State ex rel. Anderson v. BrandState ex rel. Anderson v. Brand
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Fansler
A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The relatrix contends that this was error; that, having become a permanent teacher under the Teachers’ Tenure Law before the amendment, she had a vested property right in her indefinite contract, which may not be impaired under the Constitution. The question is whether there is a vested right in a permanent teacher‘s contract; whether, under the tenure law, there is a grant which cannot lawfully be impaired by a repeal of the statute.
The establishment and maintenance of public schools is a governmental function, jurisdiction over which vests in the General Assembly, whose power, subject to constitutional limitation, is plenary and whose discretion is not reviewable. This legislative power is not exhausted by exercise, and schools may be continued or discontinued, and the school system changed, or one system substituted for another, as often as the Legislature may deem it necessary or advisable in the public interest. Follett v. Sheldon, Treas. (1924), 195 Ind. 510, 144 N. E. 867. In establishing schools and enacting laws for their regulation, and in licensing teachers and providing for their tenure, the General Assembly acts for the benefit of the public; and not for the benefit of the teachers. In a case in which it was contended that a provision of the statute, providing for the revocation of teachers’ licenses by the county superintendent, was unconstitutional for the reason that there was a vested property right in the license, this court said:
“It must be remembered that the establishment and regulation of public schools rests primarily with the legislative department, and the constitutional provisions invoked by appellee were not designed to tram
mel the State in the exercise of its general political powers, or to impose upon the courts the duty of interposing between the legislature and the citizen in matters of purely governmental concern. . . . A license has none of the elements of a contract, and does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. Statutes authorizing the issuance of such licenses are enacted to promote the good order and welfare of the State, and may ordinarily be repealed at the pleasure of the legislature. (Authorities.) “In the case of Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876), 94 U. S. 535, 540, 24 L. Ed. 148, the Supreme Court of the United States, in speaking of licenses, said: ‘The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by a state is always revocable.‘” Stone, Supt. v. Fritts (1907), 169 Ind. 361, 364, 365, 82 N. E. 792, 794.
The tenure law does not purport to give a teacher a definite and permanent contract. The word “indefinite” is used in the statute itself. The contract is variable as to compensation, and the tenure is permanent only in the event that it is not necessary to reduce the number of teachers. In effect therefore it gives the tenure teacher preferential rights over the teachers who have not attained a tenure status. If the purpose of this statute had been the granting of special privileges to certain teachers for their own benefit, its constitutionality would be seriously in question. But its enactment can be justified upon the theory that its purpose is to promote good order and the welfare of the state and of the school system by preventing the removal of capable and experienced teachers at the political or personal whim of changing office-holders. A future General Assembly may favor a policy
Judgment affirmed.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Fansler, J.—On petition for rehearing, appellant earnestly contends that the decision of this case gives
As pointed out in the original opinion, the Legislature, in enacting school laws, exercises one of the functions of sovereignty. The right to control public policy, in respect to the management and operation of schools, cannot be contracted away by one Legislature so as to fix a permanent public policy, unchangeable by succeeding Legislatures.
But, if the relationship were considered as controlled by the rules of private contract, the provision for re
The latter case was an action by a teacher to mandate the school board to continue her as a teacher in the schools under the Tenure Statute. It is said in the opinion: “The tenure act permits a teacher to cancel his contract at any time after the close of a school term up to thirty days prior to the beginning of the next school term, provided five days’ notice is given, and appellant contends that there was no contract between appellee and appellants for the reason ‘that a contract which does not bind both parties binds neither of them.’ This proposition is undoubtedly supported by the law of contracts. But there is nothing in the law of contracts to prevent one party to a contract granting to the other the privilege of rescission or cancellation on terms not reserved to the former party. The local school corporations are agents of the state in the administration of the public schools and the General Assembly has the power to prescribe the terms of the contract to be executed by these agents.” The controlling principle is that local school corporations, being agents of the state, must follow the statute and continue tenure teachers in employment so long as the statute is unrepealed. It is of no consequence whether the tenure rights are based upon a contractual obligation or upon a mere
It is contended that the opinion gives the repealing statute retroactive effect, but it does not. All annual teaching commitments continue, and the repeal acts only prospectively by striking down for the future those limitations which the statute placed upon the discretion of local school authorities with respect to reemployment of teachers for successive years.
