20 Colo. App. 139 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1904
' If there was a contract of the nature stated, and appellant violated the same by the wrongful discharge of appellee and damages resulted, he should recover.
The defense was the invalidity of the contract
Appellant is a corporation created by statute, and it's powers are thereby defined.
“The State Board of Agriculture shall be a body corporate, capable in law of suing and being sued; of taking, holding and selling personal property and .real estate; of contracting and being contracted with; of having and using a corporate seal; and of causing to be done all things necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.” — 1 Mills’ Ann. Stats., p. 411, sec. 56.
“The State Board of Agriculture shall have the general control and supervision of the State Agricultural College, the farm pertaining thereto, and the lands which may be vested in the college by state or national legislation, and of all appropriations made by the state for the support of the same. The board shall have plenary power to adopt all such ordinances, by-laws and regulations, not in conflict with law,- as they may deem necessary to secure the successful operation of the college and promote the designed objects.” — 1 Mills’ Ann. Stats., p. 414, sec. 74.
“The board shall fix the salaries of the president, professors and other employees of the college and prescribe their respective duties. The board may remove the president or subordinate officers and supply all vacancies.” — 1 Mills’ Ann. Stats., p. 414, sec. 76.
Appellant, a corporation, is thus given the general control of the state agricultural college and of all property belonging thereto, and the power of tak
The statute gives the board express power to employ professors. There is no provision thereof expressly limiting this power as to the time for which a professor may be employed; whatever limitation there may be on such power in such particular is an implied one. We know of no provision of law impliedly so limiting the power of the board, that is, prohibiting appellant from employing appellee for the term of one year. The power of the board to employ a professor for a definite time is impliedly limited to his employment for a reasonable length of time. It has not the power to employ him for an unreasonable time, but it does not appear to us that this employment for one year is for an unreasonable time. In the successful operation of the college it is necessary to make contracts of employment with various parties in the different departments connected with the college. In making such contracts the length of time for which they should run depends upon what is for the best interest of the college. We think the statute has left the determination of this question, the length of time for which the employment should be made, largely to the judgment of the board, and that such lodgment of the determination of the question is wisely made. The board is well able, as it understands the circumstances surrounding the employment, to determine whether it is for the best
“We do not think that a professor in the university is a public officer in any sense that excludes the existence of a contract relation between himself and the board of regents that employed him in respect to such employment. It seems to us that he stands in the same relation to the board that a teacher in a public school occupies with respect to the. school district by which he is employed, and that is purely a contract relation.” — Butler v. Regents, 32 Wis. 124.
“It is clear that a professor is not an officer, but an employee under contract to fill a chair of learning. Hartigan v. Board of Regents, supra.
We think according to the terms of the statute that appellant had power to employ appellee for the term of one year.
This action is to recover damages for the wrongful discharge of appellee. It is not a proceeding to prevent the removal of appellee by appellant, nor to reinstate him after removal. It is not an attempt to control appellant in the exercise of any of its discretionary powers; it is simply an attempt to hold it
Professor Meyers was an employee of appellant corporation, his relation thereto being contractual; he had the same remedy in the event of a violation of that relation by a wrongful discharge that .he would have had if his employer, appellant, had been an ordinary private corporation. While section 76, supra, gives to appellant the power to remove appellee, it does not absolve it from responsibility in damages if the discharge be wrongful. There is authority sustaining the conclusion we have reached.
In Board of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223, 229 and 230, the court being composed of Chief Justice Horton, and Justices Brewer and Valentine, Mudge was elected a professor of the Kansas Agricultural College under a contract that he should receive three months’ notice of discharge, which was an employment for at least three months. He was discharged without notice and for three months thereafter was without employment, notwithstanding his efforts to secure it. He was paid for his services to the date of discharge but nothing for the succeeding three months. He sued the board for his salary during the three months succeeding dismissal, and recovered below. The judgment was reviewed on error and affirmed. The” statute of Kansas made the board of regents a body corporate with right as such to sue and be sued, and empowered it to govern the college,
“While their powers (those of the board of regents) are extensive, still they may render their board liable by the wrongful exercise of súch power. Thus they have the unquestioned and continuing-power of employing a president, professors .and teachers whenever they may choose, and of discharging any of them whenever they may choose; but if they agree to employ a president or professor or teacher for a period of three months, and then wrongfully discharge him before the three months have elapsed, they will leave their board responsible for the whole amount of the salary for such three months, notwithstanding such discharge. While the legislature unquestionably intended to confer upon the board of regents extensive powers, yet it did not «intend to confer upon them the irresponsible power of trifling- with other men’s rights with impunity; and making the regents responsible for their acts, does not in the least abridge their powers; It only tends to make them more cautious and circumspect in the
In Board of Education v. Cook, 3 Kan. (court of appeals) 269, Miss Cook was employed by the board of education of Ottawa under a contract to teach in the public schools of that city for the ensuing year “unless sooner removed by vote of the board,” she
There the contract was with a public board and for services in a public institution. The contract with appellee has in these particulars the same characteristics. There the express contract of employment was for a definite time unless Miss Cook was sooner removed by action of the board. The implied contract of appellant with appellee was for a definite time and the statutes supplied to it the clause that appellee might be removed by the board. There is no reason of public policy for construing the contract with appellee as permitting appellant to terminate its contract with appellee at pleasure that did not apply to the contract between the board of education and Miss Cook, yet, the court there held that her discharge without good cause therefor was a violation of the contract of employment and that the board was liable in damages. The gist of the holding was that the contract for the employment of Miss Cook for a definite time as teacher in the public schools was valid and that she could not be wrongfully discharged before the expiration of the term of her employment without liability attaching to the board therefor.
