Pеtitioner, the State of Arizona ex rel. Andy Baumert, brought this special action urging that a judge of the Superior Court abused his discretion and exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering a reversal of the judgment of thе Municipal Court and by remanding for a trial by jury in that court. We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, article 6, § 5, and 17A A.R.S. Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, rules 3(b) and 3(c). We agrеe that defendant is not entitled to a trial by jury on the charge of disorderly conduct. In this opinion we do not decide, however, that as to all class-1 misdemeanors the right to a jury trial is nonexistent. This court sets forth guidelines below for determining when a jury trial is appropriate but we will not render an advisory opinion regarding *153 each of the over 133 class-1 misdemeanors listed in the Revised Criminal Code. 1
Defеndant/Real Party in Interest, Scott M. Barrett, was charged in the Municipal Court of the City of Phoenix with disorderly conduct, a class-1 misdemeanor, A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1). The penalty for a class-1 misdemeanor is six months imprisonment [A.R.S. § 13-707(1)] and a maximum fine of $1,000 [A.R.S. § 13-802(A)]. No other civil penalty or forfeiture is authorized for this offense except for a term of probation [A.R.S. § 13-901(A), A.R.S. § 13-902(A)(3)]. Defendant timely demanded and was denied a jury trial in the Municipal Court. After a trial to the court a judgment of guilty was entered, sentence suspended, and 1-year probation was imposed. Defendant appealed the judgment and sentence, based on the reсord in the lower court, to the Maricopa County Superior Court. One of the issues on appeal was defendant’s denial of a jury trial. The judge of the Superior Court ordered that the severity of the punishment authorized by statute for disorderly conduct entitled defendant to a jury trial and he remanded the case to the lower court. The State of Arizona filed this petition for special аction raising the question of whether there exists a federal and state constitutional right to a jury trial in a case of disorderly conduct for which the maximum penalty is six months imprisonment and a fine of $1,000.
The U. S. Constitution, amendment 6; and article 2, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution provide that the accused has the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury in criminal prosecutions. Despite the all-inclusive lаnguage, considerable case law has developed establishing that the right to a trial by jury does not extend to “petty” offenses in any court, be it federal, state or municipal.
District of Columbia v. Clawans,
“There is no substantial evidence that the Framers intended to depаrt from this [summary trials without a jury] established common-law practice, and the possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications. These same considerations comрel the same result under the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course the boundaries of the petty offense category have always been ill-defined, if not ambulatory. In the absence of an explicit constitutional provision, the definitional task necessarily falls on the courts, which must either pass upon the validity of legislative attempts to identify those petty offenses which are exempt from jury trial or, where the legislature has not addressed itself to the problem, themselves face the question in the first instance. In either case it is necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious infractions.”
The defendant stresses that in Duncan the court instructs us to refer to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the “nation.” In his opposing memorandum, the defendant emphasizes federal law but fails to mention that the United States Supreme Court looked to the federal system, as well as the penalties imposed in each of the 50 states, when determining the laws of the nation. We therеfore look to the law of Arizona as well as federal authority.
*154 In Rothweiler, supra, this court set forth the guidelines for analyzing whether an offense is petty or serious:
“In determining whether a crime is a petty offense that constitutionally may be tried without a jury the [1] severity of the penalty inflictable, as well as the [2] moral quality of the act and [3] its relation to common law crimes, must be considered . . . . ”
First, a defendant who did not have the right to trial by jury at the common law does not have the right to such a trial in Arizona for a violation of state offenses.
O'Neill, supra,
and
Goldman
v.
Kautz,
A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1), with which defendant is charged, reads:
“A. A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge оf doing so, such person:
“1. Engages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior; ...”
This disorderly conduct statute also includes in 2 through 6, violations for unreasonable noise, offensive language and recklessly handling а dangerous weapon in public. At common law we find comparable offenses were punished summarily, IV Blackstone Commentaries 278. Further indication that the current crime of disorderly conduct by engaging in fighting or seriously disruptive behavior is related to a common law crime triable without a jury is found in a “Collection of Petty Federal Offenses and Trial By Jury.” 39 Harv.L.Rev. 917, 928 (1926).
See also
the historical survey in
State v. Maier,
Second, the moral quality of being charged with disorderly conduct by fighting or seriously disruptive behavior must be considered. It cannot be said to be any more reproachful than drunken and disorderly conduct nor simple assault and battery which this court found not to involve morаl turpitude.
O’Neill
and
Goldman, supra.
This court previously said in
O’Neill, supra,
“Insofar as the ‘moral quality of the act’ is concerned, in today’s affluent and self-indulgent society it can hardly be suggested that one charged or guilty of mere ‘drunk and disorderly’ conduct is a deрraved and inherently base person. In and of itself the charge does not involve serious moral turpitude. We cannot hold that the moral quality of the act is a crime of such nature as warrants a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right where that right did not exist at common law.”
Cf. State
v.
Superior Court, in and for Cty. of Pima,
There remains only the severity of the penalty to consider. It is the law, federal and state, that a possible penalty of a 6-month jail sentence is not so severe as to rеquire trial by jury.
Baldwin v. New York,
In deciding whether the amount of a fine is serious, the United States Supreme Court has looked to the definition of petty offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), which provides that “the penalty dоes not exceed imprisonment for a period of 6 months or a fine of
*155
not more than $500, or both.” However, the Supreme Court stressed in
Muniz v. Hoffman,
Petitioner places reliance on
Seven Rivers Farm, Inc. v. Reynolds,
In
Clawans, supra,
and
State v. Cousins,
“Conversely, we believe that a fine which might once have been considered severe or burdensome, such as $1,000 might now be felt to be mild.”
Seven Rivers, supra,
We agree with petitioner’s discussion of the impact of inflation in our economy and we “use some modicum of common sense and maintain contact with reality,”
Seven Rivers, supra,
We find that a maximum penalty of 6 months imprisonment and a possible maximum penalty of $1,000 fine for the offense of disorderly conduct does not constitutionally require a trial by jury because the penalty is not serious, the offense was summarily decided at common law, and the offense does not involve an appreciable degreе of moral turpitude.
We vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.
Relief granted.
Notes
. This list includes crimes which range from those involving moral opprobrium such as fraudulent use of a credit card, § 13-2105, to regulatory offenses such as a citrus fruit standardization violation, § 3-466.