182 S.W.2d 163 | Mo. | 1944
Lead Opinion
Action commenced in December, 1940, to enforce the lien of back taxes for the years 1931 to 1936, inclusive, *190 assessed against certain real property situate in the City of St. Louis. The case involves a construction of the revenue laws of the State. Defendants by answer prayed for a decree cancelling the taxes; and have appealed from a judgment for plaintiff-relator.
From the year 1933 and until the year 1939 liens for back taxes on delinquent lands in the City of St. Louis were enforced merely by sale by the collector as provided by the Jones-Munger Act, Laws of Missouri 1933, pp. 425-449; see now, as re-enacted and amended, Section 11117 et seq., Article 9 of Chapter 74, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., sec. 11117 et seq. In the year 1939 the legislature by amendment provided that the lien for delinquent taxes should be enforced by action in certain classified cities and counties, including City of St. Louis. Laws of Missouri 1939, p. 878 et seq.; Section 11183 et seq., R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., sec. 11183 et seq. (Roberts v. Benson,
Defendants (appellants) assign error of the trial court in not rendering judgment for defendants for the reasons, (1) the sale discharged the lien of the delinquent taxes; (2) there is no statutory authority for the instant action; and (3) the collection of taxes for the years 1931 to 1934, inclusive, is barred by limitation.
[1] It is the contention of defendants that the sale extinguished, expended or discharged the lien of the taxes regardless of the amount realized at the sale, and that the redemption from the sale did not avail to reinstate the lien. The cases of other states are cited in support of defendants' position. Cases of French v. Toman,
Under our Jones-Munger Act, the holder of a certificate of purchase, throughout the two years immediately succeeding the tax sale, is vested with an inchoate or inceptive interest in the land subject to the absolute right of redemption in the record owner in whom the title remains vested. After the two year period of absolute right of redemption, and for a further two year period, the certificate holder has an equitable title in the property with the right to call in the legal title by producing the certificate of purchase, paying certain taxes and fees, and demanding a deed. Bullock v. Peoples Bank of Holcomb,
Every citizen has the duty to pay the taxes which the state and its delegated taxing authorities have lawfully levied and assessed against him or his property.
It has been held that the purchase at a tax sale by one who has the duty or obligation to pay the taxes is not a purchase in the sense that the title is transferred by such sale but is merely a payment of the taxes, and leaves the title vested as if payment had been made before the sale. Duffley v. McCaskey,
It is our conclusion that a lien for taxes is not discharged, expended or extinguished by a sale by the collector under the Act until the sale is consummated, that is, when the legal title to the property has been transferred under the lien to the holder of the certificate of purchase by a collector's deed, the right of redemption having not been theretofore exercised.
The language of Section 9953b, Laws of Missouri 1933, pp. 432-3, clearly shows that the legislature contemplated that the lien of taxes should not be extinguished (if the right of redemption were exercised) by any sale made under the provisions of the Act, and it is provided that, ". . . in the event of the redemption . . ." of the land, *193 the land so redeemed shall be subject to resale for all delinquent taxes not paid by such sale.
Under the Jones-Munger Act as now effective no certificate of purchase is issued to a bidder upon the first and second offerings unless his bid is equal to the delinquent taxes with interest, penalty and costs; and there is now no right of redemption from a sale upon the third offering, Section 11130, supra; and a case involving taxes unpaid by a third sale may now arise only if the purchaser at such third sale should be one who had the duty to pay the taxes.
[2] It is contended by defendants that there is no statutory authority for the instant action. There is no merit to this contention. Provision for the enforcement of the lien of back taxes in St. Louis since the year 1939, as stated, is as in Section 11183 et seq., supra, provided, and Sections 11186-7 authorize an action as instituted by plaintiff-relator in the case at bar.
[3] It is urged that Section 9953b, supra, was entirely lacking in that certainty which is "constitutionally required" of a tax statute; that the legislature in repealing it recognized the "impracticality and invalidity" of the resale provision of the Section; and that the resale provision did not purport to preserve the lien except for the provision of a resale under the particular section. Hereinbefore we have decided that the lien of the delinquent taxes was not discharged by the sale. And a more cogent reason for the repeal of Section 9953b, supra, is noticed — as we have stated, there is now no right of redemption from a sale upon the third offering, but such a sale is consummated by the immediate issuance and delivery of a collector's deed to the purchaser. Section 11130, supra; State ex rel. McGhee v. Baumann,
[4] Of defendants' contention that the enforcement of the lien for taxes for the years 1931 to 1934, inclusive, by the instant action is barred by limitation — actions for the recovery of taxes against real estate as provided in Article 9, Chapter 74, R.S. 1939, of which the instant action is an example, must be commenced within five years after delinquency "excepting taxes now (1939) delinquent, on which suit may be commenced at any time within five years after this law shall take effect, but not thereafter." Section 11194, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., sec. 11194. At the time (1939) of the enactment of Section 11194, supra, the taxes for the years 1931 to 1934, inclusive, were delinquent; and the lien for such taxes was outstanding, we have held. The instant action was instituted in the year 1940. Prior to the *194 enactment of Section 11194, supra, the period of limitation for proceedings for the sale of land for taxes by foreclosure sale in St. Louis was that provided in Section 11165, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., sec. 11165 (see Section 9961, Laws of Missouri, Extra Session, 1933-34, pp. 154-5), that is, "initial proceedings therefor shall be commenced within five (5) years after delinquency." The record in our case shows that the first offering of sale was in the year 1936, within five years after the taxes for the years 1931 to 1934, inclusive, became delinquent. We rule the contention against defendants.
The judgment for plaintiff-relator should be affirmed.
It is so ordered. Bradley and Dalton, CC., concur.
Addendum
The foregoing opinion by VAN OSDOL, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.