68 So. 993 | Ala. | 1915
The bill in this canse was filed by the state of Alabama upon the relation of Hugo L. Black, solicitor for Jefferson county, and alleged, in substance, as follows: That W. C. Delaye, a resident of Birmingham, Ala., and over the age of 21 years, was in charge of and conducted a news stand in said city, and that he had been from time to time, at least since February 10, 1915, selling various newspapers, magazines, and periodicals at such news stand to the purchasers who1 applied therefor.
In paragraph 3 of the bill it is alleged that the said Delaye since February 10, 1915, when what is known as the “Anti-Advertising Liquor Law” took effect in this state, sold various and sundry newspapers, magazines, and periodicals containing advertisments of whisky, and it may be other beverages embraced within the term “prohibited liquors,” as defined in the law of Alabama. It is further alleged that on March 8, 1915, the said Delaye at said news stand did personally circulate and sell a newspaper called the “Inquirer,” of Cincinnati, Ohio, of date March, 7, 1915, containing two advertisements of whisky, one of them being an advertisement of “Sandy River” and the other of “Magnolia” whisky. The prices at which “Sandy River” whisky might be obtained were stated, with a commendation of the said liquors, and in solicitation of mail orders it was said: “This department is on the job; all goods carefully packed and sealed in plain packages without necessary marking.”
The bill contains with more or less detail, a description of the several advertisements above referred to, but which it is unnecessary to notice further. In the con
Application was made to Hon. J. H. Miller, judge of the city court of Birmingham, for an injunction whereupon he ordered that the same be set down for hearing; •as authorized by section 4528 of the Code of 1907. On April 5, 1915, the said judge entered an order denying the injunction as prayed for, reciting in the.order, however, due notice to the defendant and his appearance at the hearing, and that none of the averments of the bill were by him denied. The order was accompanied by an opinion of the judge, which is copied in the record, .and which discloses that he entertained the view that the complainant was not entitled to the writ for the reason that the bill showed that the enforcement of the •statute there sought, under the facts as alleged in the bill, would burden interstate commerce and violate the ■federal Constitution in that respect.
In the case of West. Ry. of Ala. v. Cap. B. & I. Co., 177, Ala. 149, 59 South. 52, it was held by this court that, under the general laws and policy of this state, intoxicating beverages, including whisky, were prohibited to-be sold, even after the enactment of the local option laws, and that the effect of said local option laws was merely to ingraft an exception in particular cases on the general prohibition law of the state. The opinion also clearly demonstrates Avhat Avas meant by the use of the words “prohibited liquors,”- in the act there under review.
The above authority is directly in point in this case, and is opposed to the contention of the appellee. In addition to this, however, this question relates solely to what was the intention of the Legislature. The title of the act is as follows: “To further promote temperance and suppress the evils of intemperance; to prevent the advertising or solicitations of orders for alcoholic, spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, such as brandy, wine, rum, gin, beer, and other intoxicating liquors and beverages prohibited by the laws of Alabama to be manufactured, sold or othenvise disposed of in this state; to provide for the removal of advertisements in defined cases, and to provide for the prevention of the continuation and repetition of the acts hereby made unlawful; and to prescribe remedies, procedure, penalities and punishment.”
The preamble of the act reads as folioavs : “Whereas,, it is the public policy of this state to discourage the use and consumption of prohibited liquors and beverages, and to secure the strict enforcement of the laws against the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, or oth
And the body of the act, as to matters therein prohibited and the punishment therefor, and the authority given the sheriff and police officers to remove such prohibited advertisements, etc., all speaking in the present tense, contains no exception as to any part of the state, and gives no indication of any postponement of the time when it is to become effective. On the contrary, the concluding section of the act reads: “Sec. 5. That this act shall take effect from and after its final passage and enactment into law, the public welfare requiring it.”
We think it too clear for further discussion that the act became effective over the entire state immediately upon its passage, without any exception as to any particular locality, and that therefore it had application to the city of Birmingham, where this respondent was. engaged in business.
Indeed, this principle is not here controverted.