Since the original opinion was filed, the Supreme Court of the United States has sustained the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey in appeals from two cases involving a situation comparable in all substantial respects with the case at bar. Phelps v. Board of Education of Town of West New York et al.; Askam et al. v. Board of Education of Town of West New York et al. (1937), 300 U. S. 319, 57 S. Ct. 483.
Petition for rehearing denied.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
(On Mandate of United States Supreme Court.)
Fansler, J.—The decision in this case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and an opinion was delivered and filed on January 31, 1938. See
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court assumes that this court considered only the question of whether the relatrix’ contract vested in her tenure rights protected by the Constitution of the United States. It is said in the opinion (p. 104): “But we are of opinion that the petitioner had a valid contract with the respondent, the obligation of which would be impaired by the termination of her employment.” The decision does not discuss or pass upon the nature of the remedy available. The remanding order is as follows (p. 109): “As the court below has not passed upon one of the grounds of demurrer which appears to involve no federal question, and may present a defense still open to the respondent, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”
The demurrer is for want of facts. One of the specifications is that the plaintiff‘s action is founded upon a statute which has been repealed. Where a demurrer is sustained by the trial court, this court will affirm, if, for any reason, the ruling of the trial court is correct. Poer, Trustee v. State ex rel. Hinshaw (1919), 188 Ind. 55, 121 N. E. 83; Bruns v. Cope (1914), 182 Ind. 289, 105 N. E. 471.
This action is brought in the name of the State on the relation of Dorothy Anderson. It seeks to mandate the school authorities to reinstate the relatrix as a teacher and continue her in employment. It is not an action by Dorothy Anderson to enforce her contract, but an action to require a public officer to perform a duty required of him by law, which can be maintained only in the name of the State.
In School City of Elwood et al. v. State ex rel. Griffin et al. (1932), 203 Ind. 626, 634, 180 N. E. 471, 474, 81 A. L. R. 1027, 1032, it is clearly recognized that it is because of “the duty of appellants imposed by the same” (the statute) “that mandamus is the proper remedy in this case.” Section 1245, Burns’ Ann. St. 1926, cited in the opinion, is as follows: “The action for mandate may be prosecuted against any inferior tribunal, corporation, public or corporate officer or person to compel the performance of any act which the law specifically enjoins, or any duty resulting from any office, trust or station.”
In Kostanzer et al. v. State ex rel Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind. 536, 547, 187 N. E. 337, 341, 342, it is said: “If appellee‘s position is not an office appellants insist that mandamus is not available for the reason that the granting of mandatory relief results in enforcing a purely contractual right. It is true that mandatory relief against appellants will result in enforcing appellee‘s rights under her contract; but the duty which the judgment of the trial court compelled appellants to perform was a duty enjoined by statute and not by contract. The contract between appellants and appellee created a relation which entitled appellee to have appellants perform the duty in question; but the duty was not imposed by any provision of the contract.”
It was thought by this court when the above cases were decided, and when this case was decided, that the enforcement of tenure rights depended entirely upon the statutory duty of the school officers to continue the teacher in employment, and that the teacher‘s only protection was an action in mandate in the name of the State to enforce the performance of a statutory duty by the school officers. In the Kostanzer case we said that the tenure rights were created “by statute and not by contract.” The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the teacher‘s contract creates tenure rights which the repeal of the statute cannot strike down and destroy. The protection
Much was said about the contract in the original opinion, ineptly perhaps, for the purpose of showing that the tenure right was not created by the contract, and that, since it depended upon a statute which had been repealed, there was no such right. It followed that, there being no such right, the action for mandate would not lie, and the demurrer was properly sustained. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the tenure right was created by contract also, but the contractual right cannot be enforced by an action in mandate. Contractual rights must be enforced by an action at law or in equity in the name of the injured contracting party. We must still conclude therefore that the complaint in the name of the State for mandate does not state a cause of action.
