139 Iowa 125 | Iowa | 1908
Prior to the enactment of the statute héreinafter referred to the city council, in cities of the second class, was composed of the mayor and two councilmen from each ward (Code, section 645), and the members of the council from each ward were elected in alternate years (Code, section 646, par. 2). In 1907 the Legislature passed a statute (32d Gen. Assem. chapter 26), changing in many respects the law as to the organization of city governments and the election of officers therein. By that act Code, sections 645, 646, were repealed, and it was declared that the council in such cities shall consist of two councilmen at large and one councilman from each ward, to be selected (as provided in section 3 of that act) as follows:
On the organization of a city or town, or- on its reorganization after the change of its class, or at the first regular municipal election hereafter, a council shall be elected as follows, except that in those cities of the second class that elect a mayor in odd-numbered years, the term of those councilmen and officers expiring in 1908 is extended one year; in those cities of the second class that elect a mayor in even-numbered years, the term of those councilmen. and officers expiring in 1909 is extended one year, and at the municipal election at which a mayor is elected in 1909 or 1910, as the case may be, the council shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this act, by the election of two councilmen at large, etc. . . . Thereafter, the successors of such councilmen at large and ward councilmen, . . . shall be chosen at the regular biennial elections, and shall hold office for two years. ...
It is evident that the election was invalid, either as to the relator and Montgomery, voted for as councilmen at large, or as to the three defendants, voted for as councilmen from their respective wards. If the election was under Acts 32d General Assembly, then the councilmen at large were properly elected, and the council consisted of these two councilmen at large and the members of the former council, one from each ward holding over; for there is nothing in the statute to warrant the construction that the holdover members were being legislated out of office before the terms for which they had been elected had expired. But if the election was under the provisions of the Code as they stood prior to the change, then the council consisted of the three members, one from each ward, holding over, and the three defendants.
The repeal of Code, sections 645, 646, by Acts 32d General Assembly,' above referred to, was in terms absolute. But a repealing statute, although absolute in terms, and ■ declared to be in full force and effect from the time of publication as provided for therein, may névertheless continue in force, for some purposes and to some extent, the provisions of the statute repealed. In Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.