40 Kan. 113 | Kan. | 1888
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an appeal by John J. Stevens to the supreme court from an order of the judge of the district court of Kingman county, made at chambers, adjudging the defendant, John J. Stevens, and others, to be guilty of a contempt in violating a peremptory writ of mandamus. The facts of the case are substantially as follows: In 1874 a town or town-site designated as the “town of Kingman” was laid out and platted in Kingman county, which town embraced the northwest quarter of section 5, township 28, range 7, in said county. The plat of such town was duly filed for record on November 28, 1874. Not long thereafter this town was designated by the governor of the state of Kansas as the temporary county seat of Kingman county, and in 1876 it was
Three questions are presented in this court by the defendant, John J. Stevens, as follows: (1) It is claimed that the writ of mandamus was a nullity, for the reason that there was no allowance of the writ indorsed thereon as required by § 693 of the civil code. (2) It is claimed that the judge of the district court at chambers has no power or authority to hear or determine a proceeding for contempt for violating a writ of mandamus, or to punish for any such violation. (3) It is claimed that the evidence in this case shows that the defendant at the time of the supposed contempt was in fact holding his ■office at and within the county seat, and at a place designated by the board of county commissioners.
I. We think the first question presented by the defendant ■cannot properly be considered by this court, as the defendant, by recognizing the validity of the writ of mandamus, by obeying the same, and by making a return thereto without raising any question below with regard to its regularity or validity*
II. The second question is more difficult. No judgment or final order can legally be rendered by a judge at chambers, unless specifically authorized by some express provision of law. (Earls v. Earls, 27 Kas. 538, 542, 543, and authorities there cited; Shaffer v. Brinkman, 31 id. 124; Packard v. Packard, 34 id. 53; Kinports v. Rawson, 2 S. E. Rep. 85; Bynum v. Burke County Comm’rs, 2 id. 170; Telegraph Co v. Rld. Co., 2 South. Rep. 67.) And certainly a judge at chambers cannot, without express authority conferred by law, punish a person for a contempt not committed in his presence. (The People v. Brennan, 45 Barb. 344. See also The State v. McKinnon, 8 Oreg. 487; Oates v. McDaniel, 3 Ala. 356; Taylor v. Moffatt, 2 Blackf. 305.) Ordinarily, perhaps, it would be held, if no other statute existed, that § 2, of the act relating to district courts, (Comp. Laws of 1885, ch. 28, p. 312, § 2,) would be broad enough to authorize a judge of the district court at chambers to punish for the violation of a peremptory writ of mandamus; but other statutes do exist governing in most cases of mandamus, and it may be that these other statutes are conclusive in such cases. Section 699 of the civil code reads as follows:
“Sec; 699. Whenever a peremptory mandamus is directed to any public officer, body, or board, commanding the performance of any public duty specially enjoined by law, if it appear to the court that such officer, or any member of such body or board, has, without just excuse, refused or neglected to perform the duty so enjoined, the court may impose a fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars, upon every such officer, or member of such body or board. Such fine, when collected, shall be paid into the treasury of the county where the duty ought to have been performed; and the payment thereof is a bar to an action for any penalty incurred by such officer, or ' member of such body or board, by reason of his refusal or neglect to perform the duty so enjoined.”
The statutes also specifically provide for the punishment of contempts in other cases. Thus for the violation of an injunc
Is not the remedy furnished by § 699 of the civil code exclusive of all other remedies in the nature of contempt proceedings for the violation of a peremptory writ of mandamus f The section starts out by saying: “Whenever a peremptory mandamus is directed to any public officer,” etc., “ if it appear to the court that such officer,” etc., has violated the mandamus, “the court may impose a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars,” etc. Do not the words “whenever a peremptory mandamus is directed,” etc., mean at whatever time a peremptory mandamus is directed ? Or in any case where a peremptory writ of mandamus is directed ? etc. And if they do mean this, then where is there any room given for the hearing or trial of a prosecution for the violation of a mandamus to be had before a judge at chambers? This statute provides for such cases to be heard or tried only before the court, and for the court only to impose the fine; and provides further, that “the payment thereof is a bar to an action for any penalty incurred” for the violation of a mandamus. Now can there be some other kind of prosecution or proceeding instituted, so that the payment of this fine shall not be such a bar ? If a case of this kind may be tried under some other statute, then of course such payment might not be a bar. But there can hardly be any room for any prosecution or proceeding similar to this to come under any othel’ statute when the law provides expressly that “whenever a peremptory mandamus is directed to any public officer,” etc., the fine, if any, shall be imposed under this statute. We think that § 699 of the civil code is exclusive of all other remedies in the nature of a prosecution or proceeding for a contempt for the violation of a
III. All that we need to say with reference to the third question presented by the defendant, is this: The question whether the “south addition to Kingman” is a part of the county seat of Kingman county, or not, depends upon the further question whether it was generally understood by the people of that county at the time of the county-seat election, held in 1881, that the general name of “Kingman” included such “south addition to Kingman,” or not.
The judgment of the judge of the district court at chambers will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.