STATE, DOTD v. Hellenic, Inc.STATE, DOTD v. Hellenic, Inc.
Randall A. Smith and Phillip A. Wittmann, New Orleans, John E. Coleman, Jr., Franklin, for defendant-appellant Hellenic, Inc.
Before FOIL, PITCHER and PARRO, JJ.
FOIL, Judge.
In these expropriatiоn proceedings, we are asked to determine the proper date from which interest on an award of compensation is to be calculated. In two of the expropriation proceedings before it, the trial court awarded interest from the date the landowner filed answеrs seeking an increase in the amount of compensation filed into the registry of the court. We hold that the trial court erred in refusing to award interest on the excess awards from the date of the “taking” and reverse.
BACKGROUND
The facts forming the basis of this appeal are not in dispute. On June 17, 1988, and November 10, 1988, the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) filed petitions to expropriate two parcels of property owned by appellant, Hellenic, Inc., pursuant to
On August 24, 1992, the jury rendered judgment in favor of Hellenic, awarding Hellenic compensation of over one million dollars more than the amounts deposited by DOTD. Thereafter, Hellenic and DOTD disputed the mеthod of calculating interest on the excess awards in the suits filed on November 10, 1988 and September 6, 1991, and a hearing was held before the court on that issue.1 The dispute arose because
INTEREST ON THE AWARD
Hellenic insists that it is entitled to interest on the award from the date its property was “taken” as a matter of state and federal constitutional law, as well as Louisiana statutory law. Because we agree that statutory law affords Hellenic the relief it seeks, we pretermit discussion of any constitutional
Hellenic‘s property was taken by DOTD pursuant to the “quick-taking statute,”
The statutory scheme also provides for an award of interest on the sums determined by a court to be owed by DOTD in excess of the amount deposited by DOTD into the registry of the court. As originally enacted in 1974 by
The judgment rendered therein shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, lеgal interest on the amount finally awarded as of the date title vests in the plaintiff to the date of payment, but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as has been deposited in the registry of the court.
This provision was interpreted by the courts to provide for interest from the date оf the “taking,” that is, the date upon which DOTD filed the expropriation petition and deposited the estimate of just compensation into the registry of the court. See State, Department of Highways v. Bougere, 363 So.2d 228 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 364 So.2d 120 (La.1978).
In 1988, by
If the amount finally awarded for compensation exceeds the amount deposited, the judgment shall include legal interest on the excess from the date of legal demand until paid, but such interest shall not accrue on any award made for expert fees or attorney fees prior to judgment.
The courts interpreted the phrase “legal demand” in the amendment as the date upon which the landowner files an answer seeking additional compensation in the expropriation proceeding. Consequently, the courts construed the amendment to provide that interest is to run from a date other than the taking, and concluded that the amendment constituted a substantive change in the law. State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Estate of Davis, 572 So.2d 39 (La.1990); State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Dietrich, 598 So.2d 649 (La.App. 3d Cir.1992), writ denied, 631 So.2d 448 (La.1994); State, DOTD v. Tatman, 587 So.2d 797 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991); State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Stein, 570 So.2d 513 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990). In each of the cited cases, the courts refused to apply the 1988 amendment to exprоpriation proceedings initiated prior to its effective date, finding that such would violate the principle of non-retroactivity of substantive laws. Specifically, in State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Estate of Davis, 572 So.2d at 44, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that legal interest is a matter of substantive law and a change in the law altering an award of legal
Soon thereafter, in 1992, the legislature again amended
If the amount finally awarded for compensation exceeds the amount deposited, the judgment shall include legal interest on the excess from the date of the petition аs provided in R.S. 48:442 until paid, but such interest shall not accrue on any award made for expert fees or attorney fees prior to judgment.
Hellenic argues that the trial court should have applied the 1992 amendment tо the interest provision because it is interpretive, curative and remedial. DOTD, on the other hand, relies on the Estate of Davis case, as did the trial court, for the proposition that interest is a matter of substantive law, and a change in the law altering an award of legal interest may not be applied rеtroactively. In essence, DOTD insists that the 1992 amendment, which changes the date that interest is to accrue back to the date of the “taking,” is a substantive change in the law and cannot be applied retroactively. We disagree.
First, we conclude that the Estate of Davis case is not dispositive of the issue presented to this court. That case held that the 1988 amendment to
In determining whether the 1992 amendment may be applied to these expropriation proceedings, initiated prior to its effective date, we are guided by
In the absenсe of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.
The general rule of prospective аpplication of laws, embodied in
Substantive laws establish new rules, rights and duties or change existing ones. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Smith, 609 So.2d 809, 817 (La.1992). Procedural, remedial or curative statutes relatе to the form of the proceeding or operation of the laws. Procedural acts describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering or determining rights, liabilities, or status. Curative acts are those that remove past disabilities in order to effect the true intent of the legislature. Graham v. Sequoya Corporation, 478 So.2d 1223, 1226 (La.1985).
Interpretive laws, on the other hand, merely establish the meaning the interpreted statute had from the time of its enactment. Segura v. Frank, 630 So.2d at 723. It is the original statute, not the interpretive one, that establishes the rights and duties. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Smith, 609 So.2d at 817. When an existing law is not clear, a subsequent statute clarifying or explaining the law may be regarded as interprеtive, and the interpretive statute may be given retrospective effect because it does not change, but merely clarifies pre-existing law. Id. Interpretive laws change existing standards by redefining and returning to their original meaning, providing the legislature with the opportunity to pronounce the correct interpretation to be given to existing laws. Legislation, however, which changes settled law falls outside the category of interpretive legislation. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Smith, 609 So.2d at 820.
Considering the definitions above, we conclude that the 1992 amendment to
In light of these events, we believe that the legislature did not intend to change the established law which gave the landowner interest from the date of the “taking” by utilizing the term “legal demand” in the 1988 amendment. The legislature‘s prompt response to the judiciаl interpretation supports this conclusion. In this respect, the 1992 amendment is merely interpretive, clarifying the legislature‘s intent to award interest from the date of the taking, and does not constitute a substantive change in the law. As such, it may be applied to the expropriation actions instituted рrior to its effective date without violating the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Hellenic, Inc. is entitled to interest on the excess awards from the date of the “takings.” In suit number 82,802, the judgment is amended to reflect that Hellenic is awarded $1,153,368.00 with legal interest from Nоvember 10, 1988 until paid. In suit number 88,476, the judgment is amended to reflect that Hellenic is awarded $6,895.00 with legal interest from September 6, 1991 until paid. Costs of this appeal, in the amount of $1,054.29, are assessed to appellee, State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development.
REVERSED AND RENDERED
PARRO, J., concurs with the result on constitutional grounds.