3 Mo. App. 388 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1877
delivered the opinion of the court upon the demurrer.
In this case the demurrer to the information will be overruled. Upon this result the law does not require any written opinion to be given by the court, and it would be unnecessary for us to do anything more than to announce our conclusion, were it not that counsel, in the absence of any knowledge as to the ground of the decision, might be embarrassed in their future proceedings. For this reason we will indicate, in an informal manner, some of the positions which, in the light of the facts as now presented to us, we hold to be correct, and which have led to the result of requiring the respondents to plead over.
It is contended, at the outset, by the respondents that the authentication by the mayor of the city of St. Louis and the presiding justice of the County Court to the certificate required by the 21st section of article 9 of the Constitution makes that certificate conclusive ; that the certificate having been made according to the requirements of that section, and deposited as therein provided, is such proof of the fact that the Scheme and Charter were ratified by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the election that the actual fact cannot be investigated even in a court of law. It is admitted that this effect is extraordinary; that generally the effect of a certificate or return of officer's appointed to canvass votes is merely to show the return to be true, in the absence of evidence properly adduced to the contrary. But it is contended that the Convention, representing the people in their sovereign capacity, had power to so provide, and has so provided. Unless it is perfectly clear that the construction contended for is the correct one, it ought not to be adopted, since it cannot be presumed, on slight reasons or in a doubtful case, that the Convention intended to disregard the fundamental maxims of constitutional government and to deprive the citizens of their right to resort to courts of justice for redress. It is said, in the first place, that the Constitution uses the words “qualified voters,” and that the mayor and presiding justice were thus required to investigate and decide as to those qualifications. But, if the word “ qualified ” were not used, it would be implied, and its use adds nothing to the argument.
It is said that the words “ and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice” are used, and extraordinary effect is
But it is said that the certificate of the mayor and presiding justice is an official return, and that, if only prima-facie evidence, it is sufficient here, because there are no aver
We cannot, therefore, presume that this is a case where the party making the allegations which are complained of as insufficient intends to attack the face of the official returns, and to prove that what appears to be a majority of the votes is really a minority by proving that some of the majority votes were not legal votes ; in other words, that the apparent result is not the real result, owing to the fact that particular votes have illegally been counted. In The State ex rel. v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97, there was a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which brought certain facts before the court and enabled the court to see that the allegation of the plea that the respondent was elected by a majority of the qualified voters was a mere cover for the allegation that illegal votes were cast for Dinning, the other candidate, and that thereby the respondent was elected. In The State ex rel. v. Townsley, 56 Mo. 107, there was a trial, and issues were made up. The respondent alleged that he was duly elected. The replication denied this, and set up specifically the votes received in the different counties by Wood, the other candidate, showing a majority for Wood on the face of the returns, and showing that the secretary of state refused to open or count the returns from Jackson County, which returns gave Wood his majority. The rejoinder merely denied the allegations of the replication. At the trial the respondent claimed the right to go behind the returns, and show that the returns and abstracts from Jackson County were false, and that he was legally elected. The court held that the issue had not been made by respondent in his pleadings ;
It is said, in the next place, that the information is insufficient because it does not show any notice to the respondents, whose commissions are attacked, of an intention to contest, or any specifications of grounds, as required by the election law. Wag. Stat. 573, sec. 52 et seq. It is sufficient to say that these sections refer to elections where there are persons opposing each other as contesting candidates. There are no apt words to fit an election of this kind, and every section contains references more or less distinct and direct to persons voted for, certificates given to candidates, or other features indicative of offices in contest. Both the Yail and Townsley cases were personal contests, and the remarks made in those cases in regard to contests between individuals do not apply to the facts of this case. Counsel have argued at the bar, in this case, as though some of the main positions taken by this court in the case of Barnes v. Gottschalk were still open to review. Some remarks were made incidentally there, but we do not consider it open to question that the mayor of the city of St. Louis and the presiding justice of the County Court were the proper canvassing officers for the election for the Scheme and Charter, under the Constitution; and we may repeat hero what was in substance said in that opinion, that upon the filing of the certificate, as provided in section 21 of article
