county having •a population of not less than one hundred thousand and not over one hundred eighty five thousand the county assessor should be elected. It thus provided for one county assessor for the whole county, instead of one for each municipal division, as provided by the existing general laws. It was admitted that population might be a proper basis for the classification of counties for the purpose of choosing assessors, but, as there was no apparent reason suggested by necessity or by the difference in the situation or circumstances of counties having a population of not less than one hundred thousand and not over one hundred eighty five thousand and counties having a population of over one hundred eighty five thousand, the classification was held arbitrary and incomplete. It did not include all the members of the class, but ex-
Murray v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Ramsey County, 81 Minn. 359, 84 N. W. 103, 51 L. R. A. 828, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379, is a good illustration of the rule that classification must rest on some characteristic or' peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded. Chapter 260, p. 484, Laws 1897, provided for the treatment of inebriates at public expense in counties having fifty thousand or more inhabitants. Chief Justice Start said: ' “Classification on the basis of' population is proper for the purpose of legislation upon certain subjects, but not upon all, and the precise question here to be determined is whether there is any apparent natural reason why the treatment of' indigent inebriates at the expense of the public should be limited to-the counties having a population of fifty thousand or more and all ether counties excluded. Or, in other words, is there such a difference-between urban and rural drunkenness and its consequences to the-drunkard, his family, and the public as to naturally suggest the necessity or propriety of a classification on the basis of population for the-purpose of legislation upon the subject of the cure, -at the cost of -the public, of indigent inebriates?” The act was held invalid.
In Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 487, 84 N. W. 335, chapter 290, p. 526, Laws 1897, which provided for a distinctive method" for the collection of taxes in counties where the taxes for prior-years exceeded thirty mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of’ all the real estate was held unconstitutional. The court said: “It seems impossible to suggest any substantial reason why classification for statutory purposes should be based upon a comparison of the total sum on account of forfeited lands in any one county.” In State v. Walker, 83 Minn. 295, 86 N. W. 104, chapter 99, p. 122, Laws 1897, which imposed a limit as to the amount of money which certain-counties could raise by taxation each year, was held invalid, as there-was nothing in the situation, circumstances, or inherent differences-of the counties which suggested the propriety of different legislation with respect to these particular counties.- The classification was purely-arbitrary. In Hetland v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Norman County, 89 Minn. 492, 95 N. W. 305, chapter 133, p. 191, Laws 1903, which.
(c) There is another class of cases which forms an exception to some of the general principles applied in the preceding cases. When the statute is remedial or curative the classification is legal, if it includes within the class all the subjects which are affected by the conditions * which it is sought to remedy, or the evils it is sought to cure. Necessarily this class forms an exception to the general rule that classification cannot be based upon existing conditions alone. The very object of the statute is to remedy a present condition, and if possible avoid its repetition. State v. Spaude, 37 Minn. 322, 34 N. W. 164; Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479, 42 N. W. 396; Flynn v. Dittle Falls E. & W. Co., 74 Minn. 180, 77 N. W. 38, 78 N. W. 106; State v. City of Thief River Falls, 76 Minn. 15, 78 N. W. 867; Alexander v. City of Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623; State v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91 N. W. 18; Kaiser v. Campbell, 90 Minn. 375, 96 N. W. 916; State v. Gunn, 92 Minn. 436, 100 N. W. 97; Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. City of East Grand Forks, 94 Minn. 246, 102 N. W. 703; State v. Henderson, supra, page 369.