Judgment affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION.
Treanor, J., Dissenting—I cannot agree with the
(1) The 1933 Amendment to the Teachers’ Tenure Act should be given a prospective effect in accordance with the well recognized rule that statutes “are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended.”1
(2) If, in order to give effect to legislative intent, the 1933 Amendment must be construed to operate retrospectively the legislative enactment violates the inhibitions of the United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution against impairment of contracts.
No rule of statutory interpretation is more generally taken for granted than the rule that statutes will be treated as prospective rather than retrospective. Such a rule is supported by a sense of justice and fair dealing and is in accord with the elementary distinction between judicially and legislatively declared rules. Normally a legislatively declared rule applies to future conduct; while a judicially declared rule governs past as well as future conduct. Consequently when a statute attaches certain legal consequences to certain stated conduct, no court would tolerate the suggestion that such consequences would attach to conduct which occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, unless the statute requires such retroactive effect either by express provisions or by necessary implication.
The English cases consistently give effect to the presumption that statutes operate prospectively rather than retrospectively; and these cases emphasize the inherent validity and justice of the presumption since the English courts are under no constitutional pressure to deny a retroactive effect to statutes in order to avoid a
The statements of American courts are substantially the same as those of the English courts. It is stated in Lewis’ Sutherland Statutory Construction that “The general rule is that statutes will be construed to operate prospectively only, unless an intent to the contrary clearly appears.”4 In support of the foregoing statement numerous excerpts of decisions of state courts are quoted; of which excerpts the following is typical: “The rule is that statutes are prospective, and will not be
The objections which are urged against retrospective operation of a new statute apply with equal validity to the repeal of a statute when a retrospective operation would have the effect of destroying legally protected interests which have been created by operation of the statute. “A law can be repealed by the law-giver; but the rights which have been acquired under it while it was in force do not thereby cease. It would be an act of absolute injustice to abolish with a law all the effects which it had produced.”6 Consequently in the case of a repeal of an existing statute, the same as in the case of an enactment of a new statute, courts have assumed that the legislative intent was not to give a retrospective operation, unless the contrary was clearly indicated by the terms of the repealing act.
By the terms of the Teachers’ Tenure Act of 1927 (Acts 1927, c. 97, p. 259) township school corporations were included within its scope; and the 1933 Amending Act (Acts 1933, c. 116, p. 716) excludes township school corporations merely by omitting the words “any school corporation” and substituting therefor “any school city corporation or . . . any school town corporation.” There is nowhere in the Amending Act of 1933 any express declaration of an intention of the General Assembly to give the Amending Act retrospective effect.
The General Assembly enacted the repealing act with knowledge that this Court follows the rule that statutes are presumed to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively; and this Court should assume that the legislative intent was for this presumption to prevail, since
In accordance with the foregoing it is my belief that the Amending Act of 1933 should be construed to operate prospectively, and to leave unimpaired the rights and privileges of township teachers which were acquired under their indefinite contracts prior to the effective date of the Amending Act of the 1933 General Assembly.
