76 Neb. 155 | Neb. | 1906
The respondent and the intervener have brought this case here by an appeal from a judgment of the district court for Lancaster county awarding the relator a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the respondent to preside at all meetings of the city council of the city of Lincoln and appoint the standing committees of said council. It appears that in the year 1902 the city council of the city of Lincoln passed an ordinance known as “Ordinance No. 107,” by which it ivas provided, among other things, as follows: “The council is hereby authorized to elect one of the members of the council as president of the council, who shall préside at all meetings of the council, and, while so presiding, shall have the same privileges as other members. He shall appoint all the standing committees of the council, and perform such other duties as are usually performed by a presiding officer. In the absence of the mayor from the city, or in any case when the mayor is from any cause disqualified from acting as mayor, the president of the council shall be eoo officio mayor, and all his acts, while so acting as mayor, shall be as binding upon the mayor and upon the city as if done by the mayor.” That ordinance was in force at the time the legislature passed the act of 1905, amending article I, ch. 13, Oomp. St., commonly called the “City Charter.” That act amended section 13, and other sections of the charter, so that said
The relator now contends that the provision of section 13; above quoted, is unconstitutional and void, because it is not germane to the subject matter of the original sec
It is further contended by the relator that section 13 of the charter, as amended, and section 27 thereof are in “irreconcilable conflict, and their provisions are hopelessly repugnant.” It is said, in substance, that one or the other must be declared invalid; that section 27 is not repealed by implication, and the provisions of section 13, which are in conflict with those contained in section 27, must be declared void. We decline to entertain this view of the matter. Section 13 creates the office of president pro tempore of the council, and provides that he shall preside over its meetings in the absence of the mayor, and shall exercise the powers of the mayor on his absence from the city. Section 27 provides: “In case of vacancy in the office of the mayor or in case of his absence or disabilty, the president of the council shall exercise the powers and duties of the office until such vacancy shall be filled or disability removed, or in case of temporary absence, until the mayor returns, and such acting mayor shall perform such other duties as may be required by law.” It is our duty to read and construe the two sections together, and, if possible, to reconcile their provisions. Proceeding with this rule in view, we find that section 27 seems to supplement the provisions of section 13, and provides for contingencies not mentioned in the last named section. By
Lastly, it is contended by the relator that section 13, as amended, and subdivision 53 of section 129 of the charter are in direct conflict, and therefore the amendment in question must be declared void. Section 129 is entitled “Ordinances,” and provides: “In addition to the powers herein granted, cities governed under the provisions of this act shall have power by ordinance: * * * (subdivision 53) To elect one of the members of the city council as president of the council, and who shall preside at all meetings of the council, and have equal privileges with the other members of the council, and in the absence of the mayor from the city shall perform the duties of mayor.” It seems clear, from the language above quoted, that subdivision 53 does not, of itself, create a president
As above stated, the city council has, since the commencement of this action, repealed ordinance No. 107, and for the purpose of harmonizing its methods of procedure with the provisons of the amended charter, on February 8 of the present year, passed an ordinance, known as “Ordinance No. 346,” by which it is provided: “The council is hereby authorized to elect one of the members of the council as president pro tempore of the council, who shall preside at all meetings of the council in the absence of the mayor, and, while so presiding, shall have the same privileges as other members of the council. He shall perform such duties as are usually performed by a presiding officer. In the absence of the mayor from the city, or in any case when the mayor is from any cause disqualified from acting as mayor, the president pro tempore of the council shall be ew officio mayor, and all his acts, while so acting as mayor, shall be as binding upon the council and upon the city as if done by the mayor.” From the foregoing it appears that, at the time the peremptory writ was allowed, there was no provision either of ordinance or statute authorizing the president to preside over the city council, and appoint its standing committees. It is contended, however, by the relator that ordinance No. 346 is void, because the inducement to its passage was the amendment to section 13 of the charter, above mentioned. As before stated, we have already held that the amendatory act in question, as a whole, is valid and constitutional, and we are satisfied that without invoking its provisions the powers conferred upon the ci-ty council by other provisions of the charter are broad enough to authorize it to pass the ordinance in question. It stands to reason that the city council, a legislative body, has the inherent power, by ordinance, to
So we are of opinion that the relator was not entitled to any relief when this action was commenced; that ordinance No. 346 is valid, and both the relator and the respondent are bound by the method of procedure therein provided for.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed, the writ is denied, and the cause is hereby dismissed at the costs of the relator.
Judgment accordingly.