State Ex Rel. Arnold v. RevelsState Ex Rel. Arnold v. Revels
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Judge.
In this original proceeding in prohibition filed in this court the relator seeks to prohibit the respondent, as Judge of the Circuit Court for Volusia County, from assuming or exercising any jurisdiction in the trial of a certain bribery charge pending against the relator in that Circuit Court. Following a hearing on the relator‘s suggestion, we held that the suggestion stated a prima facie case and issued a rule nisi in prohibition directing the respondent to show cause in this court why a writ of prohibition should not be issued as prayed for in the suggestion.
The respondent has filed in this court his return to the rule nisi, admitting the allegations set out in the relator‘s suggestion in paragraphs 1 through 14 thereof and denying the allegations contained in paragraphs 15 and 16. In his return the respondent also avers that the relator has failed to demonstrate that quantum of prejudice which would entitle him to the relief sought and that the relator is not entitled to a rule absolute, but does not specifically deny the fact of prejudice.
In admitting the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 14 of the relator‘s suggestion, the respondent has admitted the following allegations to be true: that on November 30, 1956, William W. Judge, the State Attorney for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, filed an information in the Circuit Court for St. Johns County charging the relator and one Womack in two counts with the crime of bribery, which information charged in substance that the relator and Womack corruptly offered to the said State Attorney on said date a bribe in the amount of $2,500; that on November 30, 1958, and for more than twenty years prior thereto the relator was and is now an
Other facts thus admitted in the respondent‘s return are that the relator later moved to quash the information filed in Volusia County on the ground that the relator was immunized from criminal prosecution on the bribery charge under
The respondent, finally, admitted in his return that on June 9, 1958, the relator filed in the Florida Supreme Court his suggestion for writ of prohibition against the respondent as Circuit Judge of St. Johns County to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with the trial of the disbarment proceeding on the grounds that the Circuit Court of St. Johns County did not have jurisdiction of the said disbarment proceeding and that the respondent was disqualified from acting as Judge of the cause because of his prejudice against the relator and because he was interested in the subject matter of the disbarment proceeding and was a material witness to the cause; that on June 11, 1958, the Florida Supreme Court issued a rule nisi prohibiting the respondent from proceeding further in the disbarment proceedings until the further order of the Supreme Court; that on November 12, 1958, the relator filed his sworn suggestion in the Circuit Court for Volusia County in the criminal proceeding, in substance setting forth that he feared and believed that the respondent as Judge of the Circuit Court for Volusia County was prejudiced against him and that he would not receive a fair and impartial trial if the case against him was tried in the said Court of the respondent and setting forth the grounds and causes of such belief, which application was accompanied by supporting affidavits of three reputable citizens of Volusia County not of counsel for the relator and not of kin to the relator or any of his counsel, as well as supported by other exhibits attached to the application; that on the same day the relator filed a sworn suggestion of disqualification in the criminal proceeding pending in Volusia County because the respondent was a material witness in the cause and further challenged his qualification
Since the time of the filing of the relator‘s suggestion for writ of prohibition and the respondent‘s return thereto in the court, the Florida Supreme Court on February 13, 1959, has filed its opinion in the prohibition proceeding in that court, denying the respondent‘s motion to quash the rule nisi and making the rule in prohibition absolute, except as to the right of the respondent to transfer the case to the Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit. It will be remembered that the relator in that case founded his suggestion for the writ of prohibition upon two grounds: first, lack of jurisdiction of the St. Johns County Circuit Court and, secondly, the disqualification of the respondent to preside in the trial of the disbarment proceedings. The Supreme Court‘s ruling was based upon its holding that the St. Johns County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction of the disbarment proceedings. See State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, Fla., 109 So.2d 1, 2. In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court said:
“In the view that we have respecting the jurisdictional question, it is not necessary to decide whether the respondent erred in denying the relator‘s suggestion of disqualification — although in all the circumstances shown by this record it would appear that the respondent could, with propriety, have requested one of the other circuit judges in the Seventh Judicial Circuit to preside over the disbarment proceedings, and perhaps would have been well advised to do so, regardless of whether technical grounds for disqualification were sufficiently shown. Cf. State ex rel. Palmer v. Atkinson, 1934, 116 Fla. 366, 156 So. 726, 96 A.L.R. 539; Ball v. Yates, 1947, 158 Fla. 521, 29 So.2d 729.”
