STATE of Florida, Board of Regents, As Head of Famu Demonstration School and Florida Casualty Insurance Risk Management Trust Fund, Appellants,
v.
Napolean Hosea YANT, a Minor, by and through His Mother and Nеxt Friend, Barbara Bozeman, and Barbara Bozeman, Individually, Appellees.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
*100 Thomas F. Woods of Woods, Johnston & Erwin, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Harold E. Regan, Tallahassee, for appellees.
BOYER, Judge.
We are herе called upon to construe F.S. 768.28, by which the State of Florida partially waived its sovereign immunity. The real issue now presented is the effect of F.S. 768.28(5) on derivative claims.
In April of 1975, Napolean Yant, a six year old minor, sustained severe injuries as a result of the negligence of an agency of the State of Florida, appellant here. A jury returned a verdict for the injured child in the sum of $125,000.00 and for his mother, who had sustained medical bills incident to treatment of her son in excеss of $23,000.00, a verdict of $26,000.00. Appellants, defendants in the trial court, moved for an adjudication that they not be liable for a judgment in excess of $50,000.00 under the subject statute. That motion was denied and a final judgment was entered in accordance with the jury verdict.
The relevant portion оf the subject statute provides as follows:
"(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like сircumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period prior to judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $50,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thеreof, which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $100,000. Howevеr, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be sеttled and paid pursuant to this act up to $50,000 or $100,000, as the case may be, and that portion оf the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature. The limitations of liability set forth in this subsectiоn shall apply to the state and its agencies *101 and subdivisions whether or not the state or its agеncies or subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity prior to July 1, 1974."
Although involving a different statute, this court held in Tucker v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. of Shelby, Ohio,
In a more recent case, Deрartment of Health and Rehabilitative Services, etc. v. Myrtle McDowell McDougall, etc.,
We accordingly hold that the $50,000.00 limitation of liability "to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person" (emphasis added) as provided by the statute is applicable to the clаim of the minor and the same limitation is applicable to the separate derivativе claim of the mother.
In as much as the first sentence of the above quoted statute provides that the state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" but specifically excludes liability for interest "prior to judgment" it necessarily follows that the state, its agenciеs and subdivisions, in the same manner as a private individual under like circumstances, is liable for interеst after the date of the judgment and the interest should be computed on the amount of the recovery or $50,000.00 whichever is greater and is recoverable in addition to such sum.
We have сonsidered the other point raised by appellants and find that point also to be without merit.
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C.J., and SMITH, J., concur.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
BOYER, Judge.
By petition for rehearing appellants have pointed out that although we discuss in our foregoing opinion the extent of coverage and the question of interest we have fаiled to address the question as to whether costs may be taxed against appellants undеr the circumstances of this case. We hold that the statutory limitation provided for in F.S. 768.28(5) does not apply to costs and that costs may be taxed in addition thereto to the same extent and in the same manner as were appellants private individuals under like circumstances.
Our opinion being so clarified, the petition for rehearing is denied.
McCORD, C.J., and SMITH, J., concur.