This leads to the question whether such a certificate has been filed. In what we have said above in regard to the certificate being prima-facie evidence, we have assumed, in respect to it, a compliance with the constitutional provisions, because it was more, convenient to consider the questions in this order. But it is contended by the relator that Charles Speck never had any authority to act; that he was not the officer designated to act, but that Chauncey L. Shultz is the person who should, with the mayor of St. Louis, have made the certificate. The allegations of the information are that said Shultz was the “lawful presiding justice” of the County Court of St. Louis County, “ and was acting as such, and continued to be and act until the-day of December, A. D. 1876, upon which last-named day Charles Speck assumed and took upon himself to act and perform the functions of said office of presiding justice of said court, under claim of an election thereto held on the 7th day of November, 1876, under the laws applicable to said county as they existed •prior to, and independent of, the said proposed Scheme, and by no other warrant or claim whatever ;” “ that thereafter-wards, on or about the 29th day of December, 1876, the mayor of the city of St. Louis and Charles Speck, claiming to have then become the presiding justice of said court by virtue of said election of November 7, 1876, as aforesaid, notwithstanding the fact that said proposed Scheme was in no manner ratified,” etc., “ did wrongfully, and without any lawful authority, make and execute the following certificate,” etc.,; that “ the said Speck, claiming to be, and acting as, presiding justice as aforesaid, did not hear or determine, in fact or law, any question,” etc. The information then avers that no election for justices of the County Court of the new county was held, for the reason that the result of the Scheme and Charter election was accepted as a
Lord Holt’s definition, approved by Lord Ellenborough, was, “ one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law.” It is said that this definition has never been questioned in England, and is now the rule there. In The State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 467, a carefully-considered case, it is said : “ But, to protect those who dealt with such officers when apparent incumbents of offices under such apparent circumstances of reputation or color as would lead men to suppose they were legal officers, the law validated their acts as to the public and third persons, on the ground that, as to them, though not officers de jure, they were officers in fact, whose acts public policy required should be considered valid. It was not because of any quality or character conferred upon the officer, or attached to him by reason of any defective election or appointment, but a name or character given to his acts by the law, for the purpose of validating them.”
The de-facto principle is one of the oldest and most firmly established in the common law. Perhaps no more memorable instance of its application can be cited than that exhibited by the conduct of Sir Matthew Hale. On the death of Charles I., Charles II. immediately became king of England de jure; and the years of the reign of Charles II. are to this day counted from the death of Charles I. Yet there
The point is made by the relator that, as the election for the Scheme and Charter took place August 22, 1876, and the certificate was not made till December 29, 1876, the certificate had no legal force. This may be considered in connection with the objection that the power to make the certificate was exhausted, that the officers were functi ■officio, and that there could be no second action. The information, however, does not charge any first action, except so far as mental determination is a kind of action. The allegation is that the mayor and Justice Shultz decided that the Scheme had been duly rejected, etc.; but it does not appear that any steps were taken. Even if they did so determine, and evinced their resolution by acts, it is difficult to see how their determination, followed by any such action as that described, can conclude the respondents. It does not appear that the officers made any examination for themselves, or caused any to be made. It would appear that they relied upon the returns and certificates of others, not made for them or exhibited to them in such a way that they could see anything but results. Barnes v. Gottschalk, ante, pp. 109, 122. Altogether, there are no allegations showing any such performance as to warrant that which, as stated in the information, is a mere conclusion of law, that the officers had exhausted their powers, even if they could have exhausted them. The Constitution names no time within which the act must be done. The argument, stated in its fullest force, resolves itself into one from inconvenience. It may be said, Is there no limit to the operation of such discoveries? On the supposition that a majority of the qualified voters have voted in favor of a new order of things, may the community rest for years in the belief that that order of things has been defeated, and then wake up to find it enforced against them ? The diffi
Upon what is now before us, accordingly., we conclude that the certificate of the mayor and the presiding justice is prima-facie evidence of the facts required by the 21st section of the 9th article of the Constitution to be stated in it, and we cannot say that that certificate was not made in accordance with the constitutional provisions. The relator attacks this certificate, and seeks to rebut and overthrow the presumption which it raises. As on the face of the information we hold its averments to be sufficient, the demurrer is overruled.
The amended answer to the information averred the ratification of the Scheme at the election, and contained various averments, the nature of the more material of which appears from the opinion delivered on the motion to strike out parts of it and from the final opinion in the case.
delivered the opinion of the court upon the motion to strike out.