It is insisted by counsel for appellee that as the bill shows that the particular newspaper alleged to have been circulated and sold by the respondent, was published in Cincinnati, Ohio, the law which attempts to prohibit its circulation is void for the. reason that it is violative of section 8, art. 1, of. the Constitution of the United States, commonly called the “commerce clause,” which delegates to the national Congress alone the power to regulate commerce between the states. It is to be noted that paragraph 3 of said bill does not confine the acts of the respondent to the circulation of the one paper, the Cincinnati Inquirer, but it alleges that he sold various and sundary newspapers and magazines containing advertisements of whisky; and that no answer was filed to the bill, nor other pleadings or affidavit denying the averments thereof.
In view of the pleading, therefore, it may be doubted that the denial of the writ in its entirety was justified, irrespective of the constitutional questions above noted. 'That question, however, is also presented; and, in view of its importance and of the consequent desirability of its early determination by the court, we treat it as the -question of prime importance on this appeal, and it is necessarilv decisive of all others here presented.
It is insisted that, because of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, this state is without power to pass a law which would prevent the respondent from selling at his news stand in Birmingham a newspaper or
There can be no question that the newspapers and periodicals placed on the news stand of the respondent for sale to the public became mixed and mingled with the mass of property in Alabama, and thus subject to its police laws.
As that case is, in our opinion, conclusive of every constitutional question here insisted upon, frequent quotations from the opinion will be indulged. In the outset Mr. Justice White (present Chief Justice) expressly states that, as the subject dealt with is intoxicating liquors, the decisions of that court touching on the subject of interstate commerce, but dealing with the subjects to which such commerce is generally applied, and not to intoxicating liquors, or, if concerning in
After quoting tbe Wilson act, it is pointed out that its purpose was to allow tbe states, as to intoxicating liquors, tbe subject of such interstate commerce, to' exert ampler power than could have been exercised before tbe enactment of tbe statute; and that, in effect by thd Wilson act Congress adopted a special rule enabling the states to extend tbeir authority as to' such liquors shipped from other states before they became commingled with tbe mass of property in tbe state by a sale in tbe original packages. Continuing, the opinion says: “Tbe proposition relief upon, therefore, when considered in tbe light of the Wilson act, reduces' itself to this: Albeit the state of South Dakota bad power within its territory to prevent tbe sale of intoxicating liquors, even when shipped into that state from other states, yet South Dakota was wanting in authority to prevent or regulate tbe carrying on witbin its borders of tbe business of soliciting proposals for the purchase of liquors, because the proposals were to be consummated outside of tbe state, and tbe liquors to which they related were also outside tbe state. This, however, but come to this: That the power existed to prevent sales of liquor,’ even when brought from without tbe state, and yet there
The writer of the opinion then proceeds to answer some of the arguments of counsel, to the effect that as that court had held that the Wilson act did not authorize state power to attach to liquor shipped from one state into another before its arrival and delivery in the state of its destination, and that therefore the power of the state could not attach to the carrying on of the business of soliciting proposals, as none of the liquor covered by the proposals in that case had arrived and been delivered within the state of South Dakota. The court said: “The business of solicitating proposals in South Dakota Avas one which that state had a right to regulate, wholly irrespective of when or where it was contemplated the proposals would be accepted or Avhence the liquor which they embraced was to be shipped. Of course, if the OAvner of the liquor in another state had a right to ship the same into South Dakota as an article of interstate commerce, and, as such, there sell the same in the original packages, irrespective of the. laAvs of South Dakota, it would follow that the right to carry on the business of soliciting in South Dakota Avas an incident to the right to ship and sell, Avhich. could not be burdened Avithout directly affecting interstate commerce. But, as by the Wilson act the power-of South Dakota attached to intoxicating liquors, when shipped into that state from another state after delivery-but before the sale in the original package, .so as to authorize South Dakota to regulate or forbid such sale.,
Answering- the argument, made by counsel that, as under the decisions of that court, a resident of one state had the right to contract for liquors in another state and receive the same in the state of his residence for his own use, and that therefore the agent of the nonresident dealer had the right to go into South Dakota and solicit orders from residents of that state to be consummated by the acceptance of the proposals of the nonresident dealer, the opinion points out that this insistence ignores the broad distinction between the want of power of a state to prevent a resident from ordering from another state liquor for his own use, and the plenary authority of the state to forbid the carrying on within its borders of the business of soliciting orders for liquor situated in another state. The opinion states : “That the distinction betwéen the two is not only obvious but had been foreclosed by a previous opinion of this court.”