In State v. Spaude, supra, it appeared that the village of Gaylord had attempted to incorporate under chapter 73, p. 72, Taws 1883. The act was subsequently held unconstitutional because it attempted to delegate legislative powers to the district court. Chapter 231, p. 305, Taws 1885, was then enacted for the purpose of validating the incorporation of such villages. It declared that all villages which had attempted to incorporate under the act before the decision was announced “are hereby duly incorporated as villages, with the same territorial boundaries specified in the order or judgment of the district court declaring any such village to be an incorporated village under the provisions of said act; and all such villages shall possess and are hereby endowed with all the franchises, rights, powers and privileges and subject to the duties in said act enumerated and contemplated,” etc. It was contended that this act was void because in conflict with sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the constitution. But, said Chief Justice Gilfillan: “Its operation is not confined to any part of the state. Whenever in any part of the state there is a village that comes within its classification,' it operates. A law to be-general need not operate alike upon all the inhabitants of the state, or all the cities, or all the villages in the state. To require that would be utterly impracticable. A law is general which operates alike upon all the inhabitants or all the cities, or all the villages, or other subjects of a class of such subjects of legislation. That for the purpose of legislation it may be necessary to make, and that the legislature may make, such classification, is undoubted. The only practical limitation to this power is that the classification shall be based upon some natural reason — some reason suggested by necessity, by some difference in the situation and circumstances of the subjects classified suggesting the necessity of different legislation with respect to them — and shall not be merely arbitrary, with no apparent reason except a desire to evade, under the forms of a general law, the con
In Flynn v. Little Falls El. & W. Co., 74 Minn. 180, 192, 77 N. W. 38, 78 N. W. 106, chapter 191, p. 325, Laws 1893, was attacked as special legislation. The court, by Justice Mitchell, said: “The ground of attack is that the classification adopted by the act is arbitrary. We think that counsel for the plaintiff have overlooked the fact that this is merely a curative act, intended to provide for a temporary object, to wit, the legalizing of a certain class of illegal ordinances and contracts. For such a purpose, a really distinctive class may, and often must, be based upon existing temporary circumstances. Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479, 42 N. W. 396; Iowa R. Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112. Hence the act is not subject to the objection of being special legislation, if it in fact includes all existing village ordinances and contracts similarly situated as respects the subject and object of the act.” In State v. City of Thief River Fall's, 76 Minn. 15, 78 N. W. 867, as to chapter 81, p. 88, Laws 1897, which attempted to legalize the incorporation of all cities theretofore organized or attempted to be organized under the first 21 sections of chapter 8, pp. 16, 21, Laws 1895, Chief Justice Start said: “The act is a curative statute, and was intended to legalize the incorporation of a certain class of de facto municipal corporations. It applies to and operates uniformly upon all cities of the class designated in the statute, and the basis of classification adopted is clearly a valid.one. It is therefore a general and not a special law and is constitutional.”
Alexander v. City of Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623, applies a similar if not identical principle. Chapter 50, p. 47, Laws 1899, authorized cities of a certain class to issue bonds to take up their floating
In State v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91 N. W. 18, the act in question (chapter 134, p. 165, Taws 1901) provided that the city council in every city of the state now or hereafter having fifty thousand inhabitants may, upon certain conditions, issue bonds for the purpose of anticipating local improvements when special assessments are to be made upon the property benefited. The bonds were to be sold and the proceeds
The rule was again applied in State v. Gunn, 92 Minn. 436, 100 N. W. 97. A board of county commissioners of Pine county directed the construction of a highway under the authority supposed to be conferred by chapter 302, p. 712, Laws 1895. Warrants were issued to the contractor, who presented them to the county treasurer, by whom they were indorsed: “Presented for payment, Sept. 28th, 1896. Not paid for want of funds.” The statute was held unconstitutional, and in view of the hardships resulting the legislature enacted chapter 181, p. 253, Laws 1901, entitled: “An act to authorize county commissioners ' to issue certificates of indebtedness in certain cases.”
This statute provided that in all cases where any public highway theretofore laid out by the commissioners of any county pursuant to chapter 302, p. 712, Laws 1895, and for the construction of which orders have been drawn upon the county treasurer for the whole or any part of the contract price, and presented for payment, and indorsed, “Not paid for want of funds,” for the payment of which no provision has been made, they shall become a lawful indebtedness of such county. The commissioners were also authorized' to issue and negotiate certificates of indebtedness of the county for amounts sufficient to take up and pay such orders. It was claimed that the act was void as special legislation, because it singled out those cases where the holders had presented their warrants or orders to the county treasurer and had them indorsed, “Not paid for want of funds,” and makes them a lawful indebtedness of the counties while all other warrants, orders, and bonds, remain void, even though they may have been issued for the same purpose and even to the- same man. But the court, by Chief Justice Start,, said: “We do not in fact know, and have no means of knowing,, whether there were similar orders outstanding which had been presented! for payment. The presumption is that there were not, and that all orders would in the ordinary course of business be presented and in
That statutes which are intended to cure some particular condition are not regarded as special legislation is illustrated by the recent case of Merchants Nat. Bank v. City of East Grand Forks, 94 Minn. 246, 102 N. W. 703.
