State ex rel. Adams v. Aluchem, Inc.State ex rel. Adams v. Aluchem, Inc.
Lead Opinion
I
{¶ 1} In December 1984, James C. Adams, claimant-appellee, was injured in an industrial accident. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation allowed his claim for the conditions of “dismemberment left arm; phantom limb pain; muscle spasms left arm.”
{¶ 2} On April 11, 2001, claimant filed a motion for statutory permanent total disability (“PTD”) compensation under
{¶ 3} An Industrial Commission staff hearing officer granted claimant’s motion for statutory PTD compensation but applied the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶ 4} Claimant sought a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals ordering the commission to award statutory PTD compensation retroactive to the date of his 1984 injury. The court of appeals granted the writ, holding that the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
II
{¶ 6} The parties agree that claimant is entitled to statutory PTD benefits pursuant to
{¶ 7} Claimant contends that retrospective application of Thomas compels a finding that the date of his 1984 injury is the appropriate date to begin payment of compensation.
{¶ 8} We agree with claimant’s contention that our decision in Thomas must be applied retrospectively because we did not expressly state that the decision was to be applied only prospectively. See Lakeside Ave. Ltd. Partnership v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999),
{¶ 9} We disagree, however, with claimant’s contention that retrospective application of Thomas compels us to set the date of his injury as the appropriate start date for payment of compensation. To reach that conclusion, we would be required to ignore the rules of retrospective application and to disregard another provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act —
{¶ 10} Only those legal conclusions that we announced in Thomas can be retrospectively applied to other cases. Our decision in Thomas was limited to
{¶ 11} In order to reach the result urged by claimant, we would also be required to ignore the statute of limitations in
{¶ 12} Despite this express statutory limitation, claimant argues that the commission should award him compensation for a back period of 17 years. Were we to order the commission to do so, we would violate the well-established rule that “when it is used in a statute, the word ‘shall’ denotes that compliance with the commands of that statute is mandatory.” (Emphasis sic.) Dept. of Liquor Control v. Sons of Italy Lodge 0917 (1992),
{¶ 13} We have rejected other arguments to create exceptions to the two-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Baker,
{¶ 14} Claimant asks this court to disregard a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that by its own language applies to all awards of compensation and to do so only for the benefit of those receiving one type of compensation—
{¶ 15} The loss of or loss of use of one’s extremities or eyes is a life-changing occurrence with ramifications that extend far beyond the workplace. However, other claimants deal with consequences that for some individuals are equally debilitating. For example, statutory PTD claimants are permitted to work, and many of them do.
{¶ 16} In fact, we have explicitly rejected the argument that an exception to the two-year limitation is appropriate for claimants with the most severe physical injuries. Justice,
{¶ 18} Ohio AdmuCode 4121-3-34(E)(l) states:
{¶ 19} “(E) Statutory permanent total disability
{¶ 20} “Division (C) of
{¶ 21} “(1) In all claims where the evidence on file clearly demonstrates actual physical loss, or the permanent and total loss of use occurring at the time of injury secondary to a traumatic spinal cord injury or head injury, of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof, the claim shall be referred to be reviewed by a staff hearing officer of the commission. Subsequent to review, the staff hearing officer shall, without hearing, enter a tentative order finding the injured worker to be entitled to compensation for permanent and total disability under division (C) of
{¶ 22} The court of appeals determined that this provision obligates the commission to issue a tentative order finding the claimant to be entitled to compensation under
{¶ 23} However, the court of appeals reached this conclusion by applying one provision of the administrative rule out of context.
{¶ 24} References to “applications” appear throughout
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} The stated purpose of the rule and the other references to applications throughout the rule demonstrate that the Industrial Commission intended claimants to affirmatively seek, rather than automatically receive, PTD compensation.
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} A plain reading of these subsections reveals that the Industrial Commission intended applications for statutory PTD compensation to precede the issuance of tentative orders for such compensation.
{¶ 29} Thus, the court of appeals erred in holding that
Ill
{¶ 30} Claimant filed a motion for statutory PTD on April 11, 2001. As the court of appeals noted, this motion can be viewed as claimant’s application for compensation. This April 11, 2001 application triggered the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶ 31} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the order of the commission is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. {¶ a}
{¶ b} “The loss or loss of use of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this
. Statutory PTD compensation is awarded regardless of a claimant’s ability to work if the claimant has suffered “[t]he loss or loss of use of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof.”
