261 Mo. 576 | Mo. | 1914
The circuit attorney of the city of St. Louis has instituted two original proceedings in this court in the nature of quo warranto for the purpose of forfeiting the charters of two corporations, the St. Louis Club, and the Missouri Athletic Club, because of their alleged misuse and abuse of their respective franchises in having sold, without licenses as dram-shop-keepers, intoxicating liquors, and in having violated section 7226, Revised Statutes 1909, in receiving, storing, keeping or delivering* as agents or otherwise,
The material issues in these cases being identical, varying only' as to the manner in which the defenses are presented by counsel in each of the cases, they will be considered together.
These clubs were incorporated at different dates under what is now article 10 of chapter 33, Revised Statutes 1909, the statute authorizing the incorporation of benevolent, religious, scientific, educational and miscellaneous associations. This statute has not undergone any material change through legislation since the incorporation of these clubs; incidentally, its latitude, measured by judicial interpretation, may not inappropriately be likened to that virtue which is figuratively said to cover a multitude of sins. [1 Peter, iv, 8.]
No useful purpose will be served by setting out the pleadings at length. The informations formally charge the respondents with the abuse and misuse of their corporate powers in reference to the matters above stated, and ask a forfeiture of their charters. Their returns confess and avoid as to the charge of selling intoxicating liquors without license; and as to the alleged violation of section 7226, Revised Statutes 1909, that it is invalid, as being unconstitutional. The buildings, appointments, conditions of membership, privileges, government and exclusive restrictions of each club are set forth at length and with particularity.' It is pleaded that the matter of the right of these clubs to sell liquor without license has been adjudicated by this court in State ex rel. Bell v. St. Louis Club, 125 Mo. 308, and that the right under this decision has uninterruptedly been exercised by them since the rendition of the opinion in that case in 1894; that efforts have been made at successive sessions of the General Assembly to effect changes in the dramshop law which would require social clubs to take out dramshop licenses, and the failure or refusal of the Legislature to
Eelator’s reply in each case is a general denial, • and in addition in one it is alleged that the suit pleaded in abatement by respondents (State ex rel. Bell v. St. Louis Club, supra) was brought by an unauthorized person and the proceedings therein were void, and that the facts in that and the instant cases are not identical, and that section 7226, supra, had not been enacted when the Bell case was determined.
Agreed statements of facts detail the character of each club as a social organization, the nature and amount of its expenditures, including the expenditures for intoxicating liquors; the nature and amount of income, including that charged to members and their nonresident guests for intoxicating liquors; the manner in which the club is governed, and numerous other matters not necessary to be set out here. As to the dispensing of liquors, practically the same plan is pursued in each club. If a member desires liquor he orders same and it is served to him in the club; on receiving it he signs a card acknowledging the receipt of same and stating the price; he makes payment for
The questions confronting us are so interrelated that their discussion, with probably some prolixity, becomes necessary to a determination of the issues involved.
I. It is scarcely worth while at this day and time to consume space discussing the character of the liquor traffic, except to say that early in our judicial history Judge Napton, who may well be styled the Story of our jurisprudence, said, in Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591, that “the sale of intoxicating liquors is by law illegal and is not a privilege of a citizen of this or any other State, and that the right to sell same can only be acquired by complying with the law. ’ ’ Thirty-five years later, with no adverse intimation in the interim, this court reiterated the doctrine announced in the Austin case, supra, and in a per curiam opinion in State ex rel. v. Hudson, 78 Mo. 302, said, in addition, that “the license fee exacted of dramshop keepers is not a tax, but a price paid for the privilege of carrying on a business detrimental to public morals, and which the Legislature in the exer
Other opinions of this court and the courts of appeals add such'force to the doctrine announced as repetition and unvarying adherence give to any judicial declaration. The last word on the subject has been so aptly said by "Woodson, J., speaking for this court, in State v. Parker Dist. Co., 236 Mo. l. c. 255, that it may be appropriately incorporated here as follows:
“The authorities also establish the fact that the liquor traffic is not a lawful business, except as authorized by express legislation of the State; that no person has the natural or inherent right to engage therein; that the liquor business does not stand npon the same plane, in the eyes of the law, with other commercial occupations. It is placed under the ban of the law, and it is thereby differentiated from all other occupations, and is thereby separated or removed from the natural rights, privileges and immunities of the citizen.
