78 N.C. 222 | N.C. | 1878
Lead Opinion
(After stating the facts as above.) So the question is; — Can the administrator of the ward in this
Before the adoption of the new Constitution, when the Courts df Law and the Courts of Equity were kept distinct and'separate, the Courts of Law-only looked at the legal relations Of the parties to the -action, as debtor and creditor, and not at the fund, as impressed by its origin and history, with Certain ■ properties which ún -a Court of Equity imparted to it a -different ownership and mode of -transmission.
The law looked upon the fund as money only, no difference how derived, and upon the death of the owner, devolved it-upon the administrator; while equity went further -and'looked into' the derivation of the fund'and stamped it with the character and laws of devolution of its origin-Hence in the State v. Satterfield, 9 Ire. 358, which was-azi action at law, the administrator of the ward, was allowed to "recover upon the guardian bond the proceeds of the sale of land ■ for partition, which -had gone into the hands of the guárdidn. But ' the Court said; “ Without deciding how the rights Of the parties may be- considered in a Court Of Equity, we are of opinion that in- a Court of Law, the defendant having received money belonging to his ward, was after her' death, bound to pay it to her personal representative, and that his refusal to do so, was a clear breach of the bond, to the amount of the principal and interest.-’ This case was followed by Latta v. Russ, 8 Jones 111. That was an action at law, upon an administration bond. There, the administrator with the will annexed died, having in his hands money arising from the sale of land, decreed to be sold for the payment of debts, being a surplus remaining after the payment of the debts, and which money belonged by law, to the persons to whom the land was devised. ‘ It was held that the administrator d. b. n. cum. tes. an. of the original testator,-was the proper person to bring suit for
But what is the rule in a Court of Equity ? It is the inflexible rule in equity, that the proceeds of land sold for partition, to which an infant is entitled, remain real estate, until he or she comes of age, and elects to take them as money. In Scull v. Jernigan, 2 Dev. and Bat. Eq. 144, Elizabeth Sharpe, was one of several heirs of Jacob Sharpe, and entitled to a part of his lands, which were sold for partition, by order of Court, and her part of the proceeds was paid to her guardian. She intermarried with Jernigan and her guardian then settled with the husband and paid to him her estate, including her share' of the price of the
To the same effect is Gillespie v. Foy, 5 Ire. Eq. 280; Dudley v. Winfield, Busb. Eq. 91; Bateman v. Latham, 3 Jones Eq. 35. The principle running through all the equity cases is that the heir-at-law may follow and recover the fund in ■whosesoever hands it may be, whether the guardian or his administrator, or administrator of the infant or the husband. ■Their dealings with one another cannot change the equitable nature of the fund so as to disturb the rights of the heirs at law.
But now both legal and equitable rights are administered in the same action, upon the rational principle, that there shall not be two actions for the same subject matter, when .a single action will afford a complete remedy. Assume that at law, prior to the Code, the administrator of the ward could sue for and recover a part, or all this fund, it is clear that in equity the heirs, by another action, could have followed and recovered the proceeds of the land. As both actions are now combined, it would seem to follow inevitably that all the parties which were necessary to maintain the two actions, must now- unite in the one action which comprehends both. The general rule in equity is, that all persons interested in the subject of dispute, must be parties, because that Court seeks to arrange in a single action, all the claims arising upon the subject of controversy. In this case, it is evident, that unless the liters at law of the ward, as well as the distributees who are represented through the administrator, are before the Court, their several rights to the fund, cannot be determined ; for the fund is not sufficient to satisfy the claims of both parties — those entitled to the per
If the administrator plaintiff had alleged and shown a deficiency of personal assets in his hands to discharge the debts of his intestate and had made the heirs at law of the ward parties to this action, he would be entitled to condemn all or so much of the real fund, as would be necessary for that purpose. But he makes no allegation of want of assets, and his only claim to recover this fund is, that he is the proper party to recover and pay it over to the heirs at law. But as in this Court the real fund is land, and descendible as such, why should the heirs, in this more than in other-cases of descent, be compelled to reach it in this round about way, instead of directly and immediately from the intestate ? And suppose there had been no administration, or he had refused or delayed to bring an action for the recovery of this fund, are the heirs thereby to be hindered or delayed in coming to their inheritance ? The heirs do not claim through but above the administrator and immediately from the intestate ; and whoever holds the real fund at the death of the ward, holds it for the heirs and is directly amenable to their action to recover it. If the heirs had. brought the action against the defendant, Robinson, the ad-ministi’ator of the ward would have been a necessary party, as a representative of the creditors and distributees ©f the intestate. For the same reason the heirs are necessary parties to this action, that the rights of all may be adjudicated in the same action, instead of putting the heirs, as it may be, to another action against the administrator of the ward.