But if the Amending Act must be construed to operate retrospectively, I am of the opinion that it violates
Prior to the enactment of the Teachers’ Tenure Act of 1927 the employment relationship between a school corporation and a teacher was created and governed by a contract, and was legally binding upon both teacher and school corporation. The ordinary contract was for a fixed period; usually for a single term of school. In view of numerous decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of this state it is clear that such a contract carried with it all the rights and duties of contracts generally. Since such contracts were for personal services the only remedy which a teacher had in case of breach of contract by the school corporation was to sue for dam
The Tenure Act did not change the method of creating the employer-employee relationship between school corporations and teachers, but only changed the incidents of the contract which creates the relationship. As long as the contract which creates the employer-employee relationship between a school corporation and a teacher has not ripened into an indefinite contract, the school corporation can repudiate the contract and the only recourse that the teacher has is to sue for damages. But Section 1 of the Act of 1927, supra, expressly provides that an indefinite contract “shall remain in force unless succeeded by a new contract signed by both parties or unless it shall be cancelled as provided . . .” in the act. This deprives the school corporation of the legal power to repudiate indefinite contracts of employment with permanent teachers and gives to the teacher the legal right to continue in the employer-employee relationship with the school corporation under the terms and conditions of the indefinite contract. The legal result is that the teacher has a legally protected tenure of position until the same is terminated in accordance with the provisions of the statute.
When a court of competent jurisdiction decides that a school corporation unlawfully has declared the cancellation of an indefinite contract, the factual and legal result
In short, under an indefinite contract, a permanent teacher enjoys a legally enforceable right to be continued in his position as a teacher. This right is of equal validity with the right to recover damages for breach of a non-tenure contract; and is equally the creation of a contract. There are at present thousands of teachers in Indiana who have not become permanent teachers under an indefinite contract but are employed under a contract for a definite period of service. If the present General Assembly should decide to change the policy of authorizing school corporations to contract with teachers and to substitute the policy of appointing teachers at pleasure; and in pursuance of that policy should deprive school corporations of the power to enter into contracts of employment with teachers; and should further provide that all contracts heretofore entered into should be abrogated, it is not conceivable that such action could deprive a non-tenure teacher of his right to recover damages for breach of contract in case his employing school corporation, acting under such statute, should refuse to carry out the existing contract of employment in accordance with its terms. It seems to the writer equally inconceivable that the General Assembly can abrogate an existing indefinite contract and thereby destroy the valid legally enforceable right of tenure which is a legal incident of the contract; and which, as above pointed out, is as essential an element of the indefinite contract as the right to recover damages is of a non-tenure contract.
Numerous decisions of this Court support the following statement in the majority opinion: “The establishment and maintenance of public schools is a governmental function, jurisdiction over which vests in the General Assembly, whose power, subject to constitutional limitation, is plenary, and whose discretion is not reviewable. This legislative power is not exhausted by exercise, and schools may be continued or discontinued, and the school system changed, or one system substituted for another, as often as the Legislature may deem it necessary or advisable in the public interest.” But the foregoing does not validate the conclusion that the General Assembly can destroy the legal consequences of acts which have been performed under the sanction of statutes which have been enacted for the purpose of giving effect to a legislative policy respecting the school system of the state. If the method or system devised by the General Assembly for the purpose of carrying out its educational policies includes the creation of contractual relations between the state, or its sub-divisions, and private persons, it does not follow that the repeal of the statute which authorized such contractual relations destroys the rights of private persons who have entered into contracts with the state or its local agencies. This is pointed out in the following excerpt from an opinion of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin7: “In State ex rel. Harbach v. Mayor, etc., decided herewith, 189 Wis. 84, 206 N. W. 210, it is held that the entire field of education in this state is one of state affairs and regulations rather than one belonging to the local affairs or government of municipalities. Evidently, therefore, when the State by the law of 1921 expressly required (although undoubtedly the same effect
“One engaging in teaching in this state and whose services are to be paid for in whole or in part by the state school fund is not a public officer and his valid contracts cannot lawfully be destroyed or impaired by subsequent legislation, because such contracts are within the protection of
The majority opinion assumes that the General Assembly has the power to revoke all licenses of teachers and that the revocation of tenure teachers’ licenses “would of course carry with it the indefinite contract.” The opinion continues as follows: “The contract, like the license upon which it rests, is a privilege granted by grace of the sovereign for the purpose of promoting the good order and welfare of the state. The license is broader in its bearing than the contract. Without the license a tenure contract cannot exist. Since there is legislative power to revoke the license and thus destroy the contract, there must necessarily be power to do the lesser thing, and merely revoke the tenure contract without cancelling the license.”