. An award of vocational PTD compensation requires a showing that claimant’s allowed conditions, either alone or with claimant’s nonmedical disability factors, prevent sustained remunerative employment. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987),
. {¶ a}
{¶ b} “Sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed in favor of employees and the dependents of deceased employees.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 32} In my opinion, the two-year limit on retroactive payment of compensation in
{¶ 33}
{¶ 34} “The jurisdiction of the industrial commission and the authority of the administrator of workers’ compensation over each case is continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified. * * * [T]he commission shall not make any modification, change, finding, or award which shall award compensation for a back period in excess of two years prior to the date of filing application therefor.”
{¶ 35} In State ex rel. Drone v. Indus. Comm. (2001),
{¶ 36} By the same token, the two-year limitation in
{¶ 38} “The loss or loss of use of both hands or both arms, or 'both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.”
{¶ 39} Yet very little, if any, of the majority’s discussion is actually focused on this issue. Most of its analysis is digressive, as it is based on the holdings and rationale of cases that involve peripheral issues, or intermixed with concepts and concerns that either flout the statutory scheme or are tangential to the matter at hand.
{¶ 40} The majority begins its analysis by noting that
{¶ 41} The problem with this portion of the majority’s analysis, however, is that it merely begs the question whether
{¶ 42} The majority claims that in State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm.,
{¶ 44} The majority also relies on Welsh, supra, which it depicts as “emphasizing that ‘the commission cannot make any * * * award that grants compensation for any period more than two years before the date the claimant applies for such compensation’ (emphasis added).” The obvious import of this characterization is to suggest that the court in Welsh had stressed that no type of compensation could ever be exempt from the two-year limitation in
{¶ 45} In fact, the court in Welsh did not reject any asserted exception to the two-year limitation, let alone all possible exceptions. To the contrary, the court specifically noted that the claimant “has not asserted any exception to the rule, inherent in
{¶ 46} The majority’s reliance on the last of its three cited cases, State ex rel. Justice v. Dairy Mart, Inc. (2002),
{¶ 48} Nevertheless, the majority also relies on Justice to support the proposition that no one group of claimants, such as those who are statutorily permanently totally disabled, may be singled out for special treatment based on the nature of its members’ injuries. Thus, the majority reasons:
{¶ 49} “Claimant asks this court to disregard a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that by its own language applies to all awards of compensation and to do so only for the benefit of those receiving one type of compensation— statutory PTD compensation. Were we to grant this request, we would create a situation in which one group of claimants, those who are statutorily permanently totally disabled, would be treated differently from all other claimants, including those claimants who are vocationally permanently totally disabled. The latter group would be bound by a statute of limitations and commensurate restrictions on retroactive compensation, while the former group would be unencumbered. The differing treatment of the groups cannot be justified by any attempt to distinguish them based on the nature of their members’ injuries.”
{¶ 50} The majority then explains that the disabling consequences of a statutory PTD claimant’s injuries are not so uniquely life-altering or debilitating when compared to those suffered by vocational PTD claimants as to justify a special exemption from the otherwise mandatory and all-encompassing limitation on back awards. The majority concludes, therefore, that “[pjermanent total disability— no matter how it arises — is a life-altering occurrence for everyone affected, and under no circumstances should one group of PTD claimants be entitled to greater remuneration, via statutory operation, than others.”
{¶ 51} The problem with this reasoning is that it substitutes the majority’s determination of what the public policy should be with regard to PTD compensation for the policy declared by the General Assembly in
{¶ 52} Prior to 1959,
{¶ 53} “The loss of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, prima facie constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.” (Emphasis added.) 126 Ohio Laws 1015,1033.
{¶ 54} Effective November 2, 1959, 128 Ohio Laws 743, 762,
{¶ 55} Accordingly, claimants who lose any two of the body parts delineated in
{¶ 56} No other group of claimants is entitled to such special treatment, regardless of how severely its members are injured. Claimants who receive injuries other than those required to invoke relief under
{¶ 57} To illustrate the point, consider the following comparative scenario. Suppose that everything pertinent to claimant Adams in this case had also
{¶ 58} The point is that
{¶ 59} Moreover, the differing treatment effectuated under
{¶ 60} More important, statutory PTD claimants occupy a unique position with regard to the two-year limitation in
{¶ 62} Clearly, the intent of
{¶ 63} Although the case is not mentioned by the majority, the Industrial Commission argues that a different result is required under State ex rel. Clark v. Krouse (1977),
{¶ 64} When
{¶ 65} At first blush, Clark appears to support the commission’s position, since the court held
{¶ 66} Finally, the majority relies on
{¶ 67} On its face,
{¶ 68} Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, I do not believe that the drafters of
{¶ 69} For all the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.