In State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340, it was held that, while the legislature, in view of the provision of the state constitution, could not pass a special law incorporating an independent school district, it nevertheless had the power to pass a curative act legalizing the defective organization of a school district already in existence under the general law authorizing the creation of independent districts. The constitution of Iowa (art. 3, § 30) provides that the general assembly shall not pass any local or special laws for laying out, opening, and working roads and highways, etc. “In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable all laws shall' be general and of uniform operation throughout the state.” This prohibition in the enumerated cases is held to be absolute. State v. City (Iowa) 65 N. W. 818.
In Fair v. Buss, 117 Iowa, 164, 90 N. W. 527, it 'appeared that the board of supervisors of Ida county had established a highway without personal notice to the landholders, as required by section 936, Code 1873. The acts of the supervisors were therefore void, but the general assembly thereafter passed an act which recited in detail all the proceedings of the supervisors in the particular case, and provides: “That the establishing and locating of all highways and proceedings and acts of the board of supervisors and other officers of Ida county, Iowa, in establishing highways by said order of the board of supervisors on the sixth day of June, 1876, be and the same are hereby legalized and declared valid and binding in all
Givens v. Hillsborough (Fla.) 35 South. 88, very closely resembles the case at bar. The commissioners of Hillsborough county had attempted to issue certain bonds, but had been enjoined because of certain irregularities in the resolutions of the board upon which the proposed issue was based. The legislature then passed an act “To legalize and validate any county bonds heretofore favorably voted upon and afterwards advertised for sale by any county of the state of Florida for the purpose of constructing macadamized roads,” etc. Taws 1903, p. 248, c. 5253. It provides that: “Whenever any county bonds for the purpose of constructing macadamized and other hard surfaced highways in such county and to fund the outstanding indebtedness of any such county or for either or both such purposes i shall have heretofore been favorably voted for at a county election held for such purpose and afterwards advertised for sale, such bonds be, and are hereby declared legal and valid,” etc.
Justice Maxwell said: “The second objection raised to the curative act of the legislature is that, while in form a general act, it is in fact special and obnoxious to the provisions of section 20 of article 3 of the constitution. * * * The contention that the act is special rests upon the allegations in the bill that it applies only to past transactions, and that it affects only Hillsborough county and these particular bonds; that Hillsborough county was the only county in the state attempting to issue bonds for the purposes mentioned, and that this was known to the legislature in passing the act; and that no other county in the state can at any time bring ■itself within the provisions of the act. These allegations, of course, upon demurrer to the bill, are to be taken as true. The question then presented is whether such legislation is special legislation for one county or general legislation founded upon a reasonable and le
The rule th.at curative acts are not necessarily special legislation was approved by the supreme court of the United States in Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568, 2 Sup. Ct. 208, 27 L. Ed. 414. The city of Plattsmouth, without authority of law, issued bonds for the purpose of raising money to construct a high school building. The legislature thereafter passed an act entitled: “An act to legalize the proceedings of the city council of the city of Plattsmouth in reference to the construction of a high school building.” The constitution of the state forbade the legislature to pass any special act conferring corporate power. “It is contended,” says Justice Matthews, “that the " act in question, by legalizing the bonds of the city, void because it had no power to issue them, is legally equivalent to an act conferring upon the city power to issue bonds, which is conferring corporate power, and, being a special act, is therefore unconstitutional. But this conclusion we cannot adopt. * * * The statute operates upon the transaction itself, which had already previously been consummated, and seeks to give it a character and effect different in its legal aspect from that which it had when it was in fieri.” In support of the proposition that the legislature, without constitutional power to pass a special law, could yet pass a curative act legalizing a defectively organized school district, the court cited with approval State v. Squires, supra.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.