“The foregoing enunciations of the courts are based upon the well known fact that intoxicating liquors and the traffic therein, have brought intemperance, poverty and misery upon many of our citizens, and have been a fruitful source of crime on every hand. ’ ’
In Colorado it is held that a social club which dispenses liquor to its members at a price fixed by its managers, violates a local ordinance prohibiting the sale of such liquors, even though they are provided simply as an incident to the entertainment of the members, the transaction being held to be a sale. [Manning v. Canon City, 45 Colo. 571; Lloyd v. Canon City, 46 Colo. 195.]
In the District of Columbia a like ruling, under a similar state of facts, has been made, the court observing that it is immaterial for what purpose the club was formed, or whether the sale was made for1 profit or was but an incident to the cultivation of social relations between the members. [Army and Navy Club v. District of Columbia, 8 App. D. C. 544.]
In Georgia it is held that the admission only of members to club rooms, and the fact that the selling and drinking of intoxicating liquors, was only an incident and not. the main object of the incorporation, will not make the place where the liquors are dispensed and drunk the less a tippling house within the meaning of a statute making penal “the keeping open of tippling houses on Sunday.” [Mohrman v. State, 105 Ga. 709.]
In Illinois it is held to be immaterial that liquors are sold by a corporation club to its members for a price no more than sufficient to cover cost and service, or whether the organization is one in good faith or a mere subterfuge to evade the statute, as in either case the transaction is a sale within the meaning of the statute requiring a license. [People v. Law and Order Club, 203 Ill000. 127, 62 L. R. A. 884.] A.later Illinois case (South Shore Club v. People, 228 Ill. 75, 12 L.
In Maryland the law regulating the sales of liquors was held to apply to private clubs when liquor is sold to members, even without a profit. [Conoc. Club v. State, 116 Md. 317.]
In Michigan it is held that a law requiring that licenses should be obtained by retail liqnor dealers and taxing the business of liquor selling, wherever found or by whom carried on, reaches a club house or private house, as well as a saloon or tavern, and includes all persons engaged in such business. [People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250.]
In Minnesota, in a case which reviews a large number of authorities, it is held that a club or social organization chartered under the laws of the State, is a “person” within the meaning of the license laws, and that the dispensing of liquors by it to a member constitutes a sale in violation of law, unless protected by license. [State ex rel. v. Minnesota Club, 106 Minn. 515.]
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in discussing a case involving the right of a social club to dispense liquor to its members, not for profit, but without license, said: “We nnhesitatingly adopt as sound the views of those courts which have held that such a de
In New Jersey a club which disposes of liquors to its members, not to evade the law or to make a profit, is held to be subject to an ordinance imposing a penalty for selling liquor without license. The court said: “It is wholly immaterial, and not a legitimate subject of inquiry, whether an intention to violate or evade the law was present or not. Intent constitutes no part of the offense; the simple question is presented, whether the act expressly inhibited has been done? If so, the presumption of wrongful intent is absolute and cannot be controverted.” [Newark v. Essex Club, 53 N. J. L. 99.]
In Oregon the dispensing of liquors by a club to its members is held to be a sale. [State v. Kline, 50 Ore. 426; Bachelors’ Club v. Woodburn, 60 Ore. l. c. 341.]
In Washington it is held that the transaction is a sale under an ordinance forbidding the sale or disposal of liquors without license, the court saying in effect that liquors owned by a club and transferred to a buyer for a consideration is a sale, and it is immaterial that the buyer is a member and as such has an interest in the property. [Spokane v. Baughman, 54 Wash. 315.]
In West Virginia the disposal, of liquors by a club to its members is within the statute requiring a license, the statute being held to be broad enough to permit no shift or device to defeat its purpose, no matter whether the club is social, literary or otherwise. [State v. Shumate, 44 W. Va. 490.]
In the foregoing we have, so far as possible, included for and against the right of sale only cases involving bona-fide social clubs in States not under prohibition or local option laws, and not those in which the clubs were expressly prohibited from selling. The cases discussed disclose a lack of harmony in regard to what constitutes a sale, the majority being, as above indicated, against the doctrine announced in the St. Louis Club case, supra, and others of like tenor. The contrariety of these opinions may be due, to some extent, to variant statutes or to differences in the facts. If this be true, it lessens their force, which with us is, at best, but persuasive, except as they support the conclusion reached in the St. Louis Club case. The conclusion in this case we do not regard as sound or consistent in not requiring a fair and uniform enforcement of the law in regard to the sale of intoxicating liquors; and in so far as it holds that an incorporated social club is not a person within the meaning of the law in regard to corporations, and that the dispensing of liquors by it to its members is not a sale, it is overruled.
