State by and Through Pender County Child Support Enforcement Agency Ex Rel. Crews v. ParkerState by and Through Pender County Child Support Enforcement Agency Ex Rel. Crews v. Parker
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Martin
Lead Opinion
The sole issue for review in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellant Aleñe Crews’ motion to intervene in an action for child support brought against defendant Parker by the State of North Carolina. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Court of Appeals.
The record establishes that Cheryl Michele Crews was born 5 April 1968 and has lived with her grandmother, appellant Aleñe Crews, since birth. Neither biological parent has ever provided support for the child. Mrs. Crews applied for public assistance from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1981. At that time she identified defendant Parker as the father of the child. The state, through the Pender County Child Support Enforcement Agency, acted upon this information in February of 1985, filing a civil complaint against defendant Parker in which it sought an adjudication of paternity, an order mandating prospective child support, and an order mandating reimbursement of past public assistance expenditures.
Defendant and the state presented a proposed settlement to the trial court for approval. This consent order provided that defendant would acknowledge paternity and agree to pay $125 per month as child support and a total of $900 as settlement of public assistance arrearages. (Actual arrearages were in excess of $2,000.) Mrs. Crews moved to intervene, alleging that the state had failed to assist her in obtaining compensation from the defendant for amounts expended during the many years she had supported the child prior to receiving public assistance. (Presuming a minimal payment of $50 per month, this claim would total about $6,000.) She requested not only that the state be enjoined from entering into any settlement which failed to take into account her claim for reimbursement of past support but also that the state be compelled to aid her in recovering such reimbursement from the defendant. The trial court denied her motion to intervene, concluding that Mrs. Crews had assigned all support rights to the state as a condition of her receipt of public assistance, including the right to compensation for past support. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention of right:
When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
We will first address the question of the effect of the statutory assignment upon Mrs. Crews’ interest. Title IV of the Social Security Act establishes AFDC and sets forth requirements that the states must meet under the Federal Child Support Enforcement Program.
assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed.
Contrary to the interpretation of the Court of Appeals, the language of
§ 110-137 . Acceptance of public assistance constitutes assignment of support rights to the State or county.
By accepting public assistance for or on behalf of a dependent child or children, the recipient shall be deemed to have made an assignment to the State or to the county from which such assistance was received of the right to any child support owed for the child or children up to the amount of public assistance paid. The State or county shall be subrogated to the right of the child or children or the person having custody to initiate a support action under this Article and to recover any payments ordered by the court of this or any other state.
(Emphasis added.)
The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 64 L.Ed. 2d 766 (1980). Recognizing that the custodian of a minor child may make a claim against the child’s parent for amounts expended in raising the child,
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court of Appeals failed to construe the phrase “up to the amount of public assistance paid.” Whether this was an oversight or a response to concerns that the state law might be in conflict with federal regulations, we shall not venture to guess. It is true that the state must administer its public assistance program in accordance with federal regulations.
Here the import of
The reliance of the Court of Appeals on Matter of Stovall, 721 F. 2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1983), is misplaced. While that case did find an Illinois assistance plan to be substantially identical to the federal AFDC requirements, it interpreted the language of
Having resolved that Mrs. Crews retained an interest in the support obligation of defendant Parker, we now consider whether the protection of this interest would be impaired within the meaning of
We have held that the state is the real party in interest in actions to recover public assistance paid for support of a child. Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E. 2d 288 (1983). In order for a prior judgment to bind Mrs. Crews, an individual not a party to the action, she must be in privity with the real party in interest. See id. Privity, for purposes of estoppel, denotes a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property. Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E. 2d 574 (1962).
Here, by virtue of the partial assignment, Mrs. Crews and the state have concurrent interests in defendant’s support obligation. However, it is not necessary to our analysis of the intervention rules that we determine whether Mrs. Crews and the state are in privity under the facts of this case. We are guided in our reasoning by the wisdom of the commentary to
In respect to subsection (2), it will be noted that the harm to the intervenor’s interest is to be considered from a “practical” standpoint, rather than technically. In other words, the intervenor need not be threatened with being bound in a strict res judicata sense.
Clearly Mrs. Crews’ interest would be impaired by any judgment involving defendant’s child support obligation which failed to take her claim for reimbursement into account, regardless of whether she would be bound by that judgment. She would, as a practical matter, suffer the expense and inconvenience of bringing a separate suit against defendant. And, although we have declined to decide if defendant’s potential claim of res judicata has merit, Mrs. Crews would be impeded by his ability to force litigation of that additional issue.
Our courts favor the swift and efficient resolution of disputes. Allowing the state to settle defendant’s obligation to pay public assistance arrearages without providing Mrs. Crews an opportunity to litigate in this action her own claim for arrearages inevitably prolongs and complicates the litigation process. This is precisely the type of situation contemplated by the rule for intervention of right. For this reason as well as those stated above, the decision of
Reversed and remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent. I believe that the Court of Appeals opinion written by Judge Martin is correct. I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals on the basis of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. I note that nowhere in Judge Martin’s opinion does he say that the language of