Granting that the General Assembly can revoke all existing licenses and that such action would make ineffective all present contracts of teachers, it does not follow that the General Assembly can abrogate all existing contracts, without revoking all licenses. The decided
It is stated in the majority opinion that “The tenure statute was only intended as a limitation upon the plenary power of local school officials to cancel contracts.” The foregoing statement is not justified by the decisions of this Court if it must be understood to imply that prior to enactment of the Tenure Act school officials had plenary power to abrogate contractual obligations. Prior to the enactment of the Tenure Act the school officials did have full discretion in the selection of teachers from among qualified applicants; and at the expiration of the usual one school-term contract the school corporation was under no legal obligation to re-employ any particular teacher under a new contract. But school officials have not had at any time plenary power to cancel contracts in the sense that they could end legal liability thereunder.
I can not agree with the implications of the statement in the majority opinion that “The contract, like the license upon which it rests, is a privilege granted by grace of the sovereign for the purpose of promoting the good order and welfare of the state.” In a sense all contractual
It is evident that the purpose of the indefinite contract provisions of the Act of 1927 was to give to indefinite contracts the legal quality of the ordinary teacher contracts which provide for a definite term of service. And this court has held that one who had become a permanent teacher under an indefinite contract with a township school corporation had acquired a right to hold his teaching position until the indefinite contract should be cancelled in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1927, and that this right was legally enforceable. Compensated employment is surely a thing of value; and a legally enforceable right to be continued in such employment for even a short period of time is such a vested interest that it cannot be destroyed or impaired by subsequent legislation, even though it is enjoyed under a contract which has been authorized for the public interest.
The school code of California has contained permanent tenure provisions for many years, and the Supreme Court of that state has discussed at length many of the problems involved in the application of the various tenure provisions; and has declared unequivocally that a tenure teacher enjoys vested rights which cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation. The view of the California
“Assuming that petitioner automatically attained permanent tenure prior to August 14, 1931, at which time the repeal of sections 5.500 to 5.502 of the School Code, as they then existed, occurred, that status was not lost by virtue of failure on the part of the Legislature to adopt, as part of the repealing act, a saving clause.” Gastineau v. Meyer (1933), 131 Cal. App. 611, 617, 22 P. (2d) 31, 33.
“Moreover, the last-mentioned section was enacted after the petitioner in this case had acquired permanent tenure by operation of law, and for that reason it could in no way affect his vested right to the enjoyment of that status.” Id. p. 618.
“The language of this subdivision has remained substantially the same from its enactment in 1881 to its repeal by the School Code of 1929 (St. 1929, p. 303, §10.3). Anderson v. Board of Education, 126 Cal. App. 514, 516, 15 P. (2d) 774, 16 P. (2d) 272. Of course, any tenure previously acquired by respondent was a vested right and remained unaffected by such repeal. Gastineau v. Meyer, 131 Cal. App. 611, 22 P. (2d) 31. In fact, section 5 of the preliminary provisions of the 1929 School Code (St. 1929, p. 1) recognized and continued previously acquired tenure.” Klein v. Board of Education (1934), 1 Cal. (2d) 706, 708, 37 P. (2d) 74, 75.
It is not clear that the Supreme Court of California entirely relied upon the rule that tenure rights can not be divested by act of the Legislature in deciding the cases in which the language above quoted was used. But the court clearly recognized the legal soundness of the rule that tenure rights are vested and are immune from legislative impairment.