II. The dispensing of liquors by social clubs to their members having been by reason and precedent
Respondents are corporations organized to advance, by social intercourse and athletic pursuits, the bodily and mental health of their members, and by friendly exchange of views and discussi°ns advance the commercial prosperity of the city of St. Louis, and to obtain a place for the common and friendly intercourse of such members with each other. So say their returns, supplemented by like declarations in the agreed statements of facts. That respondents have no express power to sell liquor is admitted unless it be claimed that the ruling in the St. Louis Club, case operated to confer this power upon them as a species of judicial legislation; as we understand their contention, however, it is not so claimed, but that the construction given the dramshop law in that case simply emphasized an implied power which the clubs possessed, in the absence of an express prohibition. The doctrine of implied power as applied to corporations demands our attention. It will be recalled that Chief Justice Marshall said in the Dartmouth College case (4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 636) among other things that have become maxims, that “a corporation being the mere creature of the law possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence; ’ ’ and the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that the same rule is applicable to articles of incorporation which are analogous to a charter (Gould v. Fuller, 79 Minn. 414); so that by express judicial declaration the doctrine as to the limitation of the powers of -a corporation within the instrument of its creation has been made to apply to every class of incorporated association, whether it be organized for business, moral, intellectual or benevolent purposes or to promote social
The respondents were incorporated, as shown by the pleadings and the agreed statement of facts, under that article of the law of corporations of this State (Art. 10, chap. 33, R. S. 1909') providing for the formation of benevolent, religious, scientific, educational and miscellaneous associations. To' the purist their incorporation under either of these classifications might seem to do violence to the usual and well accepted meaning of the words; but judicial interpretation, which can and oftentimes does accomplish what derivation and usage cannot, has declared in Stale ex rel. v. Lesueur, 99 Mo. 552, that a social club, organized as these were, is included in one of the classes named, or may be incorporated under said article 10 of chapter 33, supra. • To this article, therefore, we must look for the express or implied powers posSessed by respondents. Section 3435 of article 10 supra, defines the purposes for which associations may be incorporated under said article whose organization is clearly authorized thereunder and'those purposes do not depend for their existence on judicial construction; but in the case of social clubs there is no declaration of express powers, their incorporation having been authorized by judicial interpretation resort must be had to that general knowledge necessarily possessed by the courts in common with individuals as to the nature and purpose of associations of this character to enable the -full extent of their powers to be determined. Guided, therefore, by this knowledge^and the declara
By'necessary and inevitable exclusion, therefore, it being impossible, under the law, for social clubs to procure licenses, and the sale of liquor being a limited privilege, no implied or other power exists authorizing corporations of this character to make sales. Further, an implied power in a corporation to do an unlawful act cannot exist; and if liquor be sold without license over a mahogany table, in glass of finest crystal, under a silken canopy in a palace, it is none the less a crime, under a fair and impartial interpretation of the law, than an unauthorized sale over a deal board in a hovel that would put “Shanahan’s ould Shebeen” to shame.
The absence of express powers from the statute which has been held to authorize the incorporation of social clubs, under that portion of the law cited by respondents as giving color to an implied power to sell liquors, is wholly inapplicable to that class of associations. The supplemental clause of section 3435, supra, relied upon by respondents, after enumerating the specific classes that may be incorporated, provides (italics are ours) that “any association, society, company or organization which tends to the public advantage in relation to any or several of the objects above enumerated, and whatever is incident to such objects,
But we wander afield.' To render respondents’ contention applicable it must be further assumed that the sale of liquors, concretely stated, is related to either benevolence, religion, science or .education, or that it is incident to one of such objects. A rather unusual relationship, to say the least, and if the sale of liquors is, as claimed, “an incident to the maintenance of the clubs,” then as we have iterated and reiterated in the discussion of other phases of this‘question, they draw their substance, in part at least, from violations of the law.
The foregoing sustains the contention of relator ■that respondents in the sale of intoxicating liquors have abused their corporate powers as social clubs, and any discussion as to the application or validity of section 7226, Revised Statutes 1909, is unnecessary.
In view of what has 'been said, we are of the opinion that each of said respondents, to-wit, the St. Louis Club and the Missouri Athletic Club, has in the sale of intoxicating liquors abused and misused the authority, franchises and privileges conferred upon them by law, and that judgments of forfeiture be entered herein dissolving each of said associations — the ousters to be suspended so long as said clubs in good faith desist from such sales. And it is so ordered.