Reference is made to the case of Nutting v. Mass., 183 U. S. 553, 22 Sup. Ct. 238, 46 L. Ed. 324, wherein the court was called upon to consider: “The power of the state on the one hand to forbid the making within the state of contracts of insurance with unauthorized insurance companies, and the right of the individual on his own behalf to make a contract with such insurance companies in another state as to property within the state of residence.”
'Applying, then, the principle to the case at hand, the opinion concludes as follows: “ The ruling thus made is particularly pertinent to the subject of intoxicating liquors and the power of the state in respect thereto. As we have seen, the right of the states to prohibit the sale of liquor within their respective jurisdictions in and by virtue of the regulation of commerce embodied in the Wilson act is absolutely applicable to liquor shipped from one state into another after delivery and before the sale in the original package. It follows that the authority of the states, so far as the sale of intoxicating liquors within their borders is concerned, is just as complete as is their right to regulate within their jurisdiction the making of contracts of insurance. It hence must be that the authority of the states to forbid agents of nonresident liquor dealers from coming within their borders to solicit contracts for the purchase of intoxicating liquors, which otherwise the citizen of the state ‘would not have thought of making,” must be as complete and efficacious as is such authority in relation to contracts of insurance, especially in view of
In tbe Delamater Case, from wbicb we have so freely quoted, tbe right of tbe agent of a nonresident dealer to solicit business was involved, and it was held that., under the Wilson act, this agent was not entitled to the protection of tbe commerce clause of tbe Constitution, and that be could not find refuge behind tbe right of tbe individual to order liquor for bis own use. Tbe principle there decided is absolutely conclusive upon !the question here involved. Advertising, as before stated, is in reality but tbe solicitation of business, and the principle here involved is identical with that of tbe Delamater Case. In that case tbe nonresident dealer could not send bis agent into South Dakota to solicit business in defiance of state law and seek protection under ■ tbe commerce clause of tbe Constitution. In tbe case at band, applying tbe same principle, tbe nonresident dealer is not authorized to send bis agent, whether in person or by newspaper or periodical advertisements, wbicb in effect are tbe same, into this state, and, by means of tbe distribution of such newspapers or periodicals containing such advertisements, solicit business in defiance of tbe act here under review. Tbe Delamiater Case and this case cannot be distinguished in principle. Tbe question involved is a federal one and one upon wbicb tbe decision of tbe United States Supreme Court is conclusive and binding, and tbe result here may well rest upon that authority. Indeed, that tbe Delamater Case decides in principle tbe case at band seems not to be denied by tbe learned counsel for appellee; but it is insisted that, while that case has not been overruled by that court, yet it is incon
We are unable to discover that these authorities are at all in conflict with the Delamater Case. The Crenshaw Case dealt with an act of the state of Arkansas which undertook to regulate the sale of stoves, ranges, etc., and applied a question of interstate commerce to articles of like kind. Cases of like character have frequently been before the court and bear no analogy whatever to the instant case nor to the principles involved in the Delamater Case. The case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Cook, supra, involved the carriage and delivery by the common carrier of liquors shipped from one state to a resident of another state, wherein it was held that the Wilson act did not apply to interstate shipments of liquor until delivery to the consignee. It is clear that this in no wise conflicts with the Delamater decision, wherein material distinction is drawn between the right of the individual to receive liquors in the state of his residence, for his own use, and the right of the nonresident liquor dealer to go into that state and carry on the business of soliciting orders for liquor from the residents.
Much argument of counsel is devoted to a criticism of the Delamater Case. We do' not share in this criticism, but on the contrary consider the opinion entirely sound and logical and as containing a full answer to the arguments here presented against it.
