STATE EX REL. JESSE W. BARRETT, ALPHONSE G. EBERLE, A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON and WILLIAM J. BLESSE, Constituting and Comprising the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of St. Louis, Relators, v. EUGENE J. SARTORIUS, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.
No. 38539
Court en Banc
December 6, 1943
175 S. W. (2d) 787
In Stephens v. The Mayor of the City of Boonville, 34 Mo. 323 the city was enjoined from levying city taxes against the personalty of an estate removed from the county into the [797] city, the county seat, for administration; the court suggesting for the purpose of taxation the situs of the property should be regarded as the domicile of the decedent. Speaking of this case in State on Petition of Taylor v. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo. 594 we said the statute requiring personal property to be assessed at the domicile of the owner was sufficient to justify the above statement about the situs of property in a decedent‘s estate.
Such rule finds support in other jurisdictions. Either because of judicial interpretation or of statutory persuasion the courts of a number of states rule that the situs for taxation of personal property in a decedent‘s estate remains at the former domicile of decedent. Anno. 129 A. L. R. 279.
Under these authorities the petition should not have been dismissed. The order of dismissal must be set aside and the case heard on its merits.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to proceed accordingly. All concur.
Owen appealed to the Circuit Court, from the action of the Board in striking his name from the list of registered voters, under the provisions of
This is a broad grant of power in very general terms. There are no limitations in it which indicate an intention to require our General Assembly to restrict exclusion from the right of voting to those convicted of a felony under the laws of this state. Nor were there, in any previous Constitution authorizations, any such limitations upon the grant to the General Assembly of the power to exclude from the right of voting persons convicted of infamous crime-(The term “infamous crime” was used in all preceding constitutional provisions; see
It is interesting to note how the General Assembly has exercised this power throughout the history of this state. At first, when any such disqualification was provided, the offense, punishment and disqualification (which also included disqualification from office, from being a juror and in some instances from “giving evidence“) were all included in the same section of the criminal code. [R. S. 1825, Crimes and Misdemeanors-Chap. 1, Sec. 32 (stealing slaves), Sec. 33 (horse stealing), Sec. 46 (forgery), Sec. 47 (counterfeiting), Sec. 56 (perjury), Secs. 59-60 (bribery), Sec. 62 (buying office), Sec. 76 (bigamy)]. Thus such disqualification seems to have been then considered more as a part of the punishment and it was clearly applied only to the particular crime specified in the section of which it was a part. Under those circumstances, of course, it applied only to such crimes when committed in this state. In 1835, much of our present criminal code was adopted in substantially its present form. (R. S. 1835, pp. 165-217.) The last section, at the end of each article thereof, specified that any person convicted of any of the offenses described in that article, or in some instances (where the article covered misdemeanors) of certain specified offenses in that article, should “be forever disqualified from voting at any election” (also from holding office or serving as a juror), and these specific disqualifications still remain in our criminal code. [Offenses affecting lives and persons. R. S. 1835, p. 172-Art. 2, Sec. 42, now
However, another statute was enacted after the adoption of the Constitution of 1875: our present statute on qualifications of voters [
The General Assembly has itself taken this view of the meaning of this disqualification, because it has in two separate statutes providing for registration in certain cities so construed it. [
Respondent argues that, because
Additional reasons and authorities for so holding, as well as the arguments and authorities supporting the contrary view, are well stated in State ex rel. Olson v. Langer (N. D.), 256 N. W. 377, construing the voter‘s disqualification section of the North Dakota Constitution using similar broad general terms. [See also Irby v. Day (Ark.), 32 S. W. (2d) 157; State v. Irby (Ark.), 81 S. W. (2d) 419; Arnett v. Stumbo (Ky.), 153 S. W. (2d) 889.] We quote and adopt from the Langer case the following:
“No one can lawfully vote under any government of laws except those who are expressly authorized by law. It is well settled, therefore, under our form of government, that the right is one conferred by constitutions and statutes, and is the subject of exclusive regulation by the State, limited only by the provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution , which prohibits any discrimination on account of ‘race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ . . . The right is also denied almost universally to idiots, insane persons, and minors, upon the ground that they lack the requisite judgment and discretion which fit them for its exercise. It has never been considered that any of these disqualifications were imposed as a punishment, and no one has thought to view them as even in the nature of a penalty. The same may be asserted as to the exclusion of unnaturalized citizens who are disqualified on the ground of alienage, and of paupers, to whom some States deny the right upon principles of State policy. It is quite common also to deny the right of suffrage, in the various American States, to such as have been convicted of infamous crimes. The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection against the invasion of corruption, just as much as against that of ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. The evil infection of the one is not more fatal than that of the other. . . . It seems to us unthinkable, in view of the purpose underlying section 127, as amended, and the inter-relationship between the state and the United States, that an elector who has committed the most serious of offenses--for example, treason, or murder, or robbery--and who has been convicted therefor in the federal court, should not be disqualified to exercise the elective franchise in North Dakota where the offense was committed. Neither can the fact that the offense of which the respondent in the instant case was convicted may by some be considered as not a serious one make any difference in the application of the rule. The constitutional provision establishes a rule for all cases, and in its application the merits of any individual case cannot be considered. . . . Acts constituting felony may differ in different jurisdiction. Statutes simply embody thestandard established by the public conscience in those jurisdictions where they are enacted. Public sentiment may vary and standards change accordingly. But he who violates the statute must be held to know what he is doing when he does the prohibited act and to know the consequence in the way of penalty. His personal standard cannot be the measure of the character of the act or its depravity. The standard established by the lawmaking body of that jurisdiction must do that. [Citing cases.] Accordingly, he who sets himself above the law and does an act, regarded by the United States as of so serious a nature as to be prohibited and penalized as a felony, may well be held in this state to be unfit to participate in governmental affairs.”