For brevity, many of the allegations of the answer to which this motion goes may be treated by classes. Certain allegations are “ that ballots against the Scheme and Charter [giving the numbers], not voted by any voter, were placed in the ballot-boxes, and counted by the judges of election against the Scheme;” other allegations are “that ballots voted by legal and qualified voters were destroyed and not counted by the judges, which should have been counted for the Scheme ;” other allegations are “ that the judges intentionally omitted to take the oath required by law;” “ that the returns of the judges for [such and such] precincts were false, and that the returns do not show the
These are specimens of the allegations which we" think are correctly made. It is, indeed, claimed upon the part of the relator that the court ought not to go beyond the returns. The ground taken seems to be, further, that the court should not go into the underlying question, whether the Scheme and Charter were ratified by a majority of the legal voters voting at the election of August 22, 1876, but should merely decide whether the mayor and presiding justice acted properly in making and filing the certificate. But we do not sit here to revise the ministerial acts of these officers. This court proceeds judicially, and will ascertain from the evidence the will of the electors. That is the underlying question to be decided; and these allegations, bearing as they do upon that question, are properly pleaded. The office of the certificate is to make prima-facie evidence. When the certificate has performed this office, its function is ended for the time being, it having availed to shift the burden of proof in the contest.
In The State ex rel. v. Townsley, 56 Mo. 107, on which case the relator relies, the secretary of state had only the returns and the abstracts from Jackson County to proceed upon ; but the mayor and presiding justice, in this case, had other things to proceed upon besides the abstract of the clerk of the County Court and the returns of the judges of election. From that case, moreover, the inference is to be drawn that, where there is no statute regulating the matter,
Perhaps the most difficult question arising is in regard to the numbering of the ballots. The.allegation is made that in such a return there were no proper numbers placed upon the ballots, and the names of the voters casting such ballots, in the order in which they voted, were not entered upon such ballots or upon the poll-books, as required by the Constitution. We have examined the different acts of the Legislature upon this subject, but it is not necessary here to give more than our conclusion, which is that, as the laws stand, the mere omission to number the ballots does not have the effect of invalidating the ballot and depriving the voter of his vote. Tbe Constitution contains no mandatory words such as existed in the act of 1863 (Sess. Acts 1863, p. 17, sec. —; Wag. Stat. 566, sec. 15), to the effect that no ballot not numbered shall be counted. Sess. Acts 1875, p. 53. Unless the words are clear, we ought not to give them such an effect as will deprive the voter of his vote merely because the officer of election does not number the ballot. The design of the 3d section of article 8 of the Constitution, as it stands, would seem to be to reconcile, as far as possible, two things which are difficult to be reconciled. One of the primary objects is to preserve the purity of the ballot. Without this, elective government is at an end. Another important object is to secure the se
The motion to strike out will be overruled, except as to those allegations which relate to the failure to number ballots. These can be stricken out without injury to the other clauses, and the pleading, thus altered, will stand.
delivered the opinion of the court upon the information.
The information in the nature of a quo warranto, filed as an original proceeding in this court, charges, in effect, that the defendants are usurping the offices of justices of the County Court of St. Louis County, under appointments made by the governor, upon an unfounded assumption that the Scheme of Separation of city and county, and the City Charter, submitted to a vote of the people on August 22, 1876, were ratified and adopted in that election. It admits that a certificate of such ratification and adoption, signed and duly authenticated by the mayor of the city and the presiding justice of the County Court, was made and deposited as directed by the 21st section of article 9 of the State Constitution; but avers that this certificate was untrue, and that the Scheme and Charter were in fact rejected at the election referred to. The respondents, answering, declare that the certificate was true; that at said election at least 12,160 votes were cast in favor of the Scheme and Charter, and not more than 8,904 against them. They further aver that at certain specified precincts enormous frauds were perpetrated by the election judges, and false returns of results were made by them, so as to make it appear that large majorities had been given against the Scheme and Charter, when in fact the true ma
On the trial the relator, after showing the various steps taken preparatory to the election, introduced in evidence the whole of the returns, as certified by the judges of election of the sixty-nine precincts in the city and county, and rested. The footings of these returns exhibit the general
result of the votes cast, as follows :
For the Charter......... 11,858
Against the Charter....................11,300
Majority for the Charter.............. 558
For the Scheme of Separation............12,726
Against the Scheme of Separation........14,142
Majority against the Scheme............1,416
The respondents here assume the burden of proof to destroy the supposed effect of the judges’ returns. They introduce as witnesses, successively, nine judges and three clerks, who had officiated at one or another of four different precincts, whose several statements — some of them differing slightly in immaterial particulars — tended to show the following facts :
First, that at the Middle Precinct of the Fifth Ward neither judges nor clerks were sworn; that a majority of votes were actually cast in favor of the Scheme and Charter, but the judges and clerks, by suppressing or destroying a large number of ballots given in their favor, and adding a larger number of spurious ballots against them, made an apparent result of 450 majority against the Scheme and Charter; that after the election the poll-books and ballots were gone over by the clerks and two of the judges, together with a man having no official connection with the
Second, that at the Eastern Precinct of the Fifth Ward the same processes were carried on, of destroying large numbers of ballots cast in favor of the Scheme and Charter and depositing hundreds of spurious ballots against them ; that after the election the ballots were taken out of the box and carried in a handkerchief or newspaper, by one of the judges, to a saloon on the Levee, where the greater part of the night was spent by judges and clerks in altering the poll-books by additions of the word “voted,” whei'e required, to make them correspond with the fraudulent additions of ballots not cast by the voters ; that early the next morning the ballots were taken back in the same manner and placed in the box, which was then sealed up and delivered to the county clerk. No one could approximate the actual vote of the precinct, but the returns were made to show 227 votes for, and 900 against, the Scheme and Charter.