The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel. O‘Neil v. Blied, supra, has been referred to, and quoted from, and this case was cited in a later decision of the Wisconsin Court9 as holding “That the status of one permanently employed as a teacher under such a
In Hall v. Wisconsin10 the Supreme Court of the United States considered a situation which does not seem to differ in its merits from the instant case. By Act of the Wisconsin Legislature, Hall and two others had been appointed “commissioners” to make a “geological, mineralogical and agricultural survey of the state.” By the terms of the Act the governor was required to enter into a written contract with each commissioner. The governor was authorized to fill vacancies in the commission and “to remove any member for incompetency or neglect of duty.” On the 29th day of May, 1858, Hall entered into a contract with the governor which bound Hall to perform his duties; and it was stipulated that the contract should “‘continue till the third day of March, 1863, unless the said Hall should be removed for incompetency or neglect of duty, . . . or unless a vacancy shall occur in his office by his own act or default.‘”
“On the part of the State it was stipulated ‘that the said Hall shall receive for his compensation and expenses, including the expense of his department of said survey, at the rate of $2,000 per annum. . . . Provided that for such time as said Hall or his assistants shall not be engaged in the prosecution of his duties, according to the terms of said act and of this contract, deduction shall be made, pro rata, from the sum of his annual compensation and expenses.‘”
By a subsequent Act of March, 1862, Act of 1856 providing for the survey and appointing Hall a commissioner, and a later Act of 1860 relating to the commission were repealed without qualification. Hall sued to recover for his services from March 1862 to March 3, 1863. The views of the United States Supreme Court,
“In a sound view of the subject it seems to us that the legal position of the plaintiff in error was not materially different from that of parties who, pursuant to law, enter into stipulations limited in point of time, with a State, for the erection, alteration, or repair of public buildings, or to supply the officers or employes who occupy them with fuel, light, stationery, and other things necessary for the public service. The same reasoning is applicable to the countless employes in the same way, under the national government.
“It would be a novel and startling doctrine to all these classes of persons that the government might discard them at pleasure, because their respective employments were public offices, and hence without the protection of contract rights.
“It is not to be supposed that the plaintiff in error would have turned his back upon like employment, actual or potential, elsewhere, and have stipulated as he did to serve the State of Wisconsin for the period named, if the idea had been presented to his mind that the State had the reserved power to break the relation between them whenever it might choose to do so. Nor is there anything tending to show that those who acted in behalf of the State had any such view at that time. All the facts disclosed point to the opposite conclusion as to both parties.”
I do not understand the decision in this case to be placed upon the ground that the abrogation of the indefinite contract was within the police power, although the appellees in State ex rel. Jones v. Kerr, Trustee (1937), 211 Ind. 703, 5 N. E. (2d) 533, urge that “If the social interest in freedom from permanent contracts in public child education or in township government is par
The indefinite contract between appellant-relator Dorothy Anderson and Chester School Township was a valid, existing contract at the effective date of the Amending Act of 1933; and by virtue of that contract the relator had acquired the legally enforceable right to be continued in her position of teacher in the schools of Chester School Township. And in my opinion the Amending Act, under the construction placed upon it by the majority decision, violates
Notes
Quoting from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at page 187: “It is chiefly where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past transactions, or impair contracts, that the rule in question prevails. Every statute, it has been said, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be presumed, out of respect to the Legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation.”
“This social interest is really two social interests: first, the social interest in the performance of a contract by a promisor; . . . The first social interest was one of the most important recognized by the common law and was protected by the law of trusts and by what is known as the law of contracts, both of which have been constantly growing and enlarging in scope throughout the centuries. . . .
“The social interest in promised advantages recognized by the common law also received express recognition in the United States Constitution in the clause forbidding the states to impair the obligation of a contract. . . . The due process clause, as we have already seen in this chapter, has also been extended to afford protection against the impairment of the obligation of a contract, so that the social interest in promised advantages has now been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a limitation on both the federal and the state governments.”