The record of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis herein is quashed. Gantt, Tipton, JJ., Douglas, C. J., concur; Ellison, J., concurs in result only in separate opinion; Leedy, J., and Clark, J., concur in result only and in separate opinion of Ellison, J.
ELLISON, J. (concurring). -I concur in the result. The cause is submitted by respondent‘s return solely on the legal theory that the phrase “convicted of a felony” appearing in
Respondent has cited considerable authority which seemingly supports his narrower view.2 But many of these cases deal with disqualification to hold office, or for jury service, or as a witness, because of prior conviction of a felony in another jurisdiction. These may be distinguishable; at least let that be conceded. And let it be further
Answering respondent‘s restrictive contention, the relator members of the Election Board in their reply brief very pertinently inquire whether it can be said “with any semblance of reason or logic, that (the people) intended that one guilty of a ‘Missouri felony’ should be disqualified, but that one guilty of an equally reprehensible act under the laws of another jurisdiction should remain qualified?” Another case, Crampton v. O‘Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 557(5), 139 N. E. 360, 362(4) declares such a course would be “anomalous, illogical, and unjust.” But turn that proposition around and look at the converse of it. Would it not be equally unjust and discriminatory to deny a citizen of this state the right to vote because he had previously been convicted of an unpardoned crime in another state, which that state had denominated a felony, while at the same time other citizens of Missouri were doing the same thing every day in our very presence, and yet voting without hindrance because the act is only a misdemeanor, or not a criminal offense at all, in Missouri?
True, it could be said of the disfranchised voter that he had violated the law of the foreign state where he was when he committed the act, but it seems to me if the purpose of the disqualification is to fix the moral standards of voters, then this state and no other is the one to say what those standards shall be. The principal opinion quotes an excerpt from the Langer case, supra, decided in North Dakota, which says it makes no difference in the application of the rule that moral views may differ in the several jurisdictions and that an act may be treated as a serious offense in one and not in another. But this would result in disqualification of a voter for violation of the blue laws of any other states that still have them; and even of the penal laws of foreign countries which are wholly unknown here-if our statute includes those jurisdictions. And it would further result that a voter could be disfranchised [792] who is morally blameless according to our own standards; or, on the other hand, that he could evade payment of his Missouri income tax with impunity, whereas he would be denied the right to vote if he evades payment of his Federal income tax. In other words, to secure equal treatment for all voters our laws would have to parallel the Federal laws.
The Langer case evidently was decided under some political stress. The proceeding there was in quo warranto (not by impeachment) to oust the respondent from the office of governor of North Dakota, because he had during his tenure been convicted of a felonious conspiracy to defraud the United States by corruptly administering the Emergency Relief Acts of Congress. The offense would have been only a misdemeanor under the state law. The theory of the action was that by conviction of the federal felony the respondent there became disqualified to serve as governor, since the constitution of the state required him to be a qualified elector and he had lost the right to vote. The decision ousted him, but he was reelected governor two years later and is now the United States senator from that state. There was a strong dissenting opinion, and the case has been ably reviewed in 2 University of Chicago Law Review, supra, loc. cit. 334, where it is said (italics ours): “The court might well have required the conviction to be for a felony within the state, or at least for an act which is considered a felony by local law.”
The italicized part of the above quotation states the true rule which should apply here, in my opinion. If, as the relators and the above cases reason, it is unthinkable that a person convicted of a Missouri felony in Missouri should be disqualified, whereas one guilty of an equally reprehensible act under the laws of another state is not disqualified, that is simply another way of saying in reverse that the outstate felony ought to be of the same kind and nature as the Missouri felony. And we apply that rule even as to common criminals in our habitual criminal statute,