If that contract was good, the one before us should be good.
School District No. 3 v. Hale, 15 Colo. 369, was an action against the school district to recover the balance due the plaintiff, Hale, under a contract employing him as a teacher for a definite period of time. The complaint set up the contract of hiring, plaintiff’s performance and his wrongful discharge. There the contract between the school district and the teacher was to teach for a definite time. It was
It seems if that contract between the board of directors of the school district and the teacher for a definite time was valid, and the board was liable for the wrongful discharge, then the contract here, employing appellee to teach for a definite time, ought to be- valid. If the fact that the contract of employment'was for a definite time was not fatal to that •contract on grounds of public policy, then it ought not to be fatal to this. In the course of the opinion the court said:
“In the statute relating to schools the board of directors is given full power to do whatever may be necessary for the due and regular management of the schools of their district. This in terms includes the hiring and discharge of teachers. This power, however, must always be exercised in' obedience to the general principles of law governing contracts of this class, unless there be some specific restriction in the statute- which prevents their application. There is nothing whatever in the statute which gives the board the' right to make a contract for a specific term, at a specified price, which shall not be subject to the legal consequences of a breach. The power of employment and discharge is not in terms beyond the control of the general law. It was always true that where a contract of hiring was entered into between two parties for a fixed period, at a definite price, the. employer could not escape liability for a discharge without "cause. ’ ’
School District v. Ross, 4 Colo. App. 493, 496, was an action by a teacher against a school district for damages on a contract of employment as teacher for a definite time. Such damages arose through a breach of the contract by her wrongful discharge
The case is at least suggestive of an absence of merit in the contention here made, that the board of regents of appellant was without power to employ appellee for a definite time. Counsel say that the law in this particular is not the same in contracts between school districts and teachers as between the board of regents and professors. No reason has been advanced why it is not the same, and we know of none.
School District v. Stone, 14 Colo. App. 211, was an action upon a contract of employment as teacher for a definite time against a school district. There was a recovery. Want of power in the board of the district to make the contract for a definite time would have defeated the action, yet this objection was not made.
In Butler v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin, supra, an action on a contract of employment for a definite time between the professor and the board of regents was sustained. Although eminent counsel appeared for the respective parties it was not suggested that the fact of the contract being for a definite time was fatal thereto.
The statute in terms authorized the making of this contract. It was made, and it was violated before its expiration by the discharge of appellee. In the absence of any showing of sufficient cause for the discharge we must for the purpose of this ruling conclude . that the discharge was wrongful, and that therefore appellant violated its contract. Appellee was damaged thereby and entitled to recover there
Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 West Virginia 491; Hartigan v. Board of Regents, 49 West Virginia 14; and Devol v. Board of Regents, 56 Pac. (Arizona) 737, are cited as contra the conclusion we have reached.
Richards v. Clarksburg was an original proceeding in the supreme court of West Virginia to prohibit the common council of the town of Clarksburg from removing from office the mayor of that town. The court denied the writ, holding that the common council possessed, upon good cause, such power of amotion. It does not follow that because the common council of a town can remove from public office its mayor for. misconduct therein, appellant can violate its contract with its mere employee, appellee, without responsibility for consequent damages.
We find nothing in the case pertinent to the question before us.
Hartigan v. Board of Regents was an original proceeding in the supreme court of West Virginia to secure a writ prohibiting the board of regents of the West Virginia university from carrying into execution a resolution passed by it removing Dr. Hartigan from a professorship therein. The writ was denied. The proceeding was to prohibit the board from carrying into effect its resolution of removal. It was not an action to recover damages for a violation by the board of any contract of employment for a definite time with Dr. Hartigan. The case does not hold that if Dr. Hartigan had a contract of employment for a definite time and the board • should remove him without cause he could not recover damages consequent upon his wrongful discharge. The writ of prohibition was denied upon three grounds: (1) The board of regents in removing Dr. Hartigan
This case contains nothing, in our judgment, contra the conclusion we have reached.
In Devol v. Board of Regents, Devol was employed by the board of regents of the University of Arizona as a professor under an agreement that he should receive three months’ notice of the termination of his employment. He was discharged without notice and without cause and sued to recover as damages his salary for the three months succeeding
We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Arizona court, or with any one of the reasons assigned therefor.
Judgment affirmed. Affirmed.