State ex rel. Bailey v. ShepardState ex rel. Bailey v. Shepard
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Clark A. Bailey appeals from the district court1 order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to
1976.
On April 14,1977 petitioner pled guilty in Minnesota state court to charges of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree,
On May 6, 1977, an information was filed in Worth County, Iowa, charging petitioner with murder in violation of
On July 6, 1977 the Governor of Iowa demanded petitioner’s extradition on the murder charge under the provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
On July 13, 1977 a rendition warrant was issued for petitioner’s extradition to Iowa. On July 25, 1977 ah extradition hearing was held, but was continued until August 1, 1977, at which time the extradition was opposed. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in Minnesota state сourt on August 8, 1977. After a hearing, the petition was denied and the decision was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court on December 30, 1977. State v. Bailey, Minn., 262 N.W.2d 406 (1977).
On January 24, 1978 the instant petitiоn for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The case was referred to a United States Magistrate, who recommended that the petition be denied without further proceedings. The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendаtion by order filed April 6, 1978. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.
Petitioner challenges his extradition on the following grounds: (1) his transfer to Iowa for trial would violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy; and (2) his proposed extradition is unlawful because the exclusive wаy for Iowa to obtain custody over him is pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“the Agreement”) 2 and not pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
When a person seeks to challenge his proposed extradition in a habeas corpus action brought in a federal court in the asylum state, the issues open for review are extremеly limited. The general rule is derived from Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 S.Ct. 137, 59 L.Ed. 302 (1914), in which Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
When, as here, the identity of the person, the fact that he is a fugitive from justice, the demand in due form, the indictment by a grand jury fоr what it and the governor [of the demanding state] allege to be a crime in that state, and the reasonable possibility that it may be such, all appеar, the constitutionally required surrender is not to be interfered with by the summary process of habeas corpus upon speculations as to what ought to be the result of a trial in the place where the Constitution provides for its taking place.
Id. at 440, 35 S.Ct. at 139.
Accordingly, our inquiry is limited to the following questions: (1) was the crime committed in the demanding stаte?; (2) is the person in custody the person charged with the crime?; (3) was the fugitive in the demanding state at the time the alleged
Under these test, it is clear that рetitioner’s double jeopardy claim cannot be litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court in the asylum state. It is well еstablished that federal constitutional challenges to prospective state criminal incarceration must first be litigated in the courts of the demanding state. See, e. g., Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90, 73 S.Ct. 139, 97 L.Ed. 114 (1952); Price v. Pitchess, supra, 556 F.2d at 928; United States ex rel. Tyler v. Henderson, supra, 453 F.2d at 793; Woods v. Cromvich, 396 F.2d 142, 143 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Tucker v. Donovan, 321 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1963), cert, denied sub nom., Tucker v. Kross, 375 U.S. 977, 84 S.Ct. 496, 11 L.Ed.2d 421 (1964); Sutherland v. Love, 359 F.Supp. 983, 985 (E.D.Ark.1973).
Petitioner’s claim involving the Agreement presents a closer question. If, as petitioner alleges, he is being threatened with extradition under a statute which does not apply to him, then it is arguable that the extradition papers may not be in proper form and that the claim is properly raisеd in this proceeding.
But assuming petitioner’s claim is cognizable in this proceeding, we find the claim to be without merit. We begin by noting that his claim is essentially one involving an interpretation of state statutes. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court is bound by state court interpretations of state criminal statutes unless a federal claim is involved. See, e. g, Olson v. Tahash, 344 F.2d 139, 141 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 858, 86 S.Ct. 113, 15 L.Ed.2d 96 (1965). Accordingly, absent a claim arising under federal law, the decision of the Minnesota Suрreme Court in petitioner’s state habeas corpus action would be binding on us.
The only arguable question of federal law here is that petitioner’s claim involves an interpretation of an interstate compact (the Agreement) to which Congress has consented under Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution. See 63 Stat. 107 (1949), codified at
Petitioner’s claim, in essence, is that the Agreement operates as the exclusive method by which one state can obtain custody of a person incarcerated under a judgment of conviction in another state. We reject this contention on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Supreme Court’s recent deсision in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). In Mauro, the Court held that a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a “detainer” within the meaning of the Agreement. The Court
The duty of states to extradite persons to other states is rooted in Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution and thus it can be assumed that the drafters of the Agreement were aware of the use of extradition procedures and that when they used the word “detainers,” they meant something quite different. Cf. United States v. Mauro, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 1847.
More importantly, the use of extradition warrants does not create the hazards to рrisoners which the Agreement was designed to prevent. The central problem with detainers was that they could be lodged against a prisoner and remаin there for a very long time without any action being taken upon them. This could substantially impair a prisoner’s privileges and opportunities for rehabilitаtion. Id. at 1846-47. Thus, the Agreement was designed to insure expeditious disposition of charges underlying a detainer. Id. Unlike detainers, and like the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, an extradition warrant is a demand for immediate custody of a prisoner to stand trial on outstanding charges. This demand for immediate сustody tends to insure the expeditious disposition of outstanding charges and simply does not create the kinds of problems which the Agreement was enacted to solve. Accordingly, we conclude that the Agreement does not prevent the use of traditional extradition procedures, at least where no detainer has been lodged in connection therewith. Id. at 1847-49.
The order of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Harry H. McLaughlin, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
. Both Minnesota and Iowa are parties to the Agreement. See
. The section provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a рerson in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United Statеs.
. Compare League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom., Raley v. League to Save Lake Tahoe, 420 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 1398, 43 L.Ed.2d 654 (1975) (jurisdiction under
. Where the United States is either a sending or receiving jurisdiction, a claim requiring an interpretation of the Agreement is a question of federal law. United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975).