603 N.E.2d 252 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, dismissing a complaint filed by the Athens County Department of Human Resources, plaintiff below and appellant herein, wherein it sought to establish that Bryan Scott Wolf, defendant below and appellee herein, was the father of one Joshua Anthony Martin. Appellant assigns the following errors:
"1. Title IV-A, and IV-D, of the Social Security Act (1975),
"2. The State has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child who has been deprived of support from one parent. Therefore, the State is always a proper party to initiate a paternity action, and R.C. Section
"3. Ohio Revised Code Section
"4. Ohio Revised Code Section
The following facts are pertinent to this appeal. Melody Martin gave birth to Joshua Anthony Martin on February 26, 1987. Melody applied in Athens County for welfare and Aid to Families with Dependent Children when she reached the age of eighteen. As a condition to receive the aid, Melody assigned her right to receive child support to appellant. On March 8, 1990, appellant filed a complaint in the court below pursuant to R.C.
A hearing was held before a referee on April 19, 1990, following which the referee recommended that the case be dismissed. Appellant filed objections to the referee's report on June 12, 1990, arguing that it did have standing to initiate a parentage action and that a more restrictive reading of R.C.
In its first assignment of error, appellant contends that R.C.
Although we do not believe that appellant's argument has any merit, we need not address this issue. In its objections to the referee's report, appellant never asserted that federal law preempted R.C.
In its second assignment of error, appellant argues that it had standing to institute a parentage action. It contends that R.C.
We agree that appellant has an interest in a potential parentage action involving Joshua Martin. However, contrary to appellant's contention, it has no standing. R.C.
"(B) If an action is brought pursuant to sections
Appellant contends that since the above language allows it to intervene in parentage actions, if that section is read in conjunction with R.C.
"The question regarding what the General Assembly intended to enact will not be entertained when the meaning of what was enacted is clear and plainly expressed." Holiday Inns, Inc. v.Limbach (1990),
We further note that even if we consider the issue of intent, we do not think the General Assembly intended for a county department of human services to file parentage actions. The legislature was certainly aware of the possible interest of a county agency since it allowed for intervention. However, the specific language of R.C.
We finally note that appellant's concerns should be directed to the General Assembly. We agree with appellant that to allow it and other county departments of human services to initiate parentage would facilitate compliance with the federal mandates set forth above. Several other states have apparently come to this conclusion and enacted such legislation. See, e.g., West's Cal.Civ. Code Ann. 7006(g) (California); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann.
However, given the fact that Ohio has no such provision and that appellant has cited no authority which would grant appellant standing under current Ohio law, we hold that appellant was not a proper party to initiate a parentage action. For the aforementioned reasons, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
In its third and fourth assignments of error, appellant contends that R.C.
Before we address the merits of these two assignments of error, we must determine whether appellant has standing to raise the constitutional *625 issues. Appellant first contends that it has standing to raise these issues because it has a pecuniary interest in having Joshua's parentage determined. However, appellant is not asserting that the statute is unconstitutional because it prevents appellant from collecting child support; appellant contends that the statute violates Joshua's right to equal protection.2
Generally, to have standing to raise an issue, a party must allege that the challenged action caused it injury in fact and that the interest asserted is within the scope of interests protected by the statute. State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc.v. Phillips (1976),
Appellant contends that under some circumstances, the state, or an agent thereof, may assert constitutional issues in cases where it ordinarily has no standing. Appellant argues that it may raise the issue where the matter is one of general public interest, citing State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich (1953),
There is very little case law which defines the phrase, "general public interest." In one Ohio case, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in State ex rel. Ross v. Guion (1959), 82 Ohio Law Abs. 1, 161 N.E.2d 800, stated the following at 4, 161 N.E.2d at 803:
"In the case of State ex rel. Glenn v. Crockett,
"`We understand "public interest" to mean more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities *626 are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question.'"
The case sub judice is not such a case. The community at large has no pecuniary interest in the determination of parentage. Further, the community at large has no legal rights or liabilities affected. The state has an interest in determining parentage because it could be reimbursed for support payments made to the child. However, that has no direct effect on the general public. We, therefore, hold that since R.C.
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
GREY and HARSHA, JJ., concur.
"(A) An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship may be brought by the child or child's personal representative, the child's mother or personal representative, a man alleged or alleging himself to be the child's father, or the alleged father's personal representative.
"(B) An agreement does not bar an action under this section.
"(C) If an action under this section is brought before the birth of the child and if the action is contested, all proceedings, except service of process and the taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony, may be stayed until after the birth."