Third, that at the Middle Precinct of the Ninth Ward about 700 votes in all were cast, giving a majority in favor of the Scheme and Charter; that the judges ancl clerks, by adding hundreds of spurious ballots and destroying real ones, created a false showing of 1,305 votes against the Scheme and Charter to eighty-three in their favor.
The respondents also exhibited in evidence the condition of the ballots cast at five different precincts, as described in
First, that in the Middle Precinct of the Fifth Ward the certificate of the judges exhibited a total of sixty-four votes more than were shown by the ballots ; that in the Eastern Precinct of the Fifth Ward there appeared a like excess in the certificate, over the ballots, of 162 ; in the Middle Precinct of the Sixth Ward appeared a similar excess of eighty-nine, and in the Eastern Precinct of the Ninth Ward a like excess of 193.
Second, that in the four precincts last mentioned, together with the Middle Precinct of the Ninth Ward, there were found 503 duplicate and triplicate ballots.
Third, that in four of these precincts there appeared to have been cast 229 votes by persons noted on the poll-books as “ dead,” “ removed,” or “ stricken off by the revisors.”
Fourth, that in three of these precincts about 150 ballots had never been folded or creased, and therefore could not have been passed through the apertures in the tops of the boxes.
Fifth, that in the Middle Precinct of the Sixth Ward the judge’s certificate declared a majority of 110 against the Scheme and Charter, while the ballots showed a majority of nineteen in their favor.
When the relator, after submitting the certificates of the judges of election, rested, it seemed to be assumed, on his part, that enough had been done to overthrow the jprimafcicie case made by the certificate of the mayor and the presiding justice. We were not then called upon to say whether his theory was or was not correct. But we do not perceive how it could be reconciled with the opinions heretofore delivered by this court.
The one great question to whose solution all others must tend, in this investigation, is, What decision was pronounced by the majority of lawful votes actually cast at the election
The mayor and presiding justice having to certify, not merely the returns of the election officers, but the actual result of the election, are presumed to have had access to the highest sources of information.
The Constitution, in providing for an inspection of the ballots in any case of a contested election, seems to say that the ballots themselves are the best evidence of the true result. For aught that appears before us, the certificate of the mayor and the presiding justice may have been based upon this highest grade of evidence. We cannot, at least, assume the contrary. The certificates of the election judges have no better foundation. We have said, in effect, that these were evidence to be used for so much as they might be worth in disproving the truth of the certificate provided for by the Constitution. But we have never said, and could not consistently say, .that, unsupported by the higher evidence of the ballots, or by any other testimony, they would be in themselves conclusive against the constitutional certificate. Our argument assumes, of course, that the ballots have not been tampered with since they left the hands of the judges. Such is the necessary presumption, since it is not shown that they have been at any time in other than lawful custody.
We might here pause, and decide this case against the relator upon the insufficiency of his proofs to rebut the presumption raised by the certificate of the mayor and presid
The relator moves the court to exclude from consideration all the testimony of the election officers which tends to impeach their returns. He insists that, on grounds of public policy, an officer cannot be heard in any case to testify that an official certificate given by himself is false. There is some disagreement among the authorities upon the question thus presented. In Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305, it was held that “ the magistrate who took the acknowledgment of a married woman to a deed is not, from considerations of public policy, if from no other, a competent witness to contradict or impeach his certificate of the acknowledgment.” In Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 338, the same court reasserted the rule, with the qualification that the officer might testify to facts tending to invalidate the instrument acknowledged, but not contradicting his certificate.