The sole issue before this court in the present proceeding is whether we should issue the rule absolute in prohibition forbidding the respondent as Judge of the Circuit Court for Volusia County from proceeding further in the criminal case involving the relator in Volusia County, for the reason that the relator‘s suggestion and the respondent‘s return thereto established that he is disqualified from so acting.
In issuing the rule nisi we held that the relator‘s suggestion stated a prima facie case. We now hold that the respondent‘s return to our rule to show cause is insufficient and that the allegations in the suggestion which are admitted by the respondent in his return are sufficient to show the respondent‘s disqualification and impel the issuance by this court of the rule absolute in prohibition.
“It is settled law in this state that prohibition may be an appropriate remedy to prevent judicial action, when the judge is disqualified, as well as when the judge is without jurisdiction to act in the cause. State ex rel. Reynolds v. White, 40 Fla. 297, 24 So. 160; State ex rel. Burr v. Whitney, 66 Fla. 24, 63 So. 299; State ex rel. Bank of America v. Rowe, 96 Fla. 277, 118 So. 5.”
The allegations in the relator‘s suggestion for the writ which are admitted by the respondent in his return to our rule nisi seem to be sufficient to show the following: (1) that the respondent may properly be considered an interested party in the trial of the bribery charges, for the charges are that the relator gave a bribe to influence the respondent; (2) that in the trial of the relator the respondent would likely be a material witness; (3) that the State Attorney, William W. Judge, a key witness at the trial, was naturally closely associated with the respondent; (4) that in preparing his order denying the relator‘s suggestion for disqualification prior to the hearing and refusing to afford relator‘s counsel an opportunity to present his arguments on the suggestions, the respondent displayed an attitude toward the relator not characterized by the cold neutrality required of a judge.
In many cases the Florida Supreme Court has pointed out the vital necessity of the neutrality and impartiality of a judge who presides over the determination of a person‘s life, liberty, or property. For instance, in the case of State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615, the Supreme Court said:
“This Court is committed to the doctrine that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of Courts to scrupulously guard this right and to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his disqualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice.
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“* * * There is no reason why he should not and every reason why he should excuse himself under the circumstances.”
Again in the case of Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459, 462, the Supreme Court said:
“Prejudice of a judge is a delicate question to raise, but, when raised as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a modicum of reason, the judge against whom raised, should be prompt to recuse himself. No judge under any circumstances is warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is shadowed or even questioned.”
We know of nothing more vital in the administration of justice in America than that the judge who sits in judgment on the life, liberty, or property of persons before his court be perfectly impartial. We think it a judge‘s duty not only to harbor no prejudice toward such persons but also to avoid the appearance of such prejudice.
In the present proceedings it may well be that, if we were able to look into the mind of the respondent, we would find therein no actual prejudice toward the relator and that he had every intention to give the relator a fair and impartial trial. Nevertheless, the respondent has admitted in his return many things alleged in the suggestion that raise a question as to his impartiality toward the relator. At the
Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the Rule in Prohibition should be made absolute.
It is so ordered.
STURGIS, C.J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
On Petition for Modification and/or Clarification
CARROLL, DONALD K., Judge.
The respondent has filed a petition for modification and/or clarification of our opinion filed May 14, 1959, in which petition he principally complains of two portions of the opinion in which we mention that he had failed to deny in his return to the alternative writ of prohibition that he is prejudiced against the relator, Arnold. The respondent contends that any denial of prejudice by him in his return “is completely superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant because this Court is limited to a review of the record as it existed below at the moment respondent held the affidavits legally insufficient for the purposes for which they were submitted“. We agree that a denial or admission in a judge‘s return to an alternative writ of prohibition of his prejudice toward the relator in prohibition, is, of course, not decisive on the question of the issuance of the absolute writ. We think the respondent misconceives the nature of the present proceedings, for this is an original proceeding in prohibition and canno be used as a substitute for appellate proceedings. State ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 175; State ex rel. Schwarz v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 137, 194 So. 313. We are not merely reviewing the respondent‘s order holding the relator‘s affidavits insufficient, but in this original proceeding the relator charges in his suggestion that the respondent is prejudiced against him, and it was certainly appropriate that in his return the respondent should respond directly to such charge. Therefore, except to the extent that this opinion may have clarified our former opinion, the petition for modification and/or clarification is denied.
STURGIS, C.J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.