123 Minn. 59 | Minn. | 1913
This is an appeal from an order overruling separate demurrers interposed by the defendant and the intervener to a petition and alternative writ of mandamus. The court below certified that the question presented by the demurrers was important and doubtful.
The main facts disclosed by the petition and writ, and necessary here to state in order to a proper understanding of the controversy, are these: The defendant is the auditor of Beltrami county. In February, 1911, the relators entered into a contract with the counties of Marshall and Beltrami to construct therein judicial ditch No. 12, and gave a proper bond for its performance. The ditch was to be completed by December 1, 1912, but an extension of one year was
The relators insist that their objection was valid and should result in the dismissal of the county’s appeal in this court. The relators are not appealing, hence cannot assail the propriety of the order permitting the intervention. Nor should they now have the appeal dismissed, because that would result in giving them the benefit of a decision on the merits on the assumption that jurisdiction -existed.
Tinder the terms of relators’ contract, and the law in force when it was executed, the auditor’s refusal to issue the warrant was prop-on But the right thereto is claimed under chapter 567, Laws of 1913, which amends the amended section .17 of chapter 230, Laws 1905 [p. 321], the drainage act, so that, as to the existing contracts involving work the total estimates of which exceed $30,000, 75 per
The appellants contend that, as to prior contracts, the act referred to contravenes the constitutional provisions, state and Federal, forbidding impairment of contract obligations; that the classification attempted is arbitrary and invalid; that it is special legislation; and' that the effect upon the contract with relators is to appropriate public funds for private gain. The relators’ position is that the county is not interested in drainage contracts, except as a mere governmental' agency of the state in carrying on the purpose of promoting public-health and welfare; that therefore the state retains full control of the drainage contracts, and may modify those already entered into with the consent of the contractors and sureties, at its pleasure; and' that the legislature has plenary power over the disposition of funds-of counties, therefore the county cannot claim any right to contract obligations, or private interest in the contract, or in ditch funds which need be respected by the legislature.
If the county is a party to relators’ contract in any other capacity than as a governmental agency of the state, or if it owned the fund from which the work done is to be paid, no one could pretend that the legislature had the power to change the terms of this contract without the consent of the county. The act would then be objectionable as an impairment of contract obligations and an interference with vested rights. But we have no doubt that in drainage work, as carried on under our statutes, the county is a mere governmental agency of the state. That the state for such public purpose, or for any legitimate object within its police power, may make use of a county or governmental subdivision, and lay the burden upon it to carry out the project is well settled. State v. Smith, 58 Minn.
Therefore, as far as existing drainage contracts are concerned, we-conclude that the county has not such an individual or private interest therein that it can object to a modification thereof by the state,, whenever the legislature may deem it advisable in furtherance of the drainage scheme. The state could, in the first instance, have prescribed any terms or conditions in drainage contracts which the lawmaking power deemed proper; and, in achieving the object to be attained by drainage, it ought to be able to modify such contract without the consent of its agent, the county, as it finds best. It has been held that a municipal corporation has no such interest in contracts, or funds, held by it for governmental purposes that it can invoke against, a legislative act affecting such contract or fund the constitutional objection of impairment of contract obligation or interference with, vested rights. Little River v. Reno County, 65 Kan. 9, 68 Pac. 1105. See also, Beach, Public Corp. §§ 722, 723, and Guilder v. Town of Dayton, 22 Minn. 366, as to the control of counties and the-funds held for public purposes.
The serious objection to this act, as to contracts entered prior thereto, is the contention that it bestows a gratuity upon the contractor’ out of public funds, without serving any public purpose and without, there being any moral obligation on the state or county so to do. A county, wherein public drainage is undertaken, is required to provide a ditch fund by the issue and sale of bonds for which the county’s, credit is pledged (Van Pelt v. Bertilrud, supra); and it is also authorized to transfer to this fund any surplus remaining in the general revenue, or other funds of the county which can properly be used-for the purpose of the act. Section 18, c. 230, p. 322, Laws 1905,, as amended by section 7, c. 469, p. 572, Laws 1909. By section 500,
To the mind of the writer, the contention that no public object is subserved by a modification of existing drainage contracts seems almost unanswerable. The only public purpose to be attained was the construction of a ditch in the place, of the kind, and upon the terms specified in the contract. A proper bond secures a strict performance thereof. The modification made by the act of 1913 does not, as a matter of right, secure a speedier or better performance of the contract or the purpose for which it was made. The benefit is to the contractor alone. His gain, the ditch fund must to some extent bear. Nor can this law, as applied to contracts already in existence, find justification in any moral claim. It applies as well to a contractor who has secured a highly profitable contract as to the one who entered into a losing venture. Surely there is no moral obligation to help out the former. In State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 15 N. W. 375; Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498, 35 N. W. 366; Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331, 22 L.R.A. 857; Wm. Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118, 77 N. W. 568; Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454, and Castner v. City of Minneapolis, 92 Minn. 84, 99 N. W. 361, 1 Ann. Cas. 934, the principle is settled in this state that the legislature has not the power to bestow a private gratuity out of public funds, where no public purpose is sought to be attained thereby, or where there is no moral obligation to render the aid.
But it is elementary that, to justify a court in holding a statute
As to future drainage contracts, it is clear that it is within the legislative discretion to classify and prescribe the terms thereof. Assuming our conclusion to be correct, that there may be a legitimate public purpose served by modifying existing incompleted drainage
The claim that the petition and writ disclose that the relators were in default, hence they were not entitled to the warrant, cannot be sustained, for it appears that an. extension had been lawfully granted to relators. Nor does it so clearly appear that any part of the money which, according to the engineer’s certificate and the act of 1913 the relators are entitled to, has been forfeited by delay occuring prior to the granted extension of time that the cause should be determined on demurrer.
Order affirmed.