It does not appear why 1 he action was not brought upon the guardian bond, instead of the bond of the administrator. As the only point presented by the appeal is that which we have discussed, we can notice no others. "We think the Court did not err in refusing to give the plaintiff judgment
The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting. "While concurring with the Court 'in the disposition made of the case, I cannot assent to the reasoning by which the result was reached.
L. B. Krimmenger as guardian to the plaintiff’s intestate who died before attaining twenty-one years of age, as part of his ward’s estate, received a sum of money arising from a sale of her land and paid to him by order of the Court directing the sale. This fund as well as the other personal estate of the ward was mismanaged and lost. The guardian died leaving a will, and the defendant, T. H. Robinson, was appointed administrator cum, testamento annexo of L. B. Krim-menger, and gave the bond on which the action is brought .against him and his sureties.
The defendant, Robinson, as such administrator took possession of the personal estate of the guardian and received assets sufficient to discharge his liabilities to the ward. The question* is, can the plaintiff recover in damages the value of the fund derived from the sale of the land, lost by mismanagement of the guardian, or must the suit to recover "^his part of the estate be brought on the relation of the heirs at law of the intestate infant ?
Although legal and equitable rights are under our present system administered by the same Court, yet the essential distinction in those rights and the remedies to enforce-them, cannot be lost sight of without introducing perplexity and uncertainty. This action is on the administration; bond to recover damages for a breach of trust, and should be controlled by those general rules that formerly governed a legal proceeding. No case has been called to my attention-ivhere an heir at law has prosecuted an action to recover the fund, or to secure his interest in it, until it has been reduced to possession or subjected to the control of the personal representative. The right to sue is essentially a personal-right vesting in the infant, and at her death transmitted to her administrator, who represents her as to all her rights of property, except her specific interest in land remaining" such until her death, and which thus descends to her heirs at law. The damages arising from the breach of trust and
This view is in my opinion fully sustained by an express adjudication of this Court in Latta v. Russ, 8 Jones, 111.
The facts of that case are these : Richard Crabtree died, having made his will and devised certain of his lands to Thomas J. Latta and wife and others. The executors named in the will renounced, and his widow was appointed .admin-istratrix with the will annexed. She filed her petition in the proper Court, and obtained license to sell the devised lands for payment of debts. There was a surplus arising from the sale of the land in her hands when she died. The defendant, Russ, then became her administrator, and administration d. b. n. with the will annexed, was granted to the relator. The action was brought by the administrator d. b. n. upon the bond of the administratrix, against her administrator and sureties, to recover the fund derived from the sale of the land. This was resisted by the defendants upon the ground that the surplus arising from the sale of theland, made assets, belonged to the devisees, and that they alone as relators coulds ue. The Court declared that the objection that the action cannot be maintained by the administrator d. b. n. was not tenable, and Pearson, C. J., in delivering the opinion, says: “ Where an administrator dies before he has completed the settlement of the assets derived from real estate by paying debts and paying over the excess to the devisees or heirs at law, this unfinished duty cannot be performed by his administrator, for there is no privity between him and the devisees and heirs at law ; and it is consequently necessary that both of the deceased per
This lucid statement of the true doctrine would seem to he decisive of our case, and to render further discussion needless. It may not however be inappropriate to notice some of the many' difficulties to be encountered in permitting the heir-at-law to sue and recover this money. If the specific fund is to be treated as land (except for the purpos-ses already stated) then its loss or destruction, like the destruction of houses on the infant’s [land, would obstruct or defeat the descent. The right to recover damages in the one case as in the other, is a personal right vesting in the infant and to which none but his representative succeeds at her death. Undoubtedly the heir has no claim for the destroyed houses, and why should she have to moneys lost, if they are to be treated as land merely ?
But in truth the fund is but a given sum of money which itself, or in case of its loss, the substituted damages which measure its value,'though its identity be lost, continues invested with the same attributes and goes to the same heir-at-law when reduced into possessson by the person, who under the law must pursue and recover it for the benefit of the party entitled thereto.
A further suggestion may be made in regard to the interest of creditors. For the space of two years after the grant of letters of administration or testamentary, the lands remain liable to debts and is inalienable by the heir or de-visee. If conveyed after-wards, the title passes but the heir
The correct rule applicable to the case in my opinion is this; — The personal representative must reduce to possession the entire personal estate, and if necessary, sue for and recover debts and damages to which his testator or intestate may be entitled ; and in an action brought for this purpose, an inquiry into the source from which the funds sought to be recovered were derived, is wholly immaterial and irrelevant. The only issue between the parties is as to the defendant’s liability, and in what amount, to the deceased •or his representative to whom the right of actiop is transmitted. When the fund has been recovered, it then becomes important to ascertain whether any or what part arises from the sale of land, and who is the heir or devisee to whom, if not required for purposes of administration, it .should be paid.