In Briggs v. Stafford, 14 La. 381, it was declared that “ a public officer who has given a solemn certificate in his official character cannot be listened to as a witness to prove it false.” This was reaffirmed in Peet v. Dougherty, 7 Rob. (La.) 85. Each case was that of a notary who had certified a protest.
In Stone v. Atwood, 28 Ill. 30, it was held that “ an arbitrator may be examined as a witness to sustain, but not to impeach, his award.”
In Harkins v. Forsyth, 11 Leigh, 294, the testimony of a magistrate to contradict his certificate of a married woman’s acknowledgment was held inadmissible. But this ruling was put on the distinct ground that such certificates were conclusive, and not impeachable by any sort of testimony. “ The deed,” said the court, “ is made to de
In Louden v. Blythe, 16 Tenn. 532, a justice of the peace who had taken and certified a married woman’s acknowledgment was permitted to testify to facts which destroyed the validity of his certificate.
In Michener v. Cavender, 38 Pa. St. 334, the alderman who had taken and certified an acknowledgment testified, ‘ ‘ under exception to his competency as a witness to contradict his own official acts,” in impeachment of the truth of his certificate. The question of competency was thus distinctly raised at the trial, and was again discussed in the Supreme Court. The latter paid no regard to the exception, but gave full effect to the testimony. The question has never been directly passed upon by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In two cases, however, the action of that tribunal implied a tacit acquiescence in the admissibility of the testimony of a canvassing officer to impeach his own certificate. In The State ex rel. v. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256, the defendant, as secretary of state, had certified to the governor, in due form, that Elijah Perry had received the highest number of votes for judge of the Eighteenth Circuit. His testimony was received by the Supreme Court to prove that this conclusion was reached by leaving out the votes cast in two counties of the circuit. The court held that he had violated the law in excluding those counties ; which was
In The State ex rel. v. Townsley, 56 Mo. 107, the facts were similar, and the testimony of the secretary of state to like effect was fully considered by the Supreme Court. Again no question was raised as to its admissibility.
Counsel for the relator urge the distinction taken between the testimony of certifying officers to impeach their certificates, and that introduced for the purpose of sustaining them. Some of the authorities above cited show that the distinction has frequently failed of recognition. We are reminded that, in all of the election cases examined, the election officers testified in support of their returns. But this proves little or nothing until it is shown that the courts have refused to hear them on the other side. No such case is produced, and we believe that none is to be found in the reports. The cases are numerous, however, in which, upon cross-examination, the election officers have sworn to facts directly impeaching their certified returns. With such a judicial history of the question before us, it would be exceedingly unsafe to affirm as a settled rule of law in Missouri that an election officer can never be heard to testify in hostility to his return. We consider that in such a case as the present, at least, the question is here open to those tests of principle by which, only, the administration of the law may prove the faithful guardianship of justice.
As this case stands, the application of a well-settled rule of practice would deprive the relator of all benefit of his objections to the competency of the witnesses, even if under other circumstances the objections might prevail. Starkie says : “ Indeed, any objection to competency ought to be taken in the first instance, and before the witness has been examined in chief; for otherwise it would be an unfair advantage to the other party, who would avail himself of
The rule and its reason readily adapt themselves to the case before us. No objection against the competency of the witnesses was suggested until five election officers had fully testified, and a sixth was undergoing examination. In any view of the question of personal competency, as to these five witnesses, at least, we could not properly exclude their testimony. But we are still not disposed to base any general conclusion on technical grounds, when more satisfactory reasons appear in the merits of the controversy.
The rule, as recognized in the instances shown, which forbids an officer’s impeaching his own certificate, had doubtless a common origin with that which formerly would not allow a witness to cast a shadow on his own attestation of a will. The exigencies of “ public policy ” were once perpetually clamoring against the supposed horrors of self-stultification, but the common-sense tendencies of later jurisprudence have long since ignored those phantoms. By the doctrine now prevailing, no man can be so steeped in fraud as not to be a competent witness to prove it. His turpitude, which formerly might have driven him from the witness-stand, now only affects his credibility. The tryers of fact are properly intrusted with authority to believe or disbelieve him, according to the impression created by all the circumstanpes and surroundings of his testimony. The reasons are very few which may be advanced against a like treatment of official witnesses brought to testify about their official acts.
