142 Ind. 102 | Ind. | 1895
The relator, Blair, filed an information against appellee in the court below, for the purpose of determining between himself and the appellee, which was entitled to the office of city attorney of Shelbyville. A demurrer was sustained to the complaint and the appellant refusing to amend, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee.
The only error assigned is that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.
As the question to be decided is one of statutory construction, it is necessary only to state such facts as will fully present that question.
The relator, Blair, was elected city attorney by the common council of the city of Shelbyville, on the 19th of May, 1891, and on the next day filed his bond, took the oath of office, and entered upon the discharge of his
Before the expiration of the two years for which the .relator was elected city attorney, the Legislature, by an act which took effect February 21,1893, amended section 3043, R. S. 1881, supra, which amendment reads as follows: “The officers of such city shall consist of a mayor, two councilmen from each ward, a city clerk, treasurer, civil engineer, street commissioner, chief of the fire department, health officer, marshal, and (if the common council deem it expedient) a city attorney and a city judge. The city attorney, the street commissioner, the civil engineer, the chief of the fire department, and the health officer shall be appointed by the common council: Provided, That the common council may dispense with the street commissioner and require the marshal to perform his duties. All such officers shall hold their respective offices for four (4) years, and until their successors are elected, or appointed, and qualified, those who are appointed by the common council being subject to removal by the-council at its pleasure, after the first general election on the first Tuesday in
On the 2nd day of May, 1893, and while he was still in office, by virtue of such election, the relator filed with the common council the consent of the surety on his
The only question presented for decision is, did the common council of the city have the power, under section 3476, R. S. 1894, Acts 1893, p. 50, supra, to remove the relator from the office of city attorney ? Under section 3043, R. S. 1881, which was amended by section 3476, supra, the city council had such power, without any offense being charged, but simply at the pleasure of the council. City of Madison v. Korbly, supra ; City of Madison v. Kelso, supra; State, ex rel., v. Sohn, supra.
It is claimed, however, by counsel for appellant, that the act of 1893, supra, hy expressly extending the term of the city attorney until the first Monday in September, 1894, took away from the common council the power to remove 'such officer before that time, provided the consent of his surety to such extension was filed as required by said act, that the power of removal given by the amendment of 1893, supra, to the common council, applied only to such officers as they might appoint after the amendment took effect.
We cannot concur in this view. The purpose of the act of 1893, section 3476, supra, was to provide that the terms of office for all the city officers should he four years instead of two; to fix the time when such terms should commence and
That part of the act of 1893, providing that the officers of the city should consist of a mayor, two councilmen from each ward, a city clerk, assessor, treasurer, civil engineer, street commissioner, and marshal, and, if the common council deem it expedient, a city attorney and a city judge, that the city attorney should be appointed by the common council, is a re-enactment of section 3043, R. S. 1881. The section amended provided that the city attorney was removable by the common council at its pleasure, while the section as amended provided that such officer was removable by the common council at its pleasure after the first Tuesday in May, 1894.
The legislative intention is to be ascertained from an examination of the whole as well as the separate parts of the act, and the intention so ascertained will prevail over the literal import of particular terms, and in searching for this meaning the court will look to each and every part of the act, the circumstances under which it was enacted, the old law upon the subject and the evil, if any, to be remedied. Lime City Building, etc., Assn. v. Black, 136 Ind. 544, 555.
The act in controversy spoke from the time it took effect, and had reference, from that date to all officers then in office, as well as those thereafter to be elected or appointed unless the contrary is clearly and expressly stated. . t
We think it clear that after the act of 1893 took effect the common council had the same power to abolish or discontinue the office of city attorney if they deemed it expedient to have such office, as they had under the section amended. And if such power was exercised prior to the first Monday in September, 1894, the city
By the terms of said act, one councilman for each ward was to be elected on the first Tuesday in May, 1894, and that the act gave the common council, as constituted after such election, the power to remove the city attorney and appoint another, who would execute the line of policy it might adopt. This is clearly the policy of our form of- government, for otherwise the common council would not have the power necessary to enforce the execution of its orders. City of Madison v. Korbly, supra.
The extension of the term of office of the city attorney to the first Monday in September, 1894, was subject to the right of the city council to abolish the office at any time, or remove the incumbent thereof at its pleasure, after the first Tuesday in May, 1894, and elect his successor.
It is only by such a construction that effect can be given to all the parts of said act and at the same time avoid any contradiction of terms.
If the extension of the terms of office of the city officers had the effect to place such officers beyond the power of the common council as claimed, then such officers could not have been removed for cause, upon charges preferred under the provisions of section 3101, R. S. 1881. City of Madison v. Korbly, supra.
No such construction should be given to the act unless
We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.
Hackney, J., did not participate in this decision.