This is a ‘ legal proceeding to recover damages for the Breach of a legal obligation and should be conducted substantially upon the principles which governed in an action at law, modified under the new practice so far only as is necessary to secure and protect those equitable- rights which formerly could only be asserted in a different tribunal. The judgment of the Court is entirely proper reversing the decision below and transmitting the cause in order to an amendment making the heir at law a co-plaintiff. So that if administration has been completed, the money recovered .which represents the land may pass at once into the hands
Per Curiam. Judgment vacated and cause remanded..
Lead Opinion
So the question is, Can the administrator of the ward in this action recover the proceeds of the sale of the real estate which had been sold for partition (224) by the decree of the court, and paid to the guardian?
Before the adoption of the new Constitution, when the courts of law and the courts of equity were kept distinct and separate, the courts of law only looked at the legal relations of the parties to the action, as debtor and creditor, and not at the fund, as impressed, by its origin and history, with certain properties which in a court of equity imparted to it a different ownership and mode of transmission.
The law looked upon the fund as money only, no matter how derived, and upon the death of the owner devolved it upon the administrator; while equity went further, and looked into the derivation of the fund and stamped it with the character and laws of devolution of its origin. Hence, in S. v.Satterfield,
But what is the rule in a court of equity? It is the inflexible rule in equity that the proceeds of land sold for partition, to which an infant is entitled, remain real estate until he or she comes of age and elects to take them as money. In Scull v. Jernigan,
To the same effect is Gillespie v. Foy,
But now both legal and equitable rights are administered in the same action, upon the rational principle that there shall not be two actions for the same subject-matter, when a single action will afford a complete remedy. Assume that at law, prior to The Code, the administrator of the ward could sue for and recover a part or all this fund, it is clear that in equity the heirs, by another action, could have followed and recovered the proceeds of the land. As both actions are now combined, it would seem to follow inevitably that all the parties which were necessary to maintain the two actions must now unite in the one action, which comprehends both. The general rule in equity is, that all persons *152 interested in the subject of dispute must be parties, because that court seeks to arrange in a single action all the claims arising upon the subject of controversy. In this case it is evident that unless the heirs at law of the ward, as well as the distributees who are represented through the administrator, are before the court, their several rights to the fund cannot be determined, for the fund is not sufficient to satisfy the claims of both parties — those entitled to the personal estate of the ward (228) and those entitled to the real estate — supposing them to be different persons.
If the administrator, plaintiff, had alleged and shown a deficiency of personal assets in his hands to discharge the debts of his intestate, and had made the heirs at law of the ward parties to this action, he would be entitled to condemn all or so much of the real fund as would be necessary for that purpose. But he makes no allegation of want of assets, and his only claim to recover this fund is that he is the proper party to recover and pay it over to the heirs at law. But as in this Court the real fund is land, and descendible as such, why should the heirs, in this more than in other cases of descent, be compelled to reach it in this roundabout way, instead of directly and immediately from the intestate? And suppose there had been no administration, or he had refused or delayed to bring an action for the recovery of this fund, are the heirs thereby to be hindered or delayed in coming to their inheritance? The heirs do not claim through, but above, the administrator, and immediately from the intestate; and whoever holds the real fund at the death of the ward holds it for the heirs and is directly amenable to their action to recover it. If the heirs had brought the action against the defendant Robinson, the administrator of the ward would have been a necessary party, as a representative of the creditors and distributees of the intestate. For the same reason the heirs are necessary parties to this action, that the rights of all may be adjudicated in the same action, instead of putting the heirs, as it may be, to another action against the administrator of the ward.
It does not appear why the action was not brought upon the guardian bond, instead of the bond of the administrator. As the only point presented by the appeal is that which we have discussed, we can notice no others. We think the court did not err in refusing to give the plaintiff judgment for the amount of the entire fund, and if nothing else (229) appeared, we would affirm the judgment. But as it also appears that the heirs at law of Margaret A. Blackwelder are necessary parties to the action and may be prejudiced by the affirmance of the judgment, we think it best and least expensive, not to dismiss the action for want of proper parties, but to vacate the judgment and remand the case, to the end that the heirs at law aforesaid may be made parties *153 plaintiff or defendant, with leave to amend the pleadings as far as the new parties are concerned, and that the case may be then proceeded with according to law. The accounts as reported and affirmed will not be reopened. The plaintiff will pay the costs of appeal.