But, supposing the rule of exclusion to be unquestionable as applied to notaries public and some other officials, are the judges of election, in the present instance, officers to whom the rule will equally apply ? An acknowledgment or a protest can be proved by the notary’s certificate only. His oral testimony will not serve for an authentication of the
An objection of public policy against the admission of particular testimony may be commended for its allegiance to the interests of the State, but it is odious in its relation to the administration of justice. It does not question the truth or materiality of the testimony; but it asserts that the truth itself must be suppressed if it is to come from a particular source. It demands that the wrong party shall recover ; that the innocent and rightful party shall be adjudged against; that every personal interest and every personal right shall yield to judicial spoliation, if need be, rather than that a possible detriment may accrue to the common weal. The party raising such an objection seems to admit that the testimony would hurt his cause. His anxiety for the public welfare may, in some cases, find a stimulus in his greater anxiety to avoid an exposure of the weakness of his claim. When courts of justice may be by such means diverted from the purposes of their sacred office in adjusting by every attainable test of truth the conflicting claims of parties litigant, it should be because of some substantial
It remains for us to announce the conclusions of fact to which the evidence has led us, with their necessary legal results as recognized by this court.
Admitting the full weight of considerations upon which counsel have dwelt as unfavorable to the credibility of some of the witnesses, we yet find ourselves, in view of their demeanor on the stand, and a mass of corroborating circumstances and surroundings, thoroughly convinced that
By the law governing such cases, if the falsifying of ballots and returns at a precinct be willfully perpetrated, through fraud and corruption in the officers, or if, because of thein-egularities, alterations, and falsifications appearing, it be found impossible to ascertain what was the true state of the polls, then the entire vote of such precinct must be throwp out of the count. Judkins v. Hill, 50 N. H. 140; Littlefield v. Green, Brightly’s Elect. Cas. 493; Russell v. The State, 11 Kan. 308.
We find both these conditions attaching to the following-named precincts; so that the numbers of votes marked opposite, respectively, will be deducted from the aggregated results as reported by the judges of election:
ELECTION EOE CHARTER.
For. Against.
Fifth Ward, Middle Precinct........146 596
Fifth Ward, Eastern Precinct.......227 900
Ninth Ward, Middle Precinct....... 83 1,307
Totals to be deducted............456 2,803
ELECTION EOE SCHEME.
For. Against.
Fifth Ward, Middle Precinct........146 596
Fifth Ward, Eastern Precinct.......227 900
Ninth Ward, Middle Precinct....... 83 1,305
Totals to be deducted...........456 2,801
Taking the condition of the ballots as our guide, in preference to the returns of the judges, and correcting the discrepancies, we find the following as the true results in the precincts named respectively:
For. Against.
Sixth Ward, Middle Precinct.......262 246
Ninth Ward, Eastern Precinct......381 421
Totals.........................643 667
ELECTION EOR SCHEME.
For. Against.
Sixth Ward, Middle Precinct.......264 242
Ninth Ward, Eastern Precinct......383 420
Totals.........................647 662 .
These figures will, therefore, be substituted for those reported by the judges, which are as follows :
ELECTION EOR CHARTER.
For. Against.
Sixth Ward, Middle Precinct....... 287 397
Ninth Ward, Eastern Precinct......449 679
Totals.........................736 1,076
ELECTION EOR SCHEME.
For. Against.
Sixth Ward, Middle Precinct......287 396
Ninth Ward, Eastern Precinct......449 679
Totals.........................736 1,075
GENERAL RESULT OE ELECTION EOR CHARTER.
For. Against.
Aggregates returned by judges.. .11,858 11,300
Totals to be deducted........... 1,192 3,879
. 10,666 7,421
Add figures substituted as above.. 643 667
Ascertained results.............11,309 8,088
Majority for Charter......... 3,221
For. Against.
Aggregates returned by judges.. .12,726 14,142
Totals to be deducted........... 1,192 3,876
11,534 10,266
Add figures substituted as above.. 647 662
Ascertained results.............12,181 10,928
Majority for Scheme......... 1,253
It follows that the Scheme of Separation and Charter of the city were duly ratified and adopted at the election held on August 22, 1876, as certified by the mayor of the city and the presiding justice of the County Court, and judgment is, therefore, rendered for the defendants.