We have examined with much care the following authorities pressed upon our attention by counsel for appellee: Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1,
Other states have found themselves likewise situated, as, for instance, Iowa. The Supreme Court of that state, in the case of McCollum v. McConaughy, 141 Iowa, 174, 119 N. W. 540, referring to a case decided by it prior to the Delamater Case, said: “It is evident ■* * * that the controlling consideration in reaching the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional was the interpretation which it was thought the Supreme Court of the United States had given to the interstate commerce clause of the federal Constitution as affecting the validity of the statute, and that if the recent decision had then been announced, and had been ■considered by this court as applicable to the legislation in question, a contrary decision would have been reached.”
Reference may also be had in this connection to State v. Miller, 66 W. Va. 436, 66 S. E. 522 Ann. Cas. 604; State v. Davis, 84 S. C. 512, 66 S. E. 875; Hart v.
As previously stated, a federal question being involved, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is final and conclusive, and the Moog Case, supra, having been decided prior to the Delamater Gase and merely in anticipation of ivhat the United States Supreme court would decide, it now becomes necessary, in the light of that authority and following in its wake, to overrule the Moog Case.
“The statute in this case is but a part of the legislation of this state upon the subject-matter of the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors, and is to be construed, so far as its lauguage will fairly and reasonably allow, in harmony with what appears from that legislation to be the legislative policy and purpose.”— 104 Me. 292, 71 Atl. 896, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496.
There has long been a statute in this state prohibiting the solicitation of orders for liquors, and which has been applied and sustained by this court. — Levy v. State, 133 Ala. 190, 31 South. 805; Mills v. State, 148 Ala. 633, 42 South. 816. In the latter, case it was said: “The statute is a police regulation, and one act will constitute a violation of it.” — Code of 1896, § 5087; Code, 1907, § 7373.
We are cited by counsel to the case of Eidge v. Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599, 51 South. 246, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 394, which, however, dealt with a question bearing no analogy to that here presented, and nothing therein contained militates against the conclusion we have here reached.
The following quotation from the case of Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, L. Ed. 184, also finds application here: “That the state, in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit the selling of intoxicating liquors, is undoubted. * * * It is also well established that, when a state exerting it recognized authority undertakes to suppress what it is free to regard as a public evil, it may adopt such measures having reasonable .relation to that end as it may deem necessary in order to make its action effective. It does not follow that, because a transaction separately considered is innocuous, it may not be included in a prohibition, the scope of which is regarded as essential in the legislative judgment to accomplish a purpose within the admitted power of the government. * * * With the wisdom of the exercise of that judgment, the court has no concern; and, unless it clearly appears that the enactment has no substantial relation to a proper purpose, it cannot be said that the limit of legislative power has been transcended. To hold otherwise would
See, also, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205, and Feibelman v. State, 130 Ala. 122, 30 South. 384.
The conclusion we have here reached, in the light of the Delamater Case, is without any consideration of the recent act of Congress known as the “Webb-Kenyon Bill,” passed in March, 1913 (Act March 1, 1913,. c. 90, 37 Stat. (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 8739) ; Fed. SL Ann. Sup. 1914, p. 208), but which act it must be confessed adds strength and confirmation to the well-reasoned opinion of that case.
The advertisements forbidden by this law are in reality but solicitations for business, and this state, possessing the unquestioned authority under its police power to prevent or regulate the sale of liquors within it» borders, has also the authority, under the same police power, to prevent or regulate the carrying on of the accessory business of soliciting orders within the state.
We therefore conclude that the anti-advertising liquor law here under review does not contravene any of the provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, is a proper exercise of the police power of the state, and i» valid and now effective throughout the entire state. The law provides for the mode of procedure here followed, and which authorizes injunctive relief as a means of obtaining the end in view. It follows, therefore, in our opinion, that the writ of injunction should have been granted by the learned judge below, and his order denying the same is hereby reversed, and one will be here entered granting the temporary injunction as prayed for in the bill